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Summary 
 
 
This thesis examines the relationships between political power, corruption, and 
witchcraft in modern Indonesia through an analysis of the discursive construction of 
these concepts in Indonesian society. The subject is approached through an observation 
of how public discourses of corruption and sorcery are used by people in an 
instrumental way to talk about and understand political processes in the country. The 
central argument of the thesis is that Indonesian society experiences contemporary 
politics in a context that combines values and practices of political modernity and 
secular rationality with those of witchcraft, sorcery, and the occult. The thesis 
demonstrates how Indonesian politics has been transformed into a modern-secular 
democracy by juxtaposing traditionalism and modernism.  Both are interconnected 
features of contemporary Indonesian modernity. 
The thesis focuses on corruption and sorcery discourses within the context of the 
political democracy that has been established in Indonesia following the collapse of the 
New Order state. There is currently a great deal of expectation that the system of 
democracy will promote public participation - in the sense that people become involved 
in political processes, that civil society becomes more effective and that the holders of 
state powers become more accountable - which should in turn curb corruption. 
Unfortunately, corruption appears to be pervasive within the new democratic polity, and 
both corruption and sorcery persist alongside the dynamics of political contestations and 
power struggles. In the light of continuing corruption practices, many groups of 
Indonesian society initiate anti-corruption movements by mobilizing social and political 
resources through collective action. Anti-corruption initiatives are taken by both state 
institutions and civil society associations, and seek to improve public governance and 
promote political reform. 
Nevertheless, non-state actors—NGOs and civil society agencies—appear to 
have become the major voices of public criticism against corruption and they have taken 
the lead in promoting anti-corruption reforms. These actors involve educated people 
from the urban middle classes: social and political activists, intellectuals, artists, poets, 
journalists, as well as religious leaders associated with Islamic organizations: the 
Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), the Muhammadiyah, and the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). It 
is argued that the ideas and practices of anti-corruption have found new spaces of 
expression under the new democratic system, and that Indonesian civil society and 
NGO activists are determined to continue their struggles to fight corruption for the 
betterment of the nation despite a great deal of opposition which is mostly political. 
They believe that the new system of political democracy will be much more beneficial 
for all Indonesian people if corruption can be eliminated from state agencies and 
political institutions. 
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‘Ah! kura-kura dalam 
perahu ..!’ 
local saying meaning that someone already knows what 
the answer is, but he keeps questioning about something 
as if he doesn’t know 
abangan  nominal, less strict Javanese Muslim 
adat local custom 
ahli hikmah a devout Muslim who acquires spiritual knowledge 
al-akhlaq al-madzmumah Arabic:  ةمومذمقلاخلأا, blameworthy, disgraced morality—
traits or attributes that are shameful and bad 
al-amin Trustworthy 
al-ma’ruf  Arabic: فورعم‎, good deeds that Islam orders one to do 
al-maslahah al-ammah the common good 
al-munkar Arabic: ركنملا, evil deeds that Islam has forbidden 
amanah the Qur’anic concept of responsibility 
Amanat Hati Nurani 
Rakyat  
the channel for the people’s conscience 
amr bil ma’ruf wa nahy an 
al-munkar 
Arabic: ركنملا نع ىهن و فورعملاب رما, to ordain the good and 
prohibit the evil 
andaru  radiant light or a white ball of light  
Anjaga tata tentreming 
praja  
a leader should make sure that people’s lives are orderly 
and peaceful 
anugerah Sang Dewa bequest of the gods 
anugerah Tuhan gift from God 
aqedah Islamic doctrine of the oneness of God 
as-shiddiq Truthful 
ayan  Epilepsy 
Bahsul Masa’il religious forums through which the ulama and leaders of 
the Nahdhatul Ulama discuss all the problems related to 
social and religious affairs among Muslim communities 
baju koko white long-hand shirt 
baku bantu mutual help 
balas jasa Payback 
barakah divine favour or benediction given by Allah Almighty to a 
pious Muslim 
batik traditional Javanese cloth created by using a manual wax-
resist dyeing technique 
batu delima ruby, garnet 
beras kuning tumeric rice 
berbudi bawa laksana, 
ambeg adil paramarta 
leader must be noble in conduct so that he is able to 
enforce justice and equality for the people 
Bethari Durga the goddess of destruction who creates misfortunes for 
people 
bid’ah innovation which does not necessarily fit in with Islamic 
norms and values 
blankon  typical Javanese hat 
buaya Crocodile 
bupati district head 
buta aksara biasa ‘conventional illiteracy’ 
vi 
 
buta aksara moral ‘moral illiteracy’ 
calo anggaran/proyek budget/business scalper  
calo politik political broker  
cicak gecko, associated with the KPK 
cukong Chinese businesspeople, Chinese tycoon 
da’wah Islamic preaching  
da’wah Islamiyah Arabic: ةيملاـسلإا ةوـعدـلا, proselytizing for Islam 
dewa-raja god-king 
dhalang  Puppeteer 
doa supplication, invocation 
dosa besar  great sin 
dukun peramal soothsayer; foreteller (person who acquires spiritual or 
mystical knowledge) 
dukun santet black magic practitioner, witch, sorcerer  
dwifungsi dual function for the Indonesian armed forces that allows 
them to take part in the civil service and in the 
management of government, in addition to the more 
conventional function of defense and security 
dzikir supplication, invocation 
Enak Dibaca dan Perlu  nice to read and needed 
fasaad Arabic: داسفلا, mischief 
fatwa edict, Islamic legal opinion 
Fiqih Korupsi Islamic jurisprudence on corruption 
firman Tuhan words of God  
gabah  unhulled paddy separated from the stalks, rice seed 
gagu Dumbness 
Ghulul Arabic: لولغ, unlawful taking from the war spoils 
[ghanimah] before they are distributed among the fighters 
or handed out to the Muslims’ common treasury 
gotong-royong co-operation 
Gusti God 
Hastabrata  eight prime characters of leadership 
ijtihad al-qiyas legal interpretation based on analogy with reference to 
scholarly works of ulama salaf (old Muslim scholars) 
ilmu hitam black magic 
ilmu putih  white magic 
iman  Islamic faith 
jahiliyya Arabic: ةيلهاج, the state of ignorance of guidance from 
God, referring to the dark period of Arab history prior to 
the advent of Islam 
jajanan pasar  various [market] snack 
jamaah  Congregation 
jamaah pengajian members of preaching  
jihad Arabic: داهج‎, a holy struggle for the sake of Allah 
jimat  Amulet 
joglo Javanese style structure of house 
Jumat (Kliwon) Friday 
kafir infidel, disbeliever (according to the Islamic faith) 
kalimat syahadat the Testament of Faith, the confession of Islamic faith 
karomah extraordinary spiritual grace 
vii 
 
kasakten  magical energy, cosmic potency 
kaum pendatang  the migrants 
kebatinan  Javanese mysticism 
kebebasan Liberty 
kejawen  Javanese-ism 
kekeluargaan family-oriented 
kekerabatan Kinship 
kekuatan jahat evil power 
kekuatan rakyat the power of people 
kembang mayang palm blossom 
kemenyan  gum, benzoine 
keris Javanese knife, double-bladed dagger 
keterbukaan  Openness 
keterlibatan  Participation 
khadam ruh typical ritual for purifying a person's mind and heart so 
that she or he can do good things and behave with good 
manners 
kiai Javanese ulama, traditional Muslim cleric  
klenik  charlatanism, things related to the supernatural world. 
kongkalikong literally an action of connivance with someone in power to 
get privileges or favours 
korban kezaliman victim of oppression  
korupsi berjamaah corruption in group, corruption committed by many 
people 
koruptor  Corruptor 
kramat holy place 
lakon  Story 
lakon wayang shadow puppet play’s story  
Lapor Dong! please kindly report to the authority 
larung sesaji drifting offering ritual taking place on river or sea 
Laut Kidul the South Sea, a legendary place for centuries because of 
its mystical attractions as Nyai Roro Kidul resides  
loyalitas tunggal exclusive loyalty (to the Soeharto regime) 
lugut itchy-bristles of bamboo 
ma’unah extraordinary spiritual knowledge and skills 
macan ompong toothless tiger 
majelis taklim community-based forum for learning about Islam 
Majelis Tarjih religious forums through which the ulama and leaders of 
the Muhammadiyah discuss all the problems related to 
social and religious affairs among Muslim communities 
malang tak bisa ditolak, 
untung tak bisa diraih  
misfortune cannot be averted, while fortune cannot be 
reached 
mantra keramat  sacred spell 
memayu hayuning 
bawawna  
leader should be involved in maintaining harmony with 
the universe 
Metrotv a private TV channel 
nasi tumpeng  cone-shaped rice cooked with coconut milk 
nasib-baik Fortune 
nasib-jelek Misfortune 
negara State 
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Nyai Loro Kidul legendary Indonesian goddess, known as the Queen of the 
Southern Sea of Java (Indian Ocean) in Javanese and 
Sundanese mythology 
orang Jawa tulen true Javanese 
orang pintar A smart person, an idiom for those who have spiritual 
knowledge and skills 
pamrih  concealed private interest/hidden personal motive 
Pandhawa brothers and 
the Korawa brothers 
famous wayang figures who represent contradictory 
characters of goodness and badness 
pandito ratu  saint-king 
pantun folk quatrain 
pawukon  Javanese horoscope 
peci haji white rimless cap 
pejabat bobrok decayed official  
pemangku adat local leader who usually takes the lead for cultural 
ceremony and ritual 
pemilu general election 
pendopo large open building in front of a Javanese mansion, or 
attached open veranda that serves as an audience hall 
pengajian  religious preaching 
pengayom Protector 
pengayoman Protection 
penyelesaian adat literally ‘customary solution’—an idiom for closing a 
scandal by removing the official involved in it from office  
penyuluh rakyat literally the torch of the people 
perjuangan besar  great struggle (to combat corruption) 
pertemanan Friendship 
perlawanan rakyat people’s resistance 
pesantren Islamic boarding school  
Piagam Indonesia Bersih Charter for Clean Indonesia 
politik uang money politics 
politisi politician  
politisi busuk rotten politician 
primbon  mythical book of Java 
pulung radiant light or a white ball of light  
pusaka magical heirlooms 
putra daerah son of the region, the native 
Ratu Adil  the Queen of Justice, the Messiah, the mythical just ruler 
reformasi era the transition period from the authoritarian New Order 
regime to a democratic politics  
restu  spiritual approval 
roh jahat  bad spirit 
ruwatan  exorcistic rite 
sabda words of the Prophet Muhammad as recorded in the 
Hadith 
sakti mondroguno  ruler with supernatural power 
saleh faithfulness, piety 
santet  Witchcraft 
santet halus  soft witchcraft 
santri pious Muslim who practises a more orthodox version of 
ix 
 
Islam 
sarong, sarung  traditional cloth for Indonesians 
Satuan Tugas 
Pemberantasan Mafia 
Hukum 
Taskforce of Judicial Mafia Eradication  
sedang dizalimi being suppressed 
Sentono Dalem inner circle of the noble family of the Kraton 
sepi ing pamrih, rame ing 
gawe 
[state officials should] refrain from indulging personal 
motives while working hard for the good of the state and 
society 
serangan sihir  sorcery attack 
shahadah Islamic witness of faith 
shalat  prayer, worship 
shari’a  Islamic law 
shirik polytheism (according to the Islamic faith) 
sihir Sorcery 
silaturahmi informal gathering  
slametan communal feast, a kind of social gathering and ritual  
suap-menyuap bribe-giving and bribe-taking 
suara hati rakyat the heartfelt voice of the people 
sukerto  Javanese: bad luck 
Sunnah Arabic: ةنس‎, authoritative tradition, habitual action and 
norm referring to the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and 
practices 
tampah  round woven bamboo trays 
tangan kotor  dirty hands 
tapa ascetic meditation 
tawheed doctrine of monotheism; the belief in God, the One and 
Only 
tazkiyah al-nafs purification of the soul, spiritual purification  
tebang pilih literally cutting down selectively, an idiom used to 
describe the unfairness of the way the authorities impose 
the law 
teluh  Sorcery 
Tobat Nasional  National Repentance 
tukang sihir sorcerer, witch 
uang pelicin literally ‘greasy money’—an idiom for bribe, kickback, 
payoff  
uang terima kasih money given to someone in return of getting contracts or 
help 
uang rokok literally money for cigarettes—an idiom for a ‘buyoff’ 
ulama Muslim scholar  
ulama salaf old Muslim scholar 
umm al-qadhayat Arabic: نيويقلا ّمأ, mother of all grave problems; severely 
damaging public morality and weakening the government 
system 
ummah Arabic: ةمأ‎, Muslim community 
upeti gift, present 
ustadz Muslim teacher 
wahyu divine radiance, a sort of spiritual sign that one might be 
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chosen to be a ruler 
wali  Saint 
wangsit  spiritual hint 
Warta Ekonomi a weekly magazine 
wayang  shadow puppet play 
wibawa  Charisma 
wuku bolo  innate power of the devil 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
1. Background  
This thesis seeks to explore the relationships between political power, corruption, and 
witchcraft in modern Indonesia through an analysis of the discursive construction of 
these concepts in Indonesian society. The subject is approached through an observation 
of how public discourses of corruption and sorcery are used by people in an 
instrumental way to talk about and understand the social and political processes in the 
country. Corruption mostly involves those occupying public offices and holding state 
powers, but it is difficult to investigate directly such illicit activities since they are 
clandestine, as is the practice of witchcraft. The actual practice of both corruption and 
witchcraft is mostly beyond empirical investigation, and thus an appropriate way of 
studying them is through people’s talk. Both witchcraft and corruption have some 
features in common in the sense that they can be used as a means of accessing power 
and accumulating material wealth. However, people usually react to these phenomena 
differently which result in controversy. They also always occur in concealed places and 
with full of secrecy so that the only way to understand and observe them is through 
representation. The representation takes the form of public narratives through which 
people talk about the subjects that are often imbued with rumours and gossip as the two 
seem to be the main characteristics of sorcery and corruption.   
The thesis focuses on corruption and sorcery discourses within the context of 
political democracy which was established in Indonesia following the collapse of 
Soeharto’s New Order. There is a great deal of expectation that the system of 
democracy will promote public participation in the sense that people become involved 
in political processes, social civil society becomes more effective, and the holders of 
state powers become more accountable, which should eventually result in the decrease 
of corruption. Political democracy is widely viewed as a means of governance reform in 
response to popular aspirations for equal relations between the state and society, 
replacing the old-centralized and despotic government of the New Order regime that 
was widely seen as corrupt. Initially, the rationale for democratic reform was that it 
would promote more rational and efficient forms of modern government in which there 
would be no space for corruption. Unfortunately, what has happened is that corruption 
appears to be pervasive within the new democratic polity and that corruption and 
sorcery persist alongside the dynamics of political contestation and power struggles. In 
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the light of continuing corruption practices, many groups of Indonesian society initiate 
anti-corruption movements by mobilizing social and political resources through 
collective action. Indeed, anti-corruption initiatives have become the primary agenda of 
Indonesians including religious community. Within the context of religious groups, 
these people also join public campaigns against corruption clearly demonstrating a 
common interest of many Indonesians. As is well known, the vast majority of 
Indonesian people (about 87.2 per cent) are Muslim, but there are also adherents to 
Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Furthermore, there are a 
diversity of indigenous religions embraced by Indonesians in Java and other parts of the 
country. Within several areas within Java, there are religious beliefs accommodating 
elements of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Animism.  Anthropologists specializing in Java 
have their own terms to describe these indigenous religions, such as ‘Agami Jawi’ 
(Koentjaraningrat 1985a) or ‘Agama Asli Jawa’ (the original religion of Java) in the 
case of Hindu Javanese Tengger (Hefner 1985). Nevertheless, for the purpose of anti-
corruption activism, Islamic organizations and Muslim leaders collaborate with 
Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus and have organized themselves into a group called 
Perkumpulan Pemuka Lintas-Agama (Association of Interfaith  Leaders). This group 
has emerged as the focal point of public anti-corruption campaigns.     
Yet anti-corruption initiatives are taken by both state institutions and civil 
society associations with the use of various modes, which are aimed at improving public 
governance and promoting political reform. In parallel with the establishment of the 
democratic system, anti-corruption reforms have emerged in the political scene that 
have been pioneered by educated people from the urban middle classes. In this context, 
the reason why I am interested in researching the subject is because I share with them 
the idea of democracy and the aspiration of democratic politics, and hope this research 
will contribute to strengthening democratic political transformation in the country. 
     
2. Aims, Scope and Contribution of the Research  
The primary aim of this research is therefore to investigate representations of corruption 
and sorcery through examining how people talk about corruption and its complexities. It 
must be stressed from the beginning that this research is not concerned with the actual 
practices of corruption and sorcery (although inevitably they have to be taken into 
account), but with the discourses which surround them and how these discourses might 
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be understood. However, this research does look at discourses and practices of anti-
corruption as they appear in the realm of Indonesian politics. This will involve situating 
corruption and sorcery discourses within the wider context of political power and 
relationships, and a wide range of actors such as state officials, politicians, bureaucrats, 
businesspeople and political brokers who establish strong networks among themselves.  
One important aspect of this research involved examining how the dynamics of 
political power has inadvertently created a context where witchcraft, corruption, and 
anti-corruption—both as practices and as discourses—flourish and are construed by 
Indonesian society. It approaches the process of political change in contemporary 
Indonesia from a cultural perspective, which stresses corruption and sorcery as major 
elements in the ways in which Indonesian people understand their changing power 
structures and perceive political transformation under the framework of a democratic 
system. The main contribution of this research is therefore to enrich the study of urban 
politics in the context of Indonesian modern democracy, in which urban elite politicians 
rest on corruption and resort, whether symbolically or in actual practice, to witchcraft, 
the occult, and other rituals by manipulating supernatural forces for political purposes. 
The country’s urban politics enlivened with supernatural magic has not so far been the 
subject of anthropological research so that this study is likely to be the first research in 
the context of modern democracy in Indonesia. 
 
 
3. Research Questions 
As indicated in the title of the thesis, the subjects of political power, corruption and 
witchcraft are the central focus of examination. Sorcery and corruption are connected 
with the dynamics of political power in the sense that both play a part in the struggle 
over power and political contest for public office. This research will therefore address 
some research questions and they will be thoroughly discussed in the thesis. There are 
two central questions with three sub-questions for each that guided the research: 
(1) In which ways are magic and witchcraft key to the dynamics of political 
contestation and the struggle over power? 
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The sub-questions are the following: 
 Why are mystical beliefs and values important in Indonesian politics while 
the country has already embraced a modern democratic system?  
 How do magic and witchcraft play a role in social and political processes in 
the world of Indonesian politics? 
 How do sorcery and corruption produce different moralities and how do 
people conceive moral ambiguity embedded within them? 
(2) How is the issue of corruption understood by people and how do they relate it to 
both religious beliefs and secular values? 
The sub-questions are the following: 
 What are the roots of anti-corruption activisms and what forms do they 
take? 
 How is anti-corruption activism organized and what outcomes do social 
political activists and proponents of Indonesian civil society seek to reach? 
 Why are anti-corruption practices important and how do they affect social 
and political behaviours of both state actors and people in general?     
All these research questions are essential to the whole discussion of the thesis, and each 
chapter will address them with the use of ethnographic materials that have been 
enriched with the existing literature in support of the discussion. Hence, in order to 
provide a general understanding of the topics of the thesis, the literature review should 
first be presented as it covers some essential themes related to the research. 
4. Literature Review 
4.1 Researching Corruption and Witchcraft through Discourse and 
Narrative  
 
As mentioned, the approach applied to research corruption and witchcraft is through 
representation with the use of discourse and narrative. For this, discourse is used as a 
way of understanding how corruption takes place in state agencies and public 
institutions, while narrative is utilized as a way of expressing one’s personal experience 
related to witchcraft. Yet both discourse and narrative can therefore be called a social 
instrument employed by people to conceive the socio-cultural phenomena of corruption 
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and witchcraft. They are useful as a medium of articulating ideas and thoughts about a 
particular subject and of expressing feelings, emotions, stories, etc. that help people 
perceive reality and understand events they experience.  
Narratives of corruption are among the ways through which Indonesian society 
tries to understand how someone accesses power and amasses wealth. In fact, corruption 
has become a controversial issue as people talk about this grave problem in their daily 
social lives. Corruption-talk may take place in the social sphere aimed at understanding 
the world of politics, which instigates public discourse. In this regard, it is interesting to 
observe how the public discourse of corruption is always connected with the idea of 
political democracy which has just recently thrived in the country. The aspirants of 
democracy believe that it is the best political system for promoting social prosperity 
among citizens after the very long autocratic system under the New Order state. But 
corruption undermines the functioning system of political democracy; corruption 
weakens the capacity of the state to deliver its jobs in bringing social welfare to the 
people. This is the reason why the issue of corruption is important as the subject of 
research, as Akhil Gupta has pointed out: “Corruption emerges as a critically important 
area to study, because narratives of corruption help shape people’s expectations of what 
states can and will do, and how bureaucrats will respond to the needs of citizens” 
(2005:190). In this respect, narratives of corruption become the key form of cultural 
expression to criticize the misuse of public office and challenge power establishment as 
how Indonesian citizens organize strong social-political opposition against corrupt 
bureaucratic politics. 
Furthermore, the public narrative provides an opportunity to investigate 
corruption by looking at the representation of the state and analyzing the everyday 
practices of state bureaucracies and public offices. Through corruption narratives people 
can also construe the discursive construction of the state power in public culture as a 
zone of socio-cultural debate conducted through, for instance, the media, public talk in 
the social arena, etc. Both narrative and discourse as a representation are particularly 
worthwhile since they can be applied hand in hand for researching corruption. Such 
approaches can be employed based upon storytelling by referring to some features of 
social life and observing how and why people use corruption as the subject of daily life 
stories, as some scholars believe that a good discursive analysis of corruption depends 
to large part on its stories, even if they are not narrated in the text but just in oral stories 
(e.g. Gupta [1995] 2006, 2005a, 2005b; Turner 2007; Blundo 2007). Indeed, narratives 
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of corruption through the media and storytelling are very supportive of an 
anthropological research explaining how private connections, personal relations, and 
social networks govern everyday society (Haller & Shore 2005; Smith 2007). In this 
sense, investigation through media agencies as a way of observing corruption is very 
important, since newspapers, magazines, and TV channels play a significant part in 
narrating corruption and how corruption narratives are reproduced. They are perhaps the 
most vital vehicle for the dissemination of public discourse on corruption.  
Discourse is always based on organized knowledge and structured narratives 
which involves arguments and the exchange of ideas to develop understanding and 
meaning about a specific subject. With reference to Foucault, discourse is a system of 
thought that operates in the mind of human beings and applies to social actions that 
functions as a medium of power relations to maintain domination with the use of 
knowledge. With the term power-knowledge, Foucault (1980) argued that power and 
knowledge are intertwined with each other suggesting that knowledge is both the 
producer of power and the product of power. In this context, discourse of corruption is 
connected with power relations as corruption itself takes place in power structures and 
is related to the struggle over power. Discourse of corruption is therefore associated 
with how power is contested in a political arena as corruption is all about politics; 
indeed there is no politics without corruption. Here, parties involved in the contest then 
make an arrangement for negotiation of power for their political establishment. Like 
discourse, narrative also deals with meaning and power, as Edward Bruner puts it: 
“Narratives are not only structures of meaning but also structures of power as well” 
(1986:144). A narrative is a way of telling a story or a report with the use of 
communication modalities and language activities to represent histories, events, 
moments, objects, and whatever with an attempt to explain them or to persuade others 
of their relevance in regard to such stories or reports (e.g. Genette 1980; White 1987; 
Ochs 1997). When a story is narrated, discerned and contextualized with actual events 
or social practices, it is transformed into a discourse. Thus, narratives become a cultural 
medium of telling a story that leads to how discourse takes place. Within the narrative 
there are several elements connected to one another: story, telling, and discourse which 
are developed in a structured account and discursive analysis. In Ethnography as 
Narrative (1986), Bruner points out:  
The key elements in narrative are story, discourse, and telling. The story is the abstract 
sequence of events, systematically related, the syntagmatic structure. Discourse is the 
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text in which the story is manifested, the statement in a particular medium such as a 
novel, myth, lecture, film, conversation, or whatever. Telling is the action, the act of 
narrating, the communicative process that produces the story in discourse. (Bruner 
1986:145) 
 
Bruner’s explanations clearly suggest that ethnographic work can be conceived as 
narrative in the sense that “ethnographies are guided by an implicit narrative structure, 
by a story we tell about the peoples we study” (Bruner 1986:139). This can therefore be 
asserted that ethnographic research is a product of the systematic work of scholarship 
through studying people along with their cultures, and anthropologists then narrate them 
as they become the interlocutors of the cultures of those people. Here, ethnographic 
narrative is constituted and interpreted by anthropologists as ethnographies are 
interpretations (Geertz 1973, 1983).  
In this context, the ethnographic materials I collected from the field are partly in 
the form of the experiences of individuals (e.g. witchcraft attacks, sacred rituals, 
mystical meditation); and such experiences are subjective and self-referential in nature. 
Yet subjective experiences appear in the form of narrative through which the individual 
expresses his/her own stories, thoughts, expectations, feelings, and others. In this 
respect, Indonesian society has experienced a secular-modern democracy which allows 
citizens to take part in and exercise democratic power. Here, political discourse of 
secular-modern democracy emerges in a social space alongside the public narratives of 
witchcraft and occult politics; sorcery narratives go along with imaginative 
transformations of democratic politics. Witchcraft narratives thus seem to be a counter-
discourse of the secular-modern democracy in the sense that people may become 
involved in political contests with the help of supernatural magic. However, sorcery 
narratives and the occult take the form of the individual’s experience. In the 
anthropology of experience, some anthropologists (see Turner & Bruner 1986) consider 
that ethnography is about cultural narrative in which personal experience expressed in a 
story becomes the centre of the representation of reality. Considering experience as the 
subject of anthropological study, those anthropologists attempt to explore how people 
experience their culture and how those experiences are sensed and expressed in various 
forms such as narrative, cultural product, sacred ritual, life history, etc. Nevertheless, 
subjective experience would be meaningful and sound to others if it refers to social 
practice or if others share a similar experience which makes it become a collective 
experience. But the experience itself is usually based on the reality in which individual 
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observes events and receives them with mindfulness and therefore a “lived experience, 
as thought and desire, as word and image, is the primary reality” (Bruner 1986:5). 
The public discourse of corruption and witchcraft narratives, being the subject of 
this research, are situated in the world of politics. For this, understanding the nature of 
Indonesian politics is important in providing a background to how corruption and 
witchcraft are embedded in the country’s politics.  
           
4.2   Indonesian Politics: A Brief Overview 
Since Indonesia proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945, it has experienced 
different types of political systems, both authoritarianism and democracy. Soekarno, the 
first president of the new republic, ruled the country for twenty-one years during which 
he applied liberal democracy between 1950 and 1959 which was represented by a multi-
party system with a very sharp political cleavage and ideological orientation. This 
resulted in an unstable government as political consensus was very hard to settle and the 
cabinet changed almost every month. Fed up with such situations, Soekarno then turned 
to authoritarianism until he resigned from office in 1966 which was preluded by a series 
of huge political turmoil. The Old Order, the very common notion of Soekarno’s 
government, was then replaced by a new government called the New Order. The 
emergence of the New Order was preceded by a severe politico-ideological conflict in 
1965-1966 which involved the military, the Communist party, Nationalist and Islamic 
parties, socio-religious organizations, political actors and civilians. This led to bloody 
social riots and political upheavals which left hundreds of thousands of Indonesians 
dead. Such bitter conflict paved the way for the military, led by General Soeharto, to 
take over the government and establish the New Order state. Within the New Order 
state, the role of the military was dominant. The armed forces were not only charged 
with national defence and security, but also with guaranteeing political stability and 
social order for the sake of national integration. They claimed to maintain the 
domination of the state under the doctrine of dwifungsi (dual function). This doctrine 
stipulated that the armed forces, because of their role in the struggle for the country’s 
independence, had a double function which allowed them to take part in the civil service 
and in the management of government, in addition to the more conventional function of 
defence and security (e.g. Jenkins 1984; Crouch 1988; Singh 1990; Said 1992; 
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Kingsbury 2003). In the course of Indonesian politics, the involvement of the armed 
forces in government affairs eventually led to a military regime as Liddle (1999) puts it:  
The armed forces implemented the interventionist dual-function doctrine by placing 
active and retired military personnel in the assembly, parliament, and provincial and 
district legislatures; in executive and staff positions in central, provincial, and district 
administration; in positions of formal and informal authority over Golkar—[an 
abbreviation of Golongan Karya, functional groups playing as the military’s party]; and 
by keeping the population under surveillance through territorial commands that covered 
the country from Jakarta to the outermost islands and down to every village. (Liddle 
1999:44-5) 
  
Within the highly-centralized New Order state, the effective government relied on the 
armed forces which presented themselves as a modern institution surpassing all other 
state agencies in importance. The military presented itself not just as a formal 
organization but also claimed to enshrine the soul of the nation and, not surprisingly, 
became the largest political organization in the country (Vatikiotis 1993:60-91) which 
exerted a tremendous influence on many aspects of social life. Since they held such 
huge power and enjoyed profound effects on the polity, the military was pejoratively 
dubbed as the “strongest political party” in Indonesia. Not surprisingly, the state 
structures and political organizations grew greatly during the New Order period and 
every single administrative unit of the government and the political parties were obliged 
to have ‘loyalitas tunggal’ (exclusive loyalty to the Soeharto government) reflecting the 
regime’s patrimonial culture in which opposition and competition were strictly 
forbidden in exchange for the allocation of economic resources. Moreover, the New 
Order regime developed into what Richard Robison (1990) calls the ‘military 
bureaucratic state’. Under the politically-centralized system of the New Order state, 
there were no possibilities and chances for popular initiatives within civil society. 
Rather, it gave abundant opportunities and privileges for the state institutions, controlled 
by the single ruling party, Golkar, to intervene and make all strategic decisions on 
behalf of the citizens. All public policies and administrative affairs were left in the 
hands of the central government. The domination of the Golkar Party and the absence of 
public control were crucial in providing a context in which corrupt practices flourished, 
but at the same time the New Order regime was remarkably successful in encouraging 
and sustaining economic development and maintaining political stability (Hill 1990; 
Liddle 1996; Emmerson 1999).  
Nevertheless, despite a certain degree of success in economic terms on the part 
of the New Order regime, political oppression, restrictions on public life, and limitations 
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on civil liberties and political freedom did not promote the quality of people’s lives. 
This led to discontent spreading amongst the Indonesian population. After controlling 
the country for over three decades, the New Order state eventually came to an end in 
May 1998 because of strong pressure from the grassroots made manifest in a series of 
social protests and political movements throughout the country. Its collapse was due to 
a number of factors, but the most significant one was that it was seen as highly corrupt, 
and state institutions were being associated with what became known as KKN—
Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme (corruption, collusion, nepotism). Worse, corruption was 
deeply ingrained in the New Order regime that concentrated power in the hands of 
Soeharto, his family and his cronies. In addition, in 1997, a severe economic crisis hit 
the country which contributed to a weakening of the New Order and was effectively 
used by the Soeharto’s opponents as a way of precipitating regime change. Following 
the collapse of the New Order government, the democratization process begun 
flourishing as seen in the alteration of the political system. The country’s political 
architecture had fundamentally altered and the change was unprecedented in the modern 
history of the nation, moving considerably from authoritarianism and centralization of 
power to democracy and devolution of state power. The new systems of politics and 
government were created along with a series of amendments to the 1945 Constitution. 
Significant changes include (1) the adoption of a multi-party system, (2) president/vice 
president and MPs are elected directly by the people, (3) the period of office of the 
presidency is strictly limited to only two terms of five years each, (4) the rejection of the 
military being involved in politics and civil service, and (5) the implementation of 
political decentralization and regional autonomy.  
Keeping with the presidential system, the body of Indonesia’s political system is 
established through an institution called the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, 
the People’s Consultative Assembly). As a result of profound constitutional reforms, the 
MPR was formed as the political body housing the two chambers of Parliament: the 
House of Representatives with 560 seats and the Regional Representatives Council with 
132 seats. Applying the system of representative democracy, Indonesia adopted a multi-
party system with nine political parties.
1
 Despite the fact that representative democracy 
                                                 
1
 Based on the 2009 general elections, nine political parties shared 560 seats in the Parliament with 
various portions for each party. The Democrat Party, the Golkar Party, and the Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle appeared to be the three biggest parties with a share of 148, 106, and 94 seats 
respectively. In the middle position were the Justice and Prosperity Party (57 seats), the National Mandate 
Party (45 seats), the United Development Party (38 seats) and the National Awakening Party (28 seats); 
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has been in place, Indonesia’s multi-party system remains volatile since it has not been 
well-established so political parties remain weakly institutionalized (see e.g. Ufen 2008; 
Tomsa 2010). Rather, parties orientate to strong political figures and rely on their 
personal charisma. Instead of strengthening structures and institutions, parties appear to 
become personalistic in the sense that they are greatly dependent on charismatic 
political leaders. Given the fact that patronage in the multi-party system is very strong, 
it can be argued that what applies in Indonesia is no doubt a paternalistic political 
democracy. Here are Carothers’s observations:  
Indonesia’s main political parties remain almost archetypical embodiments of the 
standard lament about parties—they are intensely leader-centric organizations dominated 
by a small circle of elite politicians who hold onto their positions atop parties seemingly 
indefinitely are immersed in patronage politics, and who are far more devoted to political 
intrigues in the capital than the prosaic work of trying to listen to and represent a base of 
constituents. (Carothers 2006:175) 
       
What Carothers observed basically shows the shortcomings of Indonesia’s multi-party 
system since it is based on patronage politics that paves the way for corruption through 
patron-client relationships (as will be addressed in the next section). The issue of 
corruption emerges in public discourse along with the application of the multi-party 
system that demands a high financial cost of politics. Dirk Tomsa (2010) has raised the 
problem:  
Closely related to the perpetual problem of corruption is the increasing commercialization of 
electoral politics. The trend has not only affected the image of Indonesia’s parties, but also 
transformed the role they play in the recruitment of political [elites and cadres]. The need to 
mobilize huge amounts of money in order to run for parliament or head executive posts such 
as governor, mayor, or district head has made it ever more difficult for ordinary citizens to 
become involved in politics. (Tomsa 2010:148) 
    
Tomsa’s assessment indicates that to reach political positions through democratic 
elections is too costly, and this is the crux of the problem of Indonesia’s democracy 
which prevents ordinary citizens from having a chance to compete for public positions. 
In dealing with this problem, politicians simply commit corruption for the sake of 
public office. Not surprisingly, corruption increases considerably within the democratic 
system. At the onset, it is believed that a democratic system would promote responsible 
and accountable government, assuming that public control—through civil society, 
NGOs, social political associations, the media, and other critical groups—works well. 
The situations would hopefully lead to the decrease of corruption and other forms of 
                                                                                                                                               
and the two smallest parties were the Great Indonesia Movement Party (26 seats) and the People’s 
Conscience Party (18 seats).  
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illicit practices in public institutions. Unfortunately since the turn of the Soeharto 
regime, corruption has been continuously expanding and seems to have worsened since 
the adoption of the new system of political democracy. Corruption seems to be 
embedded in the system as it is found everywhere in almost all government agencies, 
regardless of what type of regime rules the country. Since the fall of the Soeharto 
regime, the state ruler has changed four times but the main characters are still the same 
and corruption is deep-rooted in the state powers. The change of regime had also 
produced numerous new elite politicians, while the old elite groups were still there who 
formed another bloc of political alignments and occupied the state powers, but now 
through a legitimate way, that is, the democratic political system. Corruption therefore 
stays in state bodies involving state actors—officials and politicians—and it is 
necessary to define and analyze corruption for this research.  
  
4.3   Corruption as an Analytical Category 
Defining ‘corruption’ in any universalistic sense is probably impossible. Perhaps the 
most general definition would stress the lack of legitimacy, and thus what is corrupt 
within one context may not be seen as corrupt in another. Similarly, the value 
judgments that are implicit in any discussion of corruption may well end up as 
arguments over the legitimacy of different ideological positions. Most discussions of 
corruption are premised on the existence of bureaucratic forms of governance within the 
public and the private sectors in which there is a clear distinction between the office and 
the incumbent. Thus, government officials who use their office as a means of self-
aggrandizement are seen as corrupt. So too are employees of private sector companies 
who use their positions to further their own personal interests rather than the interests of 
the company that employs them. Corruption, in this sense, is very much part of a wider 
set of concepts and values which, in total, form a particular model of modernity, very 
much based on a Weberian ideal of bureaucratic rationality.  
Yet such an image of corruption is specific to a particular cultural context—that 
of ‘modernity’.  In other contexts, most obviously the ‘pre-modern’ world in which such 
distinctions between office and incumbent are less pronounced, the concept of 
corruption is more blurred. People from different cultures have their own definition of 
corruption and each society with diverse cultural backgrounds may propose distinct 
concepts of the things that might or might not be categorized as corruption. Certainly, 
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corruption is a changing phenomenon in which some of its aspects are culturally 
specific and its conceptualization is often affected by personal interest, individual 
preference, cultural values, local customs, social norms, or socio-economic status 
(Pardo 2004; Shore & Haller 2005; Barr & Serra 2006). This raises the issue of cultural 
relativism, illustrating that different cultures need to be understood in their own terms, 
and should not be judged by the standards of others. The doctrine of cultural relativism 
has been very dominant in public discourses on corruption especially in developing 
countries. Behaviour that seems to be corrupt (e.g. giving jobs to relatives or favouring 
one’s kinsmen when allocating public resources), according to the standards of Western 
capitalist countries, may be entirely acceptable as familial obligations in other societies 
in, say, Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Here, cultural values ascribed to corruption 
could be relative depending on how society perceives them and how they are practised 
in social life. Considering the various concepts of corruption, John Gledhill has made an 
important remark that “…corruption must not merely be analyzed in a moralizing 
framework but must also be seen as a mode of exercising power within complex social 
and political settings that must be analyzed carefully and in their historical and cultural 
specificity” (2004:156).  
Therefore, one should focus on the problems of meaning and representation by 
looking at the way people use cultural idioms to understand corruption and how it is 
brought into public discourse through debates, media and social disputes. This leads on 
to the challenge of how to understand seemingly corrupt behaviour within political 
structures organized in terms of patron-client ties or associated with the idea of the 
patrimonial state. The patrimonial state refers to a model of politics in which the 
structures of government bureaucracies are hierarchical and stratified, and in which 
high-ranking officials are assigned public offices largely on the basis of their loyalty to 
the ruler rather than to any special administrative competence and merit. Within this 
system, proximity to the ruler is a major consideration in appointing officials who 
ultimately become personal agents and confidants within the framework of patronage 
relation. Originally found in non-bureaucratic societies, patronage is an informal 
relation between people of different social and economic status—the ‘patron’ who is 
both wealthy and powerful, and the ‘client’ who is a dependent, follower, or protégé. 
This type of relationship is usually characterized by an imbalanced position between the 
two parties reflecting their unsymmetrical roles (e.g. Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984; 
Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2006). Here James Scott clearly delineates: 
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The patron-client relationship—an exchange relationship between roles—may be defined 
as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship 
in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence 
and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status 
(client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, 
including personal services, to the patron. (Scott 1977a:125)      
Undoubtedly, patrons and clients are generally unequal in the acquisition of both 
economic resources and political powers in which the former is obviously superior to 
the latter in his capacity to grant valuable things; and such superiority creates the so-
called ‘lop-sided friendship’ (e.g. Gellner 1977; Wolf 1977; Scott 1977b). The patron 
exercises power and influence in favour of the clients who are obliged to reciprocate in 
the forms of political support, donation, loyalty, service and the like. As a result, there is 
a permanent pattern to the patron-client relationship involving favouritism and 
responsibility between the parties. At this point, it could be argued that patronage 
systems are ‘corrupt’ involving as they do situations where there is no distinction 
between office and incumbent and where goods, services, resources, jobs and favours 
are all distributed in terms of personal relationships. Yet to see such practices as 
‘corrupt’ is to use a concept derived from one particular political context of Weberian 
modernity to judge another.  
Looked at from a slightly different point of view, there is a lot of 
anthropological literature on the gift, which again throws into question the degree to 
which corruption, as a universal category, can be used. In many—if not all—societies, 
gift exchange is a central feature of social life, and the exchange of gifts is associated 
with a strong morality of obligation. Gift-exchange symbolizes intimate social 
interaction amongst society members, as reciprocity is a matter of morality in regards to 
social relationships expressing the social closeness among them (Ferraro 2006:192). 
Such cultural practices are particularly important between a ruler or power holder and 
subordinates, and symbolize not only obedience and loyalty but also respect and moral 
regard from the latter to the former. This notion can be attached to a classical theory 
propounded by Marcel Mauss ([1954] 2006) who argued that gift-exchange is 
obligatory. He delineates a universal reciprocal structure for gift-giving explaining that 
a gift symbolizes the social status of the gift-giver, and the act of giving symbolizes the 
relationship between the gift-giver and the receiver. The act of giving in some way 
necessitates a reciprocal gift if the involved parties need to maintain social relations. If 
one party does not reciprocate it can indicate a signal of the end of the relationship. 
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Therefore, gift-giving often takes on a cyclical form and is a fundamental way that 
human societies are willing to continue social relationships.  
Mauss vividly described the moral obligations of gift-giving at three levels. 
First, the obligation to give gifts is to preserve authority, if one is a clan chief, and to 
maintain a high rank among the chiefs of tribe, as well as to show oneself as generous 
and thus deserving of respect. Second, the obligation to accept gifts is to express respect 
and sincerity to the giver, and concurrently confirms one’s own generosity showing that 
one is not afraid of having to reciprocate. Third, the obligation to reciprocate the gift is 
to demonstrate that one’s honor is comparable with that of the initial giver (pp.50-54). 
In regards to this, Douglas (2006) points out that: “each gift is part of a system of 
reciprocity in which the honor of giver and recipient are engaged” (p.xi). As a result, 
gift-giving is connected with the spirit of morality; and by giving, accepting, and 
reciprocating gifts there is a moral bond between the individuals who exchange gifts, 
since gift-exchange is meant as a way people create social relations and develop mutual 
interdependence between the parties involved. Gift-exchange is indeed the mechanism 
of establishing and strengthening social bonds, which results in social cohesion and 
solidarity among society’s members. It is the way through which enduring social 
relations are established and maintained.  
Nonetheless, an important caveat must be emphasized here. In societies that are 
organized in terms of a modern bureaucratic framework, the giving of gifts to public 
officials may create situations where there is a clash of moralities—one stressing the 
theme of social obligation between the people involved in the exchange; the other 
stressing the separation between office and the incumbent who should not confuse his 
personal duties and social obligations with the obligations of office. In these contexts, 
corruption as a narrative and symbolic system often creates conflicting statements about 
legality and illegality, proper and improper conducts, or moral and ethical behaviours 
which are subject to debate (Gupta 2005; Pardo 2004) as in the case of gift-exchange. 
Within the exchange system, gift-giving should not go beyond its social function which 
implies moral obligation for a balanced reciprocity referring to the social values and 
cultural standards of the society. Otherwise, the gift-exchange mode will be used to 
violate norms and rules that watch over social conducts. Yet it should not be misled 
with the gift-exchange system as some people wrongly or inappropriately conceive of 
this to cover up the practice of bribe-giving and bribe-taking. Corrupt officials and 
politicians even justify those kinds of misconducts with reference to the tradition of gift-
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exchange which is very commonplace within society in which patron-client 
relationships among its members are very strong. In this respect, since anthropology is 
concerned with understanding rules and social norms, anthropologists need to discover 
these cultural codes by “[examining] instances where they are violated, how people 
react to such transgression, and how actors negotiate between different norms and rules” 
(Shore & Haller 2005:8). As a result, it is important to raise the intricate issues of 
morality, cultural values, and legal aspects into public discourses on corruption, since 
every society has distinct concepts of morality and legality and cultural standards as 
well (Pardo 2000; Pardo 2004; Gupta [1995] 2006). The difficulty of defining 
corruption in the view of different societies and cultures emerges in the anthropological 
studies as seen in Jordan Smith’s A Culture of Corruption (2007) arguing: 
[…] because most anthropologists aim to understand human motives and behaviour at least in 
part from the perspectives of the people they study, social processes that political scientists 
typically describe as corruption often appear in the anthropological literature under the 
rubrics such as gift exchange, moral economies, reciprocity, and patronage. Anthropology’s 
emphasis on local rationalities and cultural logics, and the largely sympathetic sensibility of 
anthropologists regarding their subjects, produces a disinclination to attach a seemingly 
derogatory Western label like corruption to the behaviour of non-Western peoples. (Smith 
2007:9-10)  
       
Having considered all those arguments, it is more than clear that corruption is very 
complex and understanding corruption is deeply affected by the cultural values of a 
society. What is and is not corrupt is a matter of dispute, not just among people within 
one single culture but also between competing moralities. Such conflicting moralities 
are seen in how corruption discourses emerge in a context where gift-giving, patronage, 
etc. govern social relations and make such exchanges legitimate. Given the practical 
difficulties of investigating instances of what may to some, but not to others, be 
corruption makes ‘corruption talk’ the obvious focus of research for here the contrasting 
moralities and the contexts in which they are developed can be defined. As corruption 
drives ambiguous attitudes, so does sorcery in that it also instigates contesting 
moralities as seen in how people are in conflict between denouncement and 
enthrallment. It is therefore necessary to look at how corruption and sorcery are 
connected with each other. 
  
4.4   The Relationship between Corruption and Sorcery 
Without a doubt, corruption is closely connected with state power and exploring 
corruption-talk is one of the ways of understanding the world of politics. How people 
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construct ideas of the state and perceive political life depends to some degree on how 
they conceive corruption through its accusations. In other words, corruption has a very 
close relationship with the imagination of the state power, since corruption mostly 
involves state officials who develop very complex and hierarchical links and intricate 
networks within government structures. Accordingly, public discourse on corruption 
can in reality open up thoughts, perceptions, and attitudes of the people towards the 
state as a public institution.  
Similarly, sorcery is concerned with the issues of power and political contest, 
personal conflict, social vengeance, misfortune, and the need to blame others for the bad 
events within the life of society. Sorcery-talk is often used as an idiom by which social 
conflict is expressed. Many anthropological studies of sorcery focus on the relationship 
between sorcery accusations and social tensions whilst another series of studies focus 
on the role of sorcery beliefs in the understanding of individual misfortune and social 
processes. Witchcraft and sorcery are therefore seen as cultural idioms and allegories in 
explaining problems and offering an alternative solution to those misfortunes (e.g. 
Watson & Ellen 1993; Kapferer 2003; Stewart & Strathern 2004; Siegel 2006; Niehaus 
et al. 2006). 
These magic forms reflect the thoughts and cultural orientations of people in 
dealing with such a complicated world and play a dominant part in the cosmology of 
societies regardless of whether they are primitive or modern. Witchcraft beliefs and 
sorcery accusations have been controversial since they are frequently utilized as one of 
the ways to express communal conflicts usually imbued with personal revenge and 
collective retaliation. For instance, ethnographic studies of Southeast Asian and African 
societies indicate that witchcraft and sorcery are frequently involved in social tension 
and used as a way of escalating violent conflict (e.g. Ashforth 2005; Siegel 2006). In the 
case of communal conflict, both sides of the conflicting parties usually utilize sorcery 
accusations to manipulate public opinion in order to either convince people of their truth 
in the conflict or evoke the sympathy of others (e.g. Watson & Ellen 1993; Kapferer 
2003; Stewart & Strathern 2004). Sorcery and witchcraft are deeply rooted in the culture 
of societies, being part of their system of beliefs. They have their own believers and 
practitioners who apply them for multiple purposes, especially for the worst kinds of 
such wrongdoing as corruption, killing personal foes, eliminating political opponents, 
causing illness through creating diseases, making bad luck, creating marriage problems, 
and the like.  Here, it is important to note that witchcraft may kill one but corruption 
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kills more because the rights of the people are violated as public resources that are 
supposed to be allocated for many beneficiaries are diverted by corrupt officials for 
individual gains. As a part of society’s cultures, witchcraft and sorcery have been the 
focus of studies by anthropologists with different emphases and specific interests (e.g. 
Geertz 1960; Koentjaraningrat 1985; Watson & Ellen 1993; Stewart & Strathern 2004; 
Siegel 2006; Bubandt 2006). 
 Not surprisingly, given the similar roles played by sorcery talk and corruption 
talk some observers have stressed a parallel between the two, for instance, Sedlenieks 
(2004) and Bubandt (2006). Frequently, people perceive corruption as a demonic force, 
like witchcraft, but they seem incapable of dealing with it. Although both witchcraft and 
corruption are classified as evil practices, people are inclined to engage in these 
condemned actions and misconducts. As those engaging in witchcraft are dubbed devil 
worshipers, those implicated in corruption are called immoral greedy people. Thus, both 
are essentially the manifestations of demonic cults in different appearances. Like 
witchcraft, corruption is usually shrouded by mysterious power, most famously called 
the ‘invisible hand’ in political power, and done in secrecy and concealment. Similar to 
sorcery, corruption can be illustrated with ghosts and spectres. They do not appear in a 
physical manner, but affect people’s lives resulting in misery and plight. Here people 
have no knowledge for sure and commonly speculate and interpret it based upon public 
talk. As a result, accusations of corruption very often become rumours and gossip in 
which one is hardly able to provide hard facts that can assist the authority to take the 
case to court. Rumours and gossip are usually dense and numerous, and people oppose 
corruption talk about such cases vehemently. The basic accusation is one of trickery and 
deceit with the main issue of trust in the government office expressing people’s 
disappointment with the deception and dishonesty. Such an accusation of corruption 
precisely resembles accusations against sorcerers and witches, while rumours and 
gossip fill the gap in knowledge and information, and plays a dominant role in 
escalating public distrust and even forcing a social crisis into being. Comparing the 
explanations of sorcery accusations may help in understanding corruption accusations, 
as Geertz (1960) clearly illustrated, “accusations of witchcraft are common enough, but 
they are never made openly and directly against anyone; they are only whispered to 
others as malicious gossip or discussed rather abstractly as hypotheses to account for 
peculiar behaviours” (p.109). At this point, it is not important whether or not 
accusations are factual or based upon empirical evidence, since both “witchcraft and 
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sorcery in all societies are potent sources of expressive language, symbolism, and 
allegory which may be as important as actual accusations” (Ellen 1993:21). This is why 
gossip and rumours are the most critical things and they are, in the context of mass 
psychology, treated as the mechanism of transforming suspicion into accusation. 
Therefore, sorcery accusations must be seen as both ‘historical and processual’ events. 
As historical events, sorcery accusations are “products of wide-scale changes running 
through people’s lives”; while as processual event, sorcery accusations are “sets of 
events that involve complex interactions between individuals constituting micro-
histories of their own” (Stewart & Strathern 2004:27). 
Such comparison between witchcraft and corruption can also be viewed in the 
way they weaken and paralyze the human body and state power respectively. As 
witchcraft consumes life-force by eating the life of victims causing damage to 
someone’s body, corruption also devastates the state power by weakening and 
paralyzing it so that it cannot play its basic role and function within society. Through 
magical power, the witch hurts the human body by inserting magical materials and 
saying magical words (spells, the knowledge of spells) along with potions into it in 
order to harm or even kill that person. The witch is categorically ‘evil whose natural 
disposition is to harm other people mostly by mystical or invisible means’ (Forth 
1993:100), as the main character of a sorcerer is also to carry out witchcraft attacks 
against victims and to instigate perpetrated acts of malign magic. Therefore, witches and 
sorcerers are regarded as the perpetrators of evil, as Stewart & Strathern put it: 
Witchcraft is seen as power belonging to persons through their bodies or spirits, giving 
them an ability to fly out of the body or to transform themselves into other creatures to 
kill, harm, or inflict sickness on those whom they intend to weaken. Characteristically, 
the witch is seen as a kind of cannibal, eating the victim’s life-force as a way of self-
augmentation. Sorcerers are seen as destroying a victim’s life-force, not by directly 
consuming it but by inflicting sickness through magical means. (Stewart & Strathern 
2004:6) 
    
Relevant to this notion, Harrison (2004) discusses the idea that corruption is a cancer on 
the body politic. As cancer causes serious illness to the human body, paralyzes it slowly 
and eventually ends the life of a person, corruption destroys the fundamental elements 
of the state by ravaging its structures. This, in turn, leads state power to severe 
weaknesses and paralyzes it so that it cannot be as well-functioned as it is supposed to 
be. Some scholarly works (e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1999; Marquette 2003; Green & Ward 
2004; Bracking 2007) have shown how corruption weakens state power and impairs 
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governance and development since it operates within government systems, 
encompassing bureaucracy units and state apparatuses so that it will systematically 
wreck both government bodies and state institutions. As the rite of witchcraft sacrifices 
the body of the victims, the rite of corruption also sacrifices the state body that 
eventually places people in insecure circumstances. In the context of politics, sorcery 
and corruption can form serious dangers to the consolidation process of democracy, 
especially where modern democratic systems are disrupted by corrupt political actors 
who are deeply obsessed with power and wealth and use magic as the sole means of 
realizing the imagination of the state power. Bubandt (2006) explains the ambivalence 
of sorcery and corruption saying: 
[…] both appear to attain power in socially reprehensible and harmful ways. The public 
and modernist condemnation of sorcery as backward and of corruption as incompatible 
with democracy is, however, attended by a widespread notion that sorcery and corruption 
are nevertheless inescapable aspects of political life. The fact that sorcery and corruption 
appear to be simultaneously reprehensible and inescapable make both highly ambivalent. 
(Bubandt 2006:414) 
 
As the state power contains morality especially for creating social justice, equality and 
public virtue, those gaining power through corruption and sorcery practices are 
considered as being morally untrustworthy. However, the pro-cons over such illicit 
practices always emerge and the embedded notions of the morality of sorcery and 
corruption are in fact contentious, so public discourses derived from these phenomena 
are always ambiguous. Within this context, such boundaries between good and bad, 
proper and improper, moral and immoral are fuzzy and uncertain; and public 
controversy over those practising sorcery and implicating in corruption continues to 
happen in reality. Indeed, the ambiguities of corruption and sorcery within society are 
socially evident. 
4.5   Corruption and Sorcery in the Indonesian Context 
One of the major problems in developing an understanding of corruption in Indonesia is 
that all literature is written from a particular moral position. Undoubtedly, there are 
political processes that can be seen as corrupt from the point of view of a morality based 
on Weberian ideals of a rational bureaucracy and the separation of office and the 
incumbent. But the nature of political power of the New Order appeared to be in 
contrast to the Weberian concept of rational polity. In some ways, the pattern of 
government under the New Order regime was similar to the government in pre-colonial 
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Java in which the role of the leader was dominant. As the top leader of the New Order, 
Soeharto marshalled military officers, bureaucrats, and technocrats in a model of the 
state which resonated with Javanese culture and values. He acted as a very dominant 
ruler who tightly controlled the state government. Here, the ruler played such a crucial 
role and loyalty was so essential in the context of power relations between ruler and 
followers.  
In this context, one needs to look at the concept of the state in pre-modern 
Indonesia to understand the New Order. In terms of Indonesian cosmological beliefs, a 
ruler was conceived as a semi-divine ‘god-king’ whose legitimacy—the popular 
acceptance of his right to rule—relied upon cultural authority rather than the use of 
force. Using the example of Bali, Geertz (1980) illustrates that unlike modern concepts 
of the state which are often based on the control of force, the pre-colonial Balinese state 
must be perceived culturally in terms of myths, ceremonies, rituals and symbols. He 
argues that the Balinese state defied the concepts and models of modern political theory 
and contravened the standard Western approaches to understanding politics and power. 
The state was about spectacle and symbolism, where “mass ritual was not a device to 
shore up the state, but rather the state … was a device for the enactment of mass ritual. 
Power served pomp, not pomp power” (1980:13). For Geertz, the negara was a ‘theatre 
state’ centred on divine kings who claimed great symbolic power. He illustrated that 
“The whole of the negara—court life, the traditions that organized it, the extractions 
that supported it, the privileges that accompanied it—was essentially directed toward 
defining what power was; and what power was was what kings were ... a state was 
constructed by constructing a king, and a king was constructed by constructing a god” 
(p.124) through mass rituals, public ceremonies and mythical symbols. Here negara 
actually means both city—a place in Bali—and state; in terms of state, negara was 
neither a tyranny nor a hierarchical-organizational bureaucracy, nor even an effective 
government. Negara portrayed a political system that did not match the typical Western 
idea of what political power is all about. Rather, negara displayed the master image of 
political life, namely, kingship showing that “The king was a political actor, power 
among powers as well as sign among signs” (p.131) which became the centre of ‘the 
ritual extravaganzas of the theatre state’ placing the king as the symbol of the society’s 
greatness.  
During the New Order, the theatre state took the form of a patrimonial state 
organized in the context of Javanese society. A lot of literature on this subject has 
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widely explored how Java has become a profound socio-political factor of Indonesian 
politics and Javanese culture is the most influential element in shaping the patterns of 
polity in the country (e.g. Emmerson 1976; Anderson 1990; Mulder 1996 & 1998; 
Liddle 1996:63-106; Antlov & Helman 2005). In fact, most of Indonesia’s leaders are 
Javanese who tend to practise patron-client relationships emanating from the 
patrimonial state tradition in which leaders are the centre of power. The patron-client 
model appears in a vertical chain of leader-follower relationships showing that the 
patronage relation is hierarchical by nature, tying people together in personal bonds of 
unequal moral and material worth, in which the higher cares and the lower obeys and 
follows; patrons are resourceful and capable of attracting and protecting followers 
(Mulder 1996:70-71). Of course, as far as the regime and its followers are concerned, 
such a mode of resource allocation is clearly legitimate in terms of a particular 
conception of the state. But for those outside this system and for those who increasingly 
subscribe to a different set of values, it is clearly becoming nothing less than a complex 
structure of corrupt practices.  
At the time of the New Order, Soeharto’s mode of control over resources clearly 
referred to the tradition of the patrimonial state. He developed political relations 
amongst entrusted people from both the military and the Golkar Party, and in order to 
maintain power, Soeharto distributed political and economic resources as rewards to the 
followers, while at the same time applying threats and exclusion as punishments for 
those who challenged and opposed him. Indeed Soeharto’s New Order gained political 
support for his leadership by endangering fear and distributing favours with the use of a 
‘stick-and-carrot’ approach. Moreover, Soeharto established personal relationships with 
his cronies, mostly Chinese, by giving them economic resources, business chances, and 
the like. This group of Chinese, often dubbed as cukong, played a very dominant role 
since they enjoyed the privilege of obtaining lucrative state contracts through corrupt 
and collusive relations with state officials. For this, William Liddle rightly describes: 
“More important than simple corruption in maintaining the loyalty of subordinates is the 
elaborate network of government-business relations which centres on the role of the 
cukong who are protected by powerful officials in return for a share of the profits” 
(Liddle 1996:24; see also Kingsbury 2002:197-216). They all formed the so-called ‘elite 
cartel’ which was responsible for securing the economic and political interests of 
Soeharto and his family members along with their inner circles. The elite cartel then 
developed strong networks in support of its businesses and relied upon what became 
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known by its critics as KKN involving both public and private institutions. The elite 
cartel allowed the military officers, bureaucrats, and Golkar’s politicians to divert public 
resources, go into business and extract bribes and rents, but they were absolutely 
forbidden to disrupt economic development and political order (e.g. Johnston 2005:178-
82; MacIntyre 2003; Liddle 1996; Robison 1990; Crouch 1988). All these practices 
were facilitated by state bureaucracies, which had the privilege of controlling and 
distributing resources to their favourite clients based on both economic and political 
interests. Such collusive relations between state officials and private actors were the 
foundations of what its critics saw as the corrupt character of Indonesian politics. 
Soeharto’s political strategy was to maintain his power by portraying himself as the 
patron and distributing economic benefits and political privileges to his cronies, 
protégés, and followers in order to get personal loyalty from them. The interaction 
between the patron and clients—Soeharto and his cronies—in dealing with collusive 
businesses took place in three intertwined institutions (the military, the bureaucracy, and 
the Golkar Party), which greatly determined the whole political processes.  
Not surprisingly, under these political circumstances corruption has for years 
been widespread across the country. What can be described as corruption in public 
institutions took two forms: “(1) it involves the buying and selling of influence or power 
over public policy in ways that benefit only particular individuals or groups (e.g. 
families, cronies and clients); and (2) the corrupt behaviour is more easily protected 
behind a facade of legality because of the corrupt official’s position” (King 2000:605). 
As a result, such illicit exchanges practised by the government and parliament bodies 
were common in the policymaking processes. When the executive body proposes an 
annual budget to the Parliament, the representatives use their political power over 
budget allocation to take some ‘refreshments’ from the state officials; or, they act as a 
broker to facilitate their ‘clients’ to get development contracts. From there, the 
lawmakers will get upeti (gift) and uang pelicin—money taken from both state officials 
and clients involved in the lobbying process. ‘Refreshments’ are also informally 
required for the enactment of a bill, or the legal drafting process, or for any kind of 
government policies that need to be approved by the legislative body. Within this 
context, corruption therefore evolves “from one in which the predominant role was 
played by the, often coercive, bribe-taker to one in which the bribe-giver acquires 
increasing power, and these two roles then become interchangeable” (Pardo 2004:2).      
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Those sorts of activities, typical of the patrimonial state from one point of view, 
characteristic of corruption from another, were keys in maintaining the power of the 
New Order regime. Yet the uses of magic and sorcery were also important. Sorcery 
believers and practitioners surrounded the New Order state and people believed that the 
long-lasting survival of the regime depended on the help of witches and sorcerers. For 
rulers and political leaders, sorcery and witchcraft are seen as magical tools in order to 
be able to stay in power for a long time, in addition to committing corruption. When 
ruling the country for 32 years, Soeharto was believed to possess magical knowledge. 
Many Indonesian people were convinced that the reason why he successfully assumed 
power and stayed in office for more than three decades was because of the protection of 
magical power. Even Soeharto symbolized himself as a mythical figure who had 
received spiritual potency through the supernatural medium as a result of the constant 
practice of mystical discipline so that his close aides claimed that he ruled the country 
as a so-called pelindung (guard, protector), reflecting a spiritually powerful person, for 
all Indonesians. The portrayal of Soeharto as the protector of the people was a typical 
imagery of political leadership in Javanese society.       
Occupying the presidency for extraordinary longevity, Soeharto was believed to 
make use of sorcery as a means of controlling political power by creating social 
disruption as in the case of the outbreaks of sorcery-related murders at the end of his 
regime. Only a few months before Soeharto was ousted and the New Order regime fell, 
terrible massacres occurred in the Banyuwangi, Jember, and Malang regions of the East 
Java province, shocking the local communities and leading to a great deal of social 
commotion in the country. The victims were mostly kiai (traditional Islamic clerics), 
ustadz (Moslem teachers), and common villagers, and they were accused of being 
dukun santet (black magic practitioners, witches). The case was immediately 
surrounded by rumours and gossip as they very often arose as a part of witchcraft ritual 
with a single political message: the people need a ruler who is, by using the state power, 
capable of tackling social crisis. At the time, the ruler was associated with the military 
that was under direct control of Soeharto. Such bizarre slaughter of the dukun santet 
continued to happen for several months even after Soeharto left office and it claimed the 
lives of more than 200 people. The incidence of sorcery-related murders clearly 
represented what a so-called ‘state violence’ as a result of the regime change, which 
became part of power struggles. As a form of the state violence, witchcraft-related 
killings can be seen as the ways in which those who were in power exercised the power. 
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Shrouded by a great deal of mysterious incidents, there was speculation that Jakarta’s 
elite and politicians had masterminded this; they were behind the scenes of the mass 
carnage. Meanwhile, those kiai, ustadz, and ordinary villagers who were accused of 
being the dukun santet were simply scapegoats in a suspiciously manipulated campaign 
designed to disrupt political reforms and discredit the emerging power establishment of 
the post-New Order regime. Speculations also indicated that mass murders were a sort 
of military-supported intelligence operation designed to create social chaos throughout 
East Java in parallel with Soeharto’s resignation. Here, it is interesting to consider 
James Siegel’s observation:   
In Java, witchcraft accusations arose in the absence of the state. They were an attempt to 
reassert social control, which at the moment meant control over phantasms. These 
phantasms were not ghosts of Java but fears that arose within a national context. […] 
“Witch,” with the subsequent witch-hunt, offered a means for local control of general—
or national—malevolence when state control failed. I would argue that [witchcraft 
accusations] were a legacy of the New Order rather than a reassertion of a traditional 
practice. (Siegel 2006:161) 
    
What Siegel observed was an affirmation that the image of the New Order state was 
replete with magic and mysticism. They were translated into witchcraft accusations with 
two major objectives: (1) to maintain the sustainability of the regime by keeping the 
power in the hands of Soeharto; and (2) to control political stability by permeating 
psychological terror within society through rumours on dukun santet. It was widely 
acknowledged that the nature of Soeharto’s rule was malevolent, and such massive 
terrors wrapped up with rumours were the manifestations of mythical performances 
showing that violence was an integral part of his power. As a part of mythical power 
conceptualized by the New Order state, during the thirty-two years of reign, Soeharto 
was perceived by the people as possessing supernatural power and was surrounded by 
many dukuns.  
When Soeharto eventually could not hold on to power and forcibly left office, 
people also believed that his dukuns did not stand anymore by his side, since his family 
members and cronies were so greedy and voracious, and their involvement in KKN 
could no longer be tolerated. The uncontrolled desire of Soeharto’s family combined 
with unchecked political power as seen in the KKN practices had resulted in the loss of 
spiritual authority and supernatural power. Having experienced Soeharto’s New Order, 
one might realize that both sorcery and corruption had a political function and became a 
public secret in modern Indonesian politics, although the practices were not overtly 
revealed but rather concealed. Yet, in the post-Soeharto era, both sorcery and corruption 
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seem to continue alongside the establishment of the modern democratic system. 
However, Indonesian people are critical of corruption and they consolidate social and 
political resources and organize civil society groups to fight it. They promote the ideas 
and practices of anti-corruption with the use of any measure available. 
 
4.6 The Ideas and Practices of Anti-Corruption 
In the beginning, the ideas and practices of anti-corruption appear in a social space in 
parallel with the emergence of political opposition to Soeharto’s New Order 
government. Here, anti-corruption movements initially emerged in the mid-1970s when 
student-led political protests against the New Order state took place as they strongly 
alleged that Soeharto’s regime was corrupt (e.g. Vatikiotis 1998; Schwarz 2004). 
However, anti-corruption activism during that time was un-institutionalized since 
particular civil society organizations dedicated to fighting corruption were still absent. 
Such activism against corruption appeared to be a sporadic movement which was part of 
the political protest, so it received very little attention from the public. Besides, 
Indonesian civil society had not been able to consolidate social and political resources 
to challenge the misuse of power by state actors. This is because the autocratic ruler of 
the New Order did not leave any space for social criticism voiced by the civil society 
activists and other non-state actors. The regime maintained its grip on power by 
repressing people and political opponents so that they were afraid of articulating public 
critiques. The New Order severely suppressed any social and political groups who tried 
to challenge the Soeharto government. In fact, social and political activists who opposed 
the regime were blamed for being the ‘obstacle to development’ so were isolated from 
social and political processes and excluded from the world of politics. Many of them 
were even jailed for years as the New Order applied oppressive approaches in dealing 
with any political opposition. Yet public criticism of corruption came to the fore when 
Soeharto stepped down, though in its inception it appeared to be politically less 
significant. Here is Kingsbury’s assessment: 
After the fall of Soeharto, there was little holding back as criticism of Indonesia’s 
rampant corruption, in particular that of its elites, became widespread. But for many 
years, not only were observations about elite corruption in Indonesia rarely discussed, 
but those who did discuss it in public found themselves either in deep trouble within the 
state or, if outsiders, excluded from it. (Kingsbury 2002:198) 
27 
 
The discussion of corruption by critical groups of Indonesian elites was politically 
forbidden, let alone used as political jargon in public campaigns nationally. It was 
politically risky if social activists and civil society associations criticized the despotic 
regime by condemning corruption within the New Order. Yet the alteration of the 
political pendulum has created a way of voicing public criticism on corruption through 
the promotion of democratic politics since it opened up the freedom of expression. The 
ideas of democracy and democratic governance have emerged in the social discourse 
brought about by educated Indonesian elites as they grow and pioneer civil activisms 
and social movements acting as a counterforce of the New Order. Indeed, the 
democratic political system makes it possible for civil society activists to cement social 
elements and reinforce political strengths for public critiques. As corruption has become 
the crux of the problem of the country under the Soeharto government and beyond, 
NGO activists and civil society agents have raised the issue of corruption as the main 
agenda of governance reform by promoting anti-corruption initiatives. In the post-
Soeharto era, anti-corruption activism has become a massive social movement and has 
received huge attention from Indonesian people as they share the major concern about 
the problem of corruption. Such activism against corruption took place in parallel with 
the 1998 reformasi movements which demanded a transparent government and 
accountable public governance indicated by the ‘vanishing’ of corruption within state 
agencies. The reformasi movement was a critical moment for civil society activists as 
they emerged to become the focal point of social and political protest against power 
establishment. The pendulum of political power then swung into non-state agencies as 
they gained a profound political influence in the context of public criticism related to 
the management of political governance and public affairs. 
The change from the authoritarian regime to a democratic government system 
has radically altered the architecture of Indonesian politics. Within the newly 
established political system, there is a wider social space available for civic 
participation and citizens are allowed to take part in political affairs. As a result, NGOs 
and other civil society associations play a greater role in social and political processes. 
As Indonesia has become a democratic state, those non-state actors have grown 
exponentially as seen in their increasing numbers over the last thirteen years. There are 
plenty of NGOs and civil society agencies that focus on the issues of corruption and 
public governance, whether they are established in the capital or located in local sites. 
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They are usually led by independent groups of social and political activists, but in some 
cases they are based on university campuses and led by academics and intellectuals.  
In the era of democratic politics, NGO activists and civil society appear to be in 
the forefront promoting anti-corruption reforms and they take the lead in battling 
corruption. Here, the involvement of NGOs and civil society in the eradication of 
corruption represents that civil rights and political liberty are guaranteed—something 
that was not possible during the New Order period. Even though they enjoy political 
freedom under the democratic system that allows them to promote the ideas and 
practices of anti-corruption, they often face difficulties and obstructions in carrying out 
governance reform to curb corruption. The major obstacles of combating corruption 
have always been political in the sense that politicians and those holding political 
powers often impede social and political activists from accelerating their activisms 
against corruption. They always make use of public power and political influence to 
curtail any efforts to battle corruption so that anti-corruption activists are often in 
opposition to those who are in power. Despite abundant anti-corruption rhetoric voiced 
by the power holders, NGOs and civil society activists seem less trustworthy. This is 
mainly because efforts to eliminate corruption have always been at a standoff if 
corruption scandals involve state officials and politicians. The Indonesian people are 
deeply discontented with the authorities (especially the Attorney General’s Office, the 
Police), since they do not have any political courage and the ability to disclose any 
gigantic corruption scandals that are involved including ‘big and influential political 
figures’ who stay in and grip power. As Arjon Schutte points out: “… post-New Order 
efforts to battle against corruption have largely focused on the investigative and 
punitive aspects, not least the catching of ‘big fish,’ as demanded by the public” 
(2009:85). This is actually the main characteristic of how the authorities deal with 
corruption as they are politically at risk to prosecute those holding the power or those 
who have close relationships with the power-holders. The complexity of battling 
corruption centres on power relations amongst those involved in it. Not surprisingly, 
tension and conflict very often materialize which lead to the contestation of power 
involving a wide range of social political groups which will be thoroughly explored in 
the thesis.  
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5.   Setting the Scene  
Carried out for twelve months, from September 2008 to August 2009, this research 
project took place in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. During the fieldwork, I spent time 
in parliament, public offices, and offices of civil society institutions, religious 
organizations, NGOs, and media agencies. They were the scenes where my fieldwork 
was set out and with which my sources associated. In the period of the fieldwork, I 
settled in two places that were suitable for me to arrange the activities and to do all 
things in relation to the research project. The first place was my office, that is, the 
National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), the state body, which is 
responsible for economic planning and social policymaking. Bappenas gave me space to 
work on my research project and allowed me to use all facilities in support of the 
fieldwork, but I was actually not on official duty at that time. The second place was my 
colleague’s office, that is, the Research Institute for the Study of Development and 
Business Ethics (LSPEUI), a private institution where I used to be a research associate. 
Both are located in the heart of the capital which allowed me to move back and forth 
from one place to another to make contact with and reach informants. 
5.1 Informants  
Settled in those two places, I spent time working on the research project and arranged a 
series of meetings and interviews with informants to gather data. Informants are well-
educated people of urban-middle class with different socio-cultural backgrounds; and 
this study therefore does not claim to represent the whole Javanese, let alone the whole 
Indonesian society. They are males and several females of various ages; the young 
groups are in their thirties and forties while the older groups are between their fifties 
and sixties. Getting in touch with them during fieldwork, I was fortunate to have been 
able to capture various perspectives of the subjects being studied. Here I present the 
sources with whom I spoke by classifying them into seven groups.  
The first group are politicians who are members of political parties and active in 
day-to-day politics and legislators, serving in the House of Representatives. They are 
part of the urban elite politicians who know about politics very well and have 
knowledge about how the Javanese culture has a profound effect on the country’s 
politics. As politicians and legislators, they engage with the management of political 
parties so that they are familiar with the issue of political affairs and cultural values 
embedded within polity. These informants are appropriate sources as they are involved 
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in political activities that allow them to get in touch with the issues being researched. 
One of the informants is a leader of a party and former minister and the other was a 
candidate running for vice president during the presidential election.  
The second group are intellectuals/academics/lecturers who teach at universities 
and do not have any affiliation with a certain political party. They are obviously 
educated elites with high academic credentials and engage immensely in social 
activities such as participating in public talks on corruption and joining social 
associations to organize public campaigns against corruption with the spirit of 
intellectualism and rationality, that is, to improve public governance and to create civic 
politics in which civic virtue and morality should be the basis of polity. One of them has 
expertise in Islam and Javanese culture and he is concerned with the issues of mysticism 
and politics. As knowledgeable people, they are concerned with the world of politics 
and how the cosmological belief of Indonesian society has a profound influence on the 
dynamics of political practices.  
The third group are public officials—state prosecutors working with the 
Attorney General’s Office (AGO)—and (former) officials of the anti-graft state body, 
the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (the Commission of Corruption Eradication) who 
are responsible for and involved in corruption alleviation based on official and civic 
duty combined. They are professionals and have been taking part in the fight against 
corruption for many years. As they are officials dedicating themselves to battling 
corruption, these informants are potent sources as they express their own experiences in 
regards to the issues of corruption and witchcraft.  
The fourth group are th religious leaders of Islamic organizations: the Nahdhatul 
Ulama (NU), the Muhammadiyah, and the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). They 
represent the Muslim middle class groups who demand greater social and political 
participation related to public governance. Like other civil society groups, they are also 
concerned about social issues and public interests with reference to religious ethics. As 
educated groups, these religious leaders actively engage in activisms against corruption 
believing that they would be able to voice Islamic teachings and religious morality in 
support of anti-corruption initiatives. The religious leaders are trustworthy people and 
have knowledge about social issues and political affairs so that they are capable of 
articulating public criticisms against corruption.  
The fifth group are social and political activists associated with NGOs and civil 
society institutions who share interests in common with other groups about the problem 
31 
 
of corruption. They are educated elites and urban middle class who are committed to 
pioneering and mobilizing anti-corruption activisms with a political purpose, that is, to 
create an efficient and effective government for a better Indonesia. As critical groups, 
they are the main focal point of anti-corruption initiatives and frequently organize social 
movements and political protests against corruption. They are prominent activists of the 
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) and other civil society groups so that they are the 
best sources for understanding anti-corruption reforms. 
The sixth group are businesspeople who have worked for many years in their 
profession and are familiar with the relationship between business and politics. They are 
established economic groups who maintain social networks and political relations in 
support of their business activities. From them, among others, I gained much 
information about how corruption—in the form of bribe-giving and bribe-taking, paying 
off, kickback, and the like—takes place in state agencies. They are aware that patronage 
also applies in business as many businesspeople benefit from this to get contracts from 
the government and deal with state bureaucracies to gain state-financed projects.   
The seventh group are journalists working with media agencies and artists, 
musicians, and poets who are concerned about the issue of corruption and then take part 
in anti-corruption movements. As professionals in journalism and popular arts, they are 
literate groups who are critical of the grave problem of corruption. Having shared ideas 
with other civil society groups about battling corruption, their critical views are 
transformed into journalistic reports and talk-show programmes screened on TV 
channels; and expressed through popular songs, poems, pantuns (folk quatrains), 
caricatures, and cartoons that address the issue of (anti)-corruption. The media people 
and popular artists are knowledgeable groups who have the responsibility to fight 
corruption in their own ways as other groups of Indonesian society do. 
For all these resourceful people who became informants for my research project, 
here I apply pseudonyms for their safety and confidentiality. Nevertheless, it is often 
difficult to maintain this especially for well-known sources as they can still be 
recognized, even though I used a fictitious name. But at certain points, I will leave their 
real name in with the belief that it will not harm them. I should also mention that I have 
paraphrased all the quotations taken from interviews with informants as I quote the 
essence of their views and the main points that are relevant with the subject being 
studied.  
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5.2 Notes on methods of the research  
In order to collect the data, I employed the traditional method of anthropological 
research, participant observation, in addition to carrying out interviews and reviews of 
media reports and publications. These methods helped me to access plenty of essential 
sources primary data. The interviews gave me the opportunity to talk with the 
informants by deepening a particular topic of the research so that I could reach a better 
understanding of the subject being investigated. I talked with informants by asking them 
questions through unstructured and open-ended interviews, as this approach made it 
possible for me to change from one topic to another and gave interviewees the chance to 
talk freely and openly. Yet I still controlled the flow of the talk as the interviews went 
on, to keep the subject focused. Through a series of interviews, I had a good chance to 
deepen particular issues and to address specific themes so I could gather as much data 
as I needed from the interviewees. Interviews usually took place in various locations 
depending on informants’ preferences and convenience. The interview process could 
therefore be done in homes, offices, coffee shops, or any preferable venues. The 
interview was of course worthwhile in helping me reach explanations and insights into 
some research problems that emerged during the fieldwork. The interviews with 
informants then became a medium of private narratives as they talked to me in person 
about particular subjects related to the research. The large amounts of data were mainly 
collected in Jakarta, but I also went to other cities, out of the capital, to interview 
informants. A colleague of mine, a lecturer at Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta, 
Central Java, helped me to meet and talk to other informants. Another colleague, an MP 
at the local parliament of the Banten province, also assisted me to meet informants 
there.      
In addition to the interviews, a review of media reports and publications were 
obviously important to help me trace public discourses on corruption and sorcery, which 
were documented by the public media.
2
 In doing so, I spent an extensive period of time 
examining the archives of newspapers, magazines, and televisions as there were 
                                                 
2
 In order to analyze public discourses that appeared in the public media, I relied on both printed and 
electronic media. For printed media, I took major national newspapers, such as The Jakarta Post, Kompas, 
Media Indonesia, and Warta Kota. Meanwhile, for weekly magazines I just took the two most influential 
ones, Tempo and Gatra, as they are the major references for the Indonesian middle class groups. For 
electronic media, I took two TV channels (TV-One, Metro-TV), since they have special programmes in 
the form of talk-shows and live event reports which address the issue of corruption. These two TV 
channels are the biggest ones and viewers favour them as they provide many interesting programmes that 
effectively shape public opinion. 
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abundant reports and publications on the subject. I found plenty of public media 
documents that addressed the issue of corruption, stimulating public debate among 
those concerned with this topic. Certainly, reviewing the public media archives was 
critical since they illustrated corruption as a social phenomenon within society and 
presented political contestation behind the corruption scandals, which affected the 
everyday lives of Indonesian people. The archives of newspapers, magazines, and the 
television programmes I reviewed were mostly published in the capital and distributed 
nationwide. Thus, readers and viewers of those public media were people across the 
country. Reviewing and analyzing reports and publications was equally important with 
interviewing informants on the same subject, since they seemed to reflect a ‘reality’ 
constructed by the media. Here, the media archives facilitated me to read, document, 
and examine public discourses of corruption within a certain period of time.  
Through participant observation, I engaged in a number of social activities 
relevant to the research project which helped me obtain first-hand data about the subject 
being researched. The participant observation allowed me to get the real picture of 
social life that could not be gained through interviews. In doing so, I attended some 
sessions in court to observe the dynamics of public debate on corruption in trial and 
joining people in the workplace to grasp public talk about corruption. Observing public 
trials directly helped me understand how corruption was perceived and interpreted in 
different ways by various people. I could also note that corruption is a complicated 
phenomenon since it is closely associated with power-holders who have a great deal of 
political influence within the state powers. I did field observation not only about the 
actual events in court, but also about social protests organized by many social groups 
such as NGOs, civil society associations, religious organizations, political activists, and 
other elements of Indonesian society. Here, I observed live events and took photographs 
which complement my written descriptions, expressing how the public were deeply 
frustrated with pervasive corruption which caused serious problems within society. I 
documented live events of carnivals, public congregations, public meetings, and social 
protests in which all of them were part of anti-corruption movements. Through 
participant observation, I had a very good chance to talk, not only to common people 
about the incidence of corruption, but also to listen to public complaints about the grave 
problem. Moreover, I attended dozen of public discussions in Jakarta from which I had 
the opportunity to capture ideas, thoughts, and opinions on relevant subjects which 
appeared in public debate. Here, public discussion refers to an open discussion for those 
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interested in talking about current topics emerging in the national sphere. It was usually 
organized by social activists, civil society institutions, NGOs, radio and TV agencies, 
journalists’ associations, or university student groups, which took place in many sites in 
the capital. The kind of discussion was held in response to social issues and public 
affairs becoming part of the public forum and social discourse among educated middle 
class groups. Speakers were various in terms of social background: scholars, 
intellectuals, politicians, MPs, religious leaders, NGO activists, and others. 
5.3 Notes on being an internal researcher 
As a civil servant working with Bappenas, the National Development Planning Agency, 
I certainly benefited from the status in which I could have conducted this fieldwork with 
few obstructions. Having the status of government employee made it relatively easy to 
find a variety of sources for my research project, since I have plenty of contacts who 
have given me a great deal of assistance the during fieldwork. However, at the time of 
the fieldwork I was completing my doctoral studies, and every time I approached 
informants and interviewed them I always introduced myself as a social researcher 
rather than as a government employee. For this, I developed informal relations with 
informants and whenever I visited them to talk about contemporary issues of Indonesian 
politics, it was certainly an unofficial visit. This is to minimize the biases and 
limitations of carrying out the research project as informants might have remained 
reticent given my own position within this field of government activity. Besides, 
whenever I contacted and approached informants I preferred to identify myself as a 
(former) social activist rather than as a civil servant or a professional working at a 
government agency in order to make the ‘gap’ between me and the informants closer. 
Indeed this strategy seemed effective as informants became more open and less 
reluctant to talk about the subject being researched.  
Being an internal researcher was very helpful especially in terms of accessing 
sources and how to reach resourceful people both in government offices and the 
Parliament, as I could approach them almost without any major obstacles. But it was not 
merely because I am a government employee working with Bappenas; rather, I have 
known them for long time before they became politicians, legislators, or officials. 
Despite many years of friendship with informants, I still needed to make an extra effort 
to convince them about the subject being researched so they were willing to share their 
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thoughts and information with me. At this point, there were some difficulties as the 
research topic was about corruption in state agencies and political institutions which 
involve state officials and politicians.  My sources sometimes felt insecure talking about 
the subject as it seemed to reveal ‘rahasia dapur’ (internal affairs) which might place 
them at risk and humiliate public institutions. Nevertheless, I explained that I was 
observing public discourse on corruption, not the actual corruption or the practice of 
corruption committed by state officials. What I studied was how people talked about 
corruption and how public media recorded people’s talk; and I examined the dynamics 
of public discourse on corruption raised by many groups of Indonesian society in a 
variety of ways. Besides, most corruption scandals had already been revealed in the 
media and became public knowledge for all Indonesian people so the sources should not 
be unduly worried. As such, I interviewed media people and activists of NGOs and civil 
society as they were enthusiastic when talking about the topic of corruption and 
interested in the issue. This is because they wanted to disperse ideas and activisms 
against corruption into as wide audience as possible including through research I was 
conducting. This is why they always invited me to get involved in anti-corruption 
activities and informed me about social actions or public discussion addressing the issue 
of corruption from which I was able to gather data for my research project.   
 
6. Organization of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is divided into two parts comprising three chapters for each 
and each chapter discusses a specific theme. Following this introduction there are six 
substantive chapters consisting of ethnographic materials, and ending up with a 
conclusion.    
Chapter 1, Javanese Mysticism and Pathways of Power, explores the topic of 
Javanese mysticism and its impact on political practice by illustrating how mystical 
beliefs and politics are connected with each other. This chapter demonstrates how 
Javanese mysticism is deeply rooted in the society and becomes part of the culture and 
identity of the nation. It also presents pathways of power in the views of the Javanese 
people by highlighting mystical practice, as Java has been the epicentre of Indonesian 
politics. 
Chapter 2, Witchcraft and Political Contestation at the Time of the 2009 General 
Elections, addresses the issues of witchcraft and politics by illustrating the relations 
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between the two and showing how witchcraft plays a part in political processes. 
Discourses of witchcraft and politics are extensively explored by bringing in the very 
recent cases of the 2009 general elections. This chapter will also examine the contesting 
ideas of being both traditional and modern, and how they appear in the political 
contestation that instigates much public controversy as the country embraces a modern 
democratic system. 
Chapter 3, Witchcraft and Corruption: the Risk to Human Lives, examines the 
dangers of witchcraft in relation to eradicating corruption as it threatens human lives by 
bringing case studies of prosecutors and social activists who have personal experiences 
of sorcery attacks related to their activities. It illustrates how witchcraft is used by 
alleged corruptors as a way of attacking prosecutors, of obstructing a prosecution 
process, and of intimidating activists who work for anti-corruption campaigns. 
Chapter 4, Religious Activism in the Fight against Corruption, explores with 
the role of religious organizations: the Muhammadiyah, the Nahdhatul Ulama, and the 
Hizbut Tahrir in taking part in the fight against corruption by addressing the moral and 
religious bases they employ in support of anti-corruption movements. As these social 
organizations are Islamic institutions, discussion in this chapter focuses on Islamic ideas 
and moralities that drive such movements and look at theological thoughts and religious 
teachings on corruption discourse. 
Chapter 5, Social and Political Activism in the Battle against Corruption, 
addresses social and political activism in support of public campaigns against corruption 
by focusing on NGO activities along with civil society agencies and actors who play a 
part in anti-corruption movements. The political significance of these groups in fighting 
corruption is elaborated thoroughly. This chapter also presents the views and thoughts 
of social and political activists on corruption in public discourses and shows how 
corruption influences the establishment of political democracy. 
Chapter 6, The Role of the Public Media and Popular Art in Anti-Corruption 
Movements, presents the significance of the public media and artists in combating 
corruption as seen in their work. It stresses the public criticism of corruption expressed 
in many forms: popular songs, cartoons, caricatures, murals, poetry, and pantuns (folk 
quatrains), as well as media reports and TV programmes in relation to public campaigns 
against corruption. The chapter shows that all these cultural measures are critical in 
support of social movements to combat corruption. 
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The last part is the Conclusion that will sum up the whole discussion emerged in 
the thesis by bringing some reflections on the major issues of the research. Here, all the 
ideas and thoughts in the discussion will be blended together as final, concluding 
remarks. 
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Chapter 1 
 
JAVANESE MYSTICISM AND PATHWAYS OF POWER 
 
 
This chapter mainly aims to provide a conceptual ground and basic understanding for 
further discussion in the following chapters on how the occult and corruption have 
social-political significance as part of the struggle over power. For this, it is necessary 
to start with a discussion on the subject of Javanese culture, since Java has become the 
epicentre of Indonesian politics. This chapter therefore seeks to examine Javanese 
mysticism in relation to political processes by illustrating how mystical belief and 
politics are connected with each other.  Discussion then focuses on pathways of power 
by presenting mystical practices performed by politicians.  It will also talk about the 
production of political leadership and how political legitimacy is gained. The reason for 
exploring these issues is to show how the Javanese conceive of power and how they 
believe it should be exercised for the public interest, not for self-enrichment resulting 
from pamrih (concealed private interest). The main argument of this chapter centres on 
how the dynamics of Indonesian politics are informed by competing ideas between 
traditionalism and modernism as traditional values and norms remain alive in the realm 
of political modernity.  
   
1.1 The Idea of Power: Contesting Meaning, Gaining Supernatural 
Potency 
 
This section addresses the concept of power from the view of the Javanese people as 
they have a distinct notion of it compared to what is commonly found in Western 
literature. It is widely acknowledged that Javanese culture greatly affects the way in 
which they perceive power, how it is contested, gained, and maintained in the course of 
power struggle in the tradition of Indonesian politics. Certainly, a much-quoted classic 
work of Benedict Anderson, The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture (1990 [1972]), is 
essential as the basis for the explanation of the subject. For the Javanese, power 
intimately relates to spirituality as “the quest for Power is pursued through extreme 
ascesis” (p.23) by taking various forms such as fasting, ascetic meditation, ritual 
purification, and others; and is characterized by syncretism and absorption, and centred 
in the person of a ruler. Because power is concentrated in the hands of the ruler, it 
becomes personalized and sacred, since the rulers, as in the case of President Soekarno 
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and President Soeharto, enjoyed portraying themselves as Javanese kings who were 
imagined by the people to be Ratu Adil (the Queen of Justice, the Messiah, the mythical 
just ruler) and acquired supernatural force. In this sense, the ruler was believed to have 
received so-called wahyu (divine radiance), passed down through ancestral dynasties; 
and the ruler was thus associated with the founders of a kingdom or dynasty attempting 
to link with their predecessors through very complicated lines of descent (Anderson 
1990:38-41). The link between rulers and ancestral dynasties reveals how the idea of 
power is close to mysticism and asceticism, as Anderson put it: 
While personal ascesis was generally regarded as the fundamental way to accumulate and 
absorb Power, traditional Javanese thinking also recognized that this process of 
absorption or accumulation could be furthered both by certain rituals, often containing a 
core of asceticism, such as fasting, meditation, and the like, and by the possession of 
certain objects or persons regarded as being “filled” with Power. (Anderson 1990:25) 
 
In a similar way to Geertz’s influential work on the traditional Balinese state or Negara, 
Anderson has developed a culturalist approach to studying (state) power. Interestingly, 
both employ Weberian theoretical framework when they illustrate the cultural lens 
through which Indonesian people—more specifically Balinese and Javanese—construe 
the dynamics of state power and come to understand their political institutions and 
practices. Power is ascribed to and centres on a strong and dominant figure who 
maintains the spiritual quality and charismatic authority to exercise power. The structure 
of power is illustrated by what Geertz (1980) calls ‘exemplary centres’, in which the 
leader becomes the central focus of power dynamics within a political organization.  His 
personal charisma then becomes the main source of his authoritative leadership. 
According to Weber’s classification of authority, charismatic authority refers to a leader 
who has extraordinary personal qualities, often with divine power and spiritual potency; 
and with this kind of charismatic authority, a leader is able to encourage, guide and 
inspire followers—winning their loyalty and obedience—to deliver a collective mission 
and reach common goals. This authority rests on “devotion to the specific and 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the 
normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (Weber 1947:328). Viewed in 
this light, a charismatic leader is viewed as an epicentre of political organization, and 
power is constituted within a pyramid of social structure.  The individual occupying the 
top position controls everything and thus becomes the centre of power. Spiritual 
potency and charismatic quality overtly radiate from the leader, and constitute the 
source of passion and principle attraction for followers and supporters.  This approach 
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has been exactly how the Javanese conceived the leadership style of Indonesia’s two 
presidents: Soekarno and Soeharto. They appeared to have represented charismatic 
leadership; their style accorded well with the Javanese traditional concept of power 
being highly concentrated in the person of the ruler (Geertz 1973; Anderson 1990). In 
addition to being empowered with personal charisma, Soekarno and Soeharto became 
symbolic representations of traditional authority, since both portrayed themselves as 
strongly influenced by Javanese culture and tradition in their leadership performance.  
Within Java, culture and tradition greatly impact on the political leadership of a ruler, as 
there is a belief that the ruler should maintain a variety of sacred objects called pusaka 
(heirlooms)—[e.g. krisses, spears, traditional musical instruments, and the like]—which 
are believed imbued with supernatural power. Javanese believe that the supernatural 
power embodied within these sacred objects can be absorbed by and added to the ruler’s 
earthly power.  Their loss can be interpreted as the decline of the ruler’s power and even 
a sign of imminent collapse of the dynasty (Moertono 1968; Anderson 1990).  Indeed, 
the belief structures of Javanese culture and tradition have important repercussions for 
political practices and even during the Soeharto’s New Order state, clear elements of 
Javanese culture were adopted to justify, establish, and stabilize the President’s 
authoritarian regime (Pemberton 1994). As mentioned earlier, traditional authority can 
be used as one of the primary sources of power within the country’s political structures. 
Following Weberian thinking, traditional authority is grounded in the integrity of a 
tradition which relies on “an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions 
and the legitimacy of the status exercising authority under them” (Weber 1947:328).  
Obviously, these categories of authority are central to the legitimization of power; and 
in the context of power establishment, legitimacy is both unequivocal and crucial 
because it relates not only to the institutionalization of power, but more importantly to 
the moral basis of this power. Without legitimacy, a ruler would not be able to exercise 
power effectively since power is directly linked to the people’s consent.  In this context, 
legitimacy refers to how people believe in the moral integrity of an organized system. 
Legitimacy is therefore central to power issues because it provides an ethical foundation 
to those holding power.  In this respect, Weber’s analysis and classification of authority 
appears highly significant to understanding the process of establishing legitimate, 
enduring power. 
In addition to understanding power from a cultural perspective, it is important to 
examine how power is defined by considering another aspect of Weber’s analysis. In 
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contemporary literature, power is associated with physical force as conceptualized by 
Weberian political theorists. Weber himself defines power as the ability to control the 
behaviour of others even against their will by any means; thus the most direct source of 
political power is coercion for imperative control (Weber 1946). On the other hand, 
Marxist political theorists define power as a state’s instrument of repression and the 
mechanism of subjugation, reflecting the dynamic of class struggle for domination 
between the capitalists and the workers (e.g. Gramsci 1971; Lukes 2005).  In this sense, 
power is seen in the more classic, material image of it—power through coercion 
whether it takes the form of physical or economic forces. However, power should not 
merely be reduced to brute force as the exercise of power relations may take different 
forms along a continuum.  Consent may be manufactured in a refined approach using  
what Kate Crehan calls ‘subaltern culture’, indicating ‘the mentality of the 
subordinated’ (Crehan 2002:100). Interpreting Gramsci’s theoretical approach of the 
subject, Crehan argues that power relations “can be seen as occupying a continuum with 
direct coercion through brute force at one pole and willing consent at the other” 
(2002:101). Indeed, the various understandings of power indicate that there are different 
conceptions of power as it is associated with the intersection of political ideologies of 
dominance and social processes (Wolf 1999). Taking into account the complexity of 
defining power, Eric Wolf has pointed out:  
Conceptualizing power presents difficulties of its own. Power is often spoken of as if it 
were a unitary and independent force, sometimes incarnated in the image of a giant 
monster such as Leviathan or Behemoth, or else as a machine that grows in capacity and 
ferocity by accumulating and generating more powers, more entities like itself. Yet, it is 
best understood neither as an anthropomorphic force nor as a giant machine but as an 
aspect of all relations among people. … Power works differently in interpersonal 
relations, in institutional arenas, and on the level of whole societies. (Wolf 1999:4-5) 
        
 As a part of an old tradition in Java, the Javanese defined power as a gift from 
God (anugerah Tuhan) or a bequest of the gods (anugerah Sang Dewa), and that is why 
“Power is that intangible, mysterious, and divine energy which animates the universe” 
(Anderson 1990:22). The anthropologist Koentjaraningrat mentions that for the 
Javanese “power is an ascribed quality which [can be] obtained either through 
inheritance or by divine favour” in that there is an important attribute called kasakten 
(magical energy, cosmic potency) which “reinforces the rituals for the preservation and 
intensification of power” (1985b:290). In this sense, before granting power to someone 
God or the gods would bestow one wahyu—a sort of spiritual sign that one might be 
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chosen to be a ruler; and the wahyu might be attained through a series of conscientious 
mystical practices. In essence, the wahyu is a sort of boon from God or the gods that 
usually conveys mystical knowledge for the would-be ruler. The Javanese believe that 
the wahyu emanates from the supernatural usually in the form of radiant light or a white 
ball of light called andaru or pulung (see Moertono 1968). In this respect, the idea of 
wahyu is closely connected with the concept of ‘dewa-raja’ (‘god-king’) for the power-
holder—the ruler; and those wishing to gain it must take up a series of rituals as a part 
of political mysticism. In the Javanese cosmological belief, the wahyu will provide the 
ruler with spiritual legitimacy and supernatural potency derived from God or the gods. 
For Javanese society, the centrality of the wahyu has been evident in the course of 
someone’s ascendancy into power, as power would only be possessed by a person who 
has gained supernatural potency. The acquisition of the wahyu was among the major 
causes for the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, popularly known as SBY
3
, in 
the presidential race of 2004 and his re-election for a second term in 2009. On the 
ascendancy of SBY into power and how he gained the wahyu, two informants, Abdul 
Halim, a former candidate for vice-president, and Ahmad Asrafi, a scholar and former 
minister, shared their stories with me in separate interviews. Abdul Halim told me the 
story of the election of SBY to become president in 2004 as follows:  
On May 21, 1998, Kiai Afifuddin, the charismatic ulama and head of a Pesantren (Islamic 
boarding school) in East Java, was watching on television broadcasting the process of the 
stepping down of President Soeharto. When President Soeharto delivered the national address 
in the Palace to announce his resignation from power, he saw a white ball of light slowly 
coming out from Soeharto’s mouth indicating that divine radiance (the wahyu) had been 
pulled out from him. It then came into the body of Kiai Afifuddin while he heard a 
supernatural voice that it must be imparted to a military General who is younger than him. 
Kiai Afifuddin tried to find out who the person was and found that it was SBY; he eventually 
met SBY who at that time served as chief of staff for social-political affairs in the armed 
forces, and asked him about his age and birthday. Believing that SBY was the right person he 
was looking for, Kiai Afifuddin gently touched SBY’s head and blew on it to transfer the 
white ball of light to him by saying: “You will be the sixth president of Indonesia.” Since 
then, SBY appeared to be one of the prospective leaders of the country and became the focus 
of public talk among Indonesians. (Quoted from interview, 16 December 2008)           
 
Kiai Afifuddin’s confession indicates the process of withdrawal of the wahyu because 
of the abrupt collapse of Soeharto’s power, which fits with what Moertono has 
mentioned: “A wahyu left the king at his death or at his apparent downfall to go over to 
those chosen by the gods” (1968:58).  
                                                 
3
 SBY—short for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—is a nickname of the president and is often used 
either in informal talk or in the press.  
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During the years of political transition towards the consolidation of democracy, 
political elites were involved in power struggles. When the MPR (People’s Consultative 
Assembly) held a special session to elect a president and vice president, as the 
incumbent President, Abdurrahman Wahid, was removed from power through the 
impeachment process in 2001, and SBY was contending for vice president for the new 
elected president, Megawati Soekarnoputri. Unfortunately, however, he lost to Hamzah 
Haz, head of the United Development Party, since he did not have party yet to be a 
political vehicle. Learning from the loss, the supporters of SBY, including Kiai 
Afifuddin, strongly advised him to establish his own party so he could stand for the 
presidential race in 2004. He did so and was in fact elected. The wahyu came into being 
along with the ascendancy of SBY into power through direct election under the newly 
established democratic system. Meanwhile, the story of the re-election of SBY in the 
2009 presidential contestation was told by Ahmad Asrafi, as follows:   
A few months prior to the 2009 general elections, President SBY held a meeting with 
Governors of the Sumatra provinces to assess the implementation of the development 
programmes. In the middle of the discussion, SBY with strong assurance mentioned that he 
would be re-elected as president for the second term, claiming that he had already received 
the wahyu in the form of divine radiant light plummeting into his private home. In the 
meeting President SBY confidently claimed that, with or without the support of Islamic 
political parties, he would be the champion of the presidential election in July 2009. As 
President SBY believed that he possessed the wahyu, he perceived that the presidential race 
was merely a democratic procedure to bring him to power for the next period of office. 
Having gained the wahyu, President SBY believed that the supernatural had given restu 
(spiritual approval) for him to stay in power. (Quoted from interview, 10 July 2009)  
 
 These stories assert that the wahyu has been pivotal in the political processes in 
the world of Indonesian politics. In Javanese culture, it is believed that those who are 
granted by the wahyu will gain power or stay in power. The wahyu is seen as the 
mystical quality that surrounds the Javanese leader. As the Javanese believe that there 
are parallel dimensions of political processes occurring in the secular world and the 
supernatural, spiritual legitimacy in the form of obtaining the wahyu is therefore critical 
in the course of the struggle for power. Thus, it can be argued here that the importance 
of the wahyu is that it provides the spiritual right for a ruler to possess power or to keep 
it in the ruler’s hands, so that he or she would have the privilege and the sacred mandate 
to rule and exercise authority. These politico-cultural phenomena illustrate how 
influential the supernatural potency is and show that the occult plays a part in political 
processes, thus illustrating that the traditional belief of the occult can go together with 
modern democratic politics. Ronenbaum & Siderberg’s The Occult and Political 
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Development (1971) argue that the ramifications of occult practices and beliefs in 
politics should not be regarded as ‘traditional’ since they may be helpful and supportive 
of the establishment of a modern political system. They put it thus: 
Of all the possible practices which might be classified as traditional, or even primitive, the 
occult initially appears to be the most inconsistent with political and social modernization. 
Superstition and the supernatural seem grossly inappropriate in the secularized world of 
science and technology often associated with modernity. Such a dismissal is premature, for 
occult practices may indeed be beneficial, under certain circumstances, for the creation of 
modern political and social systems. (Ronenbaum & Siderberg 1971:562) 
 
 In addition to connecting with the supernatural, power is also associated with the 
notion of pamrih (hidden personal motive) which means that those holding public 
power should not exercise it for their private benefit or self-aggrandizement but for the 
good of the people. Used as the moral principle of power, the concept is written in full 
as sepi ing pamrih, rame ing gawe suggesting that state officials should “refrain from 
indulging personal motives while working hard for the good of the state [and society]” 
(Anderson 1990:51). The pamrih may take the form of, among others, the accumulation 
of wealth, which is considered as unsuited to or even regarded as breaching that moral 
principle; and it becomes completely immoral if power-holders amass such wealth by 
becoming implicated in corruption. The accumulation of wealth through corruption 
symbolizes someone’s greed, lust and self-indulgence that contradict the value of 
asceticism in which the Javanese believe, as illustrated earlier. This emphasizes how 
important the moral dimension of power is, and if it does not exist then someone could 
easily fall into abusing their power in various ways, as the Dutch anthropologist Niels 
Mulder has warned: “…[with] the virtual absence of moral constraints on the use of 
power, there can be little wonder that corruption and social irresponsibility are rampant 
in Indonesia” (1978:70).   
 In this regard, the concept of pamrih explains why corruption has become the 
centre of national discourse and the subject of public condemnation, as people conceive 
that the state power must be exercised for the benefit of citizens, not for individuals 
occupying it. In the Javanese political tradition, corruption is a clear sign of the pamrih 
because striving for personal wealth definitely opposes the basic assumption that 
“Wealth should flow to the holder of Power as a consequence of the Power … wealth 
necessarily follows Power, not Power wealth” (Anderson 1990:53).  In this regard, 
corruption may result in a power struggle in the two intertwined contexts: (1) corruption 
can result within the power structures of the state with a number of parties involved in it 
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through the very complicated power relations among them; and (2) power-holders 
commit corruption for the sake of accumulating more wealth and of increasing their 
power. The idea of corruption is always connected with the establishment of power, but 
corruption-based establishment of power is morally contested. Here, ethics and moral 
values are obviously critical for the basis of exercising public office and maintaining 
political leadership. 
 
1.2 Javanese Wisdom as the Basis for Political Leadership    
 
This section explores the local wisdom and values of Javanese society which are used 
by the Javanese as ethical and moral bases for political leadership. After decades of 
experiencing an authoritarian system with the Javanese style of national leadership, 
Indonesia has now entered a new phase of political modernization as the country has 
established a democratic political system. Nevertheless, political leadership is 
developed by combining both modern values of democracy and traditional values 
referring to local wisdom within society.  With regard to Javanese wisdom, traditional 
values that are imparted to leaders usually refer to moral wisdom taken from the so-
called wayang (shadow puppet play), since it contains ideas of what a leader should 
learn and what wisdom s/he should have. The wayang tradition has existed in Java for 
centuries, dating back to the ancient history of the Hindu kingdoms, although there have 
been some modifications, adjusting to modern contexts. Originating in the Hindu 
tradition, the main stories of the wayang theatre are generally taken from the 
Mahabharata and the Ramayana epics, and portray the everlasting battle between good 
and evil (e.g. Geertz 1960; Brandon 1993 [1970]; Keeler 1982 & 1997; Sears 1996). 
Both good and evil characters of wayang figures are depicted, to show the quality of an 
individual whom leaders/people should mirror.  
 Among the famous wayang figures are the Pandhawa brothers and the Korawa 
brothers
4
 who represent contradictory characters of goodness and badness, as the first 
                                                 
4
 The Pandhawa and Korawa figures are taken from the most popular lakon (story) of the Bharatayudha 
battle. In The Religion of Java (1960), Geertz explains that “[i]n essence, the Mahabharata is the story of 
a struggle between cousins, the Pandhawas and the Korawas, the struggle which culminates in the great 
war of kinsmen, the Bharatayudha, during which the champions from each side face one another. … The 
immediate impulse is to call the Pandhawas who are certainly heroes, the “good” men and the Korawas, 
who are not quite so clearly villains, the “bad” men. … The struggle between the Pandhawas and the 
Korawas is an endless one—despites its seeming ending in the Bharatayuda war. The time-bound realities 
of good and evil, pleasure and pain, love and hate are dwarfed and rendered meaningless by the timeless 
and ultimately amoral background against which they are fought out.” (Geertz 1960:269) 
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group are portrayed as more spiritual, virtuous, benign and decent than the second one. 
Always placed on the right-hand side of the dhalang (puppeteer) during performances, 
the former symbolize such high moralities as generosity, benevolence, courage, bravery, 
love and compassion, and the like. Conversely, placed at all times on the left-hand side 
of the dhalang, the latter represent such low moralities as jealousy, greed, arrogance, 
chicanery, malevolence, resentment, and the like (e.g. Sears 1996; Pasuacker 2004).  
Derived from the Indian epics, the stories performed in the wayang have been adapted 
in the Javanese versions in which they always play dichotomous moralities through 
allegoric dramas.    
 As the wayang has been so influential in social and political life, it appears to be 
a symbolic representation of moral teachings for the Javanese. On the centrality of the 
wayang, I talked to Slamet Prawiro, a native of Java and a lecturer who teaches at 
Universitas Islam Negeri Jakarta, saying that it has been in the heart of the people. The 
wayang has provided abundant moral lessons from which both people and leaders could 
learn many aspects of life, both for private and public, including political, affairs. This 
is why when people talk about the actual problem of politics and political leadership, 
they very often apply allegories with reference to the shadow puppet play’s stories 
(lakon wayang). Prawiro then shared with me about the concept of leadership referring 
to the wayang wisdom called Hastabrata (eight prime characters of leadership). 
Derived from the Ramayana epic, the Hastabrata are moral teachings of the king Rama, 
the central figure of the lakon, appearing at the time of the defeat of Rahwana during the 
battle in the kingdom of Alengka. In essence, the Hastabrata principles suggest that a 
leader should be strong, wise, virtuous, decisive and determined. A leader must have the 
ability to create peace and order, eliminate crime and malevolence with the principle of 
impartiality, promote prosperity for the people, and fight against the enemy with 
courage and bravery in order to save the people and protect the sovereignty. The 
Hastabrata’s teachings make use of symbolism: earth, sun, moon, star, ocean, wind, sky 
and fire. Each of these symbols represents a certain quality of leadership (see Appendix 
for further illustration).
i
  
 A number of scholarly works (e.g. Koentjaraningrat 1985a; Anderson 1990; 
Pemberton 1994; Liddle 1996; Antlov & Cederroth 1998; Antlov & Helman 2005) have 
addressed the significance of Java with regard to the wider culture, identity, politics and 
leadership of the nation. In order to understand the ideals of Javanese leadership, Antlov 
& Cederroth’s Leadership on Java: Gentle Hints, Authoritarian Rule (1998) may help 
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one comprehend the nature of Javanese rulers and how they attain and maintain the 
power establishment. The authors address the central issue of political leadership 
through the examination of how Javanese leaders come to power, stay in power, and 
pass their power on by presenting some case studies in local and national contexts. The 
Javanese idea of leadership offers a concept called pandito ratu (saint-king)—first 
coined by Bagus Burhan, also well-known as Raden Ngabehi Ronggowarsito (d. in 
1873), the legendary poet of the Kraton Surakarta—which means a leader must acquire 
the quality of saint. This concept implies that a king—who is a saint and receives an 
enlightened feature—rules the kingdom by the grace, will and guidance of God. 
Following this concept, there is a collective imagination among the Javanese that a 
leader should have an association with those who are considered as holy figures 
resembling saints. Becoming pandito ratu, a leader should bear three main public 
responsibilities: (1) Berbudi bawa laksana, ambeg adil paramarta which means that he 
must be noble in conduct so that he is able to enforce justice and equality for the people; 
(2) Anjaga tata tentreming praja which means that he should make sure that people’s 
lives are orderly and peaceful; and (3) Memayu hayuning bawana which means that he 
should be involved in maintaining harmony with the universe, since all elements of life 
should always be in synergy with nature, from which the Hastabrata’s teachings are 
derived. In traditional Javanese society, political leadership rests on the identification 
with sacred figures becoming the main source of legitimacy. While the modern concept 
of political leadership is based on public approval, the traditional Javanese concept of it 
relies largely on charisma in which the authority of the leader is legitimized by ritual 
intensification and the possession of sacred symbols of authority (see e.g. 
Koentjaraningrat 1985b; Anderson 1990; Woodward 1989; Mulder 2005 [1998]).  
These two elements of leadership are critical, as Koentjaraningrat has illustrated: 
“In Javanese traditional society such ritual intensification has to take place repeatedly; 
on such occasions, sacred objects which symbolize authority occupy a central position” 
(1985b:291) in the political establishment. This is the main difference between the 
modern and the Javanese traditional concept of political leadership. Today, in 
accordance with the application of modern democracy, charisma is not the sole source 
of legitimacy. Political leadership should also obtain public approval through 
democratic election. However, in Java, political leaders still need to be associated with 
wali (saints) and holy figures; and this is the reason why they need to perform rituals in 
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sacred places, seeking blessings from them. In general, rituals performed for various 
purposes are very often connected with political processes, as illustrated in detail below. 
   
 
1.3 Sacred Rituals within Political Processes  
 
This section considers sacred rituals in connection with political activities by illustrating 
how they are preserved and practised by people within the context of political 
modernity. Although the system of secular democracy has been put in place, Indonesian 
politics has maintained traditional beliefs such as klenik (charlatanism, things related to 
the supernatural world). The klenik takes part in political processes despite the fact that 
the country has adopted modern democracy. In the context of modernity, politics takes 
place in a secular world and is dictated by secular reasoning with the use of rational 
judgment. In other words, politics has nothing to do with irrationality related to the 
supernatural forces. But this is not the case in Indonesian politics as it is connected with 
klenik, which implies the power of prophecy in political affairs.  
To illustrate the relation of klenik and politics, I introduce some stories. On 20 
October 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), a retired four-star General, was 
sworn-in to be the sixth president of Indonesia, becoming the first president who was 
directly elected by the people through a democratic election in the modern history of the 
country. Sadly, soon after his election, a series of misfortunes and distressing events 
happened that led Indonesians to an insufferable mourning. President SBY began 
assuming office with a deadly traffic accident taking place in the Jagorawi highway 
between the cities of Jakarta and Bogor on 17 November 2004. The collision of vehicles 
occurred as motorcade officers suddenly blocked toll road to prepare the way for 
convoy vehicles of the presidential security guards, causing six people to die while ten 
others were severely injured. Soon after the tragic accident, a series of natural disasters 
struck the country in the following years. The adversities include—mentioning just a 
few—landfill slide in Bandung in 2005; earthquakes in Papua and Alor in 2004 and in 
Padang, Yogyakarta, and Pangandaran in 2006; and volcanic eruptions in Yogyakarta in 
2006, which resulted in the death of thousands of people. The most upsetting disaster 
was of course tsunami that severely hit the Aceh and Nias regions in the Sumatra Island 
on 26 December 2004, which claimed the lives of more than 200,000 people and 
thousands more were missing. With such a huge number of victims, the Aceh-Nias 
tsunami had definitely become the most heartbreaking catastrophe of the nation.  
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In fact, all those catastrophic events could be explained with the help of 
scientific methods since earthquake, volcanic eruption, and tsunami are purely natural 
phenomena; while the topography of Indonesia is situated in the ring of fire which is 
vulnerable to those kinds of natural disasters. Despite the scientific accounts of those 
disastrous events, the Javanese people perceived them from the supernatural point of 
view, believing that all those misfortunes and upsetting events indicated the wrath of 
those occupying the otherworld, the power of the supernatural.  In this respect, 
Bakasura, a paranormal, claimed that it was President SBY himself who brought a great 
deal of bad luck for the country because his pawukon (Javanese horoscope) is shrouded 
by Bethari Durga—the goddess of destruction who created misfortunes for people.  
Bakasura claimed: 
In the Javanese primbons (mythical books of Java), SBY’s birthday
5
 is covered by wuku 
bolo (the innate power of the devil) representing darkness and bad fate as manifested in 
all sorts of havoc, mayhem and destruction. According to the Javanese horoscope, SBY 
caused various catastrophes for Indonesians; he created misfortunes for them. Certainly, 
SBY was elected by the people to be president, but nature rejected him. The goddess 
Bethari Durga was full of wrath so she sent a series of calamities to express her anger. 
That is why the ascendance of SBY as president consumed the lives of the people. 
(Quoted from interview, 2 September 2008)    
   
 What Bakasura described in essence represents traditional Javanese beliefs that 
some people are predestined to encounter misfortune due to the configuration of their 
birth. Therefore, a ritual called ruwatan (exorcistic rite) is needed in order to ward this 
off and to neutralize the wuku bolo as well. In regard to this, I spoke to Gunawan, a 
native of Surakarta, Central Java, who has very close relations with the Kraton 
Kasunanan Solo (or, Surakarta), as in 2004 he was granted the noble title of Kanjeng 
Raden Ariyo, often written in short: KRA. This is considered a very high status within 
the Sentono Dalem (inner circle of the noble family of the Kraton).  Since completing 
his tertiary education, Gunawan has been working as a professional in an interior design 
consultancy for several years. Having an interest in politics, he joined the National 
Mandate Party; and during the years 1998-2009, he served as chair of the local 
executive board of the Party in Surakarta and as one of the caretakers of the party’s 
central executive board in Jakarta. 
                                                 
5
 President SBY was born on 9 September 1949, often written 9949.  In public, people often gossip about 
SBY being deeply obsessed with the number 9, indicating that he strongly believes in klenik, as that 
number appears to have brought great fortune for SBY himself. Believing in number 9, therefore, SBY 
established his political party, the Democrat Party, on 9 September 2001, with the party’s initiator 
consisting of 99 people. However, his political opponents think the opposite, claiming that according to 
the Javanese pawukon, it has caused never-ending misfortunes for the Indonesian people.  
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On 17 June 2006, Gunawan held the ruwatan ceremony for President SBY that 
took place in the great mosque of the Kraton Kasunanan Surakarta. He explained that 
the ruwatan is a traditional ritual that has existed in Javanese society since ancient 
times, passed on through generations, and practised by the people during some special 
events. The ruwatan means a ceremony of wishing and hoping to be free from bad fate 
in life; while the main purpose of the ritual is to banish what is called sukerto (Javanese: 
bad luck) that afflicts people’s lives. As Mulder explained, the ruwatan is culturally “an 
attempt to change inauspicious coordinates to orderly ones, to undo the evil spell that 
hovers over persons who suffer from [an] involuntary state of affliction, who are 
sukerto” (2005 [1998]:85).  Indeed, it is essentially to pray to God asking for protection 
and prevention from all disturbances. Traditionally, with the ritual of ruwatan people 
hope that all kinds of misfortune and bad luck that upset them will be driven out, and 
they expect that their life will be safe and they will become prosperous. In fact, the 
ruwatan ceremony can be held in a wide variety of forms, depending on what the ritual 
is for. At some point, it may represent purely the so-called kejawen (Javanese-ism) with 
strong Hindu elements as it is usually conducted along with the performance of shadow 
puppet plays (wayang) presented as an offering to the ancestors and as an attempt to 
address the problems of those holding the ritual (see Koentjaraningrat 1985a; Sears 
1996:235-240).  
However, the ruwatan can also integrate some elements of Islamic values, as 
seen in the ceremony Gunawan carried out in the great mosque of the Kraton 
Kasunanan Surakarta. In the afternoon after Friday prayer, about six thousand Javanese 
Muslims attended the ruwatan (see figure 1.1), as in the Javanese primbon (mythical 
book), Friday, called Jumat Kliwon, is believed to be the day on which SBY was born.  
During the event, the jamaah (congregation) sat quietly inside the mosque, while many 
others flocked into the field outside since the mosque could not accommodate them. In 
the front line, there was a table covered by a green tablecloth. On the table, there were 
four tampahs (round woven bamboo trays) with banana leaves on which a variety of 
foods were served: nasi tumpeng (cone-shaped rice cooked with coconut milk), jajanan 
pasar (various [market] snacks), vegetables, fruits, and some baked black cockerels 
dished up for an exclusive ritual of the ruwatan. All these foods were presented as 
offerings which in essence symbolized gratitude and represented a prayer to Gusti, God; 
they were an expression of being grateful to God and a request to God for His blessings 
and good and safe life. It is important to note that for different ruwatan ceremony, the 
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kind of foods served as offering may also be distinct. During the ceremony, the 
Kraton’s ulama, KRHT Tafsir Anom, led the invocation and the jamaah all together 
invoked Allah Almighty for the safety of the nation. The invocation was solemnly 
chanted:  
Oh Lord, please kindly protect and save our nation from being ruined. Oh Lord, please 
kindly give your guidance and direction for our leaders to govern the country. Oh Lord, 
please kindly keep our country away from all dangers that threaten the life of the people. 
Oh Lord, please do not send us any disaster or catastrophe that are beyond our capacity 
to bear. (Quoted from Gunawan’s words, interview on 2 September 2009) 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The ruwatan ritual for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono held in the mosque 
of the Kraton Kasunanan Surakarta, Central Java. (Photo by informant) 
 
 
A similar ruwatan ceremony (see figure 1.2) was held three years later at the time of the 
2009 legislative election. The ruwatan ritual on that occasion seemed to be purely 
Javanese, since no Islamic elements were found in it; the ceremony did not take place in 
the mosque and Friday prayer was not performed. Wearing Javanese traditional outfits, 
batik skirts fitted with a modern style of blazer in various colours, along with blankon (a 
typical Javanese hat), a group of respected figures sat tranquilly in the main room of 
Gunawan’s private museum in Surakarta. Given the sense of kejawen, the museum was 
replete with plenty of framed drawings of wayang figures hung on the wall, 
symbolizing how puppet shadow plays have become immensely integrated in the life of 
the Javanese, reflecting social, cultural and political meanings. As part of the 
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requirements for the ruwatan ceremony, two packages of offerings were served, 
consisting of nasi tumpeng alongside various vegetables and two cooked ducks put on 
the tray and seven kinds of fruits put on a separate tray. During the ruwatan ritual, they 
quietly intoned words of invocation supplicating the safety of the country during the 
general election event, as follows: 
Oh Lord, please kindly pour your blessings on our country and bring peace and order for 
our people. Oh Lord, kindly leave out all sufferings and difficulties from our society; 
instead, please bring prosperity and well-being for the whole people. Oh Lord, please 
secure our safety and give us strength to prevent general elections from falling into 
political conflict which would affect the social life of the people. (Quoted from 
Gunawan’s words, interview on 2 September 2009) 
 
 
Figure 1.2: The ruwatan ritual of the 2009 general elections taking place in Gunawan’s 
mansion in Surakarta, Central Java. (Photo by informant) 
 
 In traditional Javanese culture, the ruwatan ceremony seems to be similar to the 
slametan ritual in the sense that, as Geertz wrote, “it symbolizes the mystic and social 
unity of those participating in it” (1960:11). Moreover, the slametan also “forms a kind 
of social universal joint, fitting the various aspects of social life and individual 
experience together in a way which minimizes uncertainty, tension, and conflict …” 
(Geertz 1960:11).  As the purpose of the slametan ritual is basically to strengthen social 
solidarity and reinforce social harmony among the community members, as well as to 
empower people in facing uncertainty and to prevent conflict from happening, so the 
ruwatan ritual is essentially to expel misfortune, create peaceful hearts in dealing with 
calamity and uncertainty, and make people’s lives safer.  
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Although the ruwatan is usually associated with social and cultural events, it has 
now been brought onto the political stage, as the ritual is carried out for political 
purposes. The ruwatan of SBY’s presidency and of the general elections arranged by 
Gunawan must be seen as the contemporary use of a traditional mechanism of an 
exorcistic rite to cleanse spiritually all the negative aspects of political processes and the 
dynamics of power struggles.  In essence, the ruwatan is a cultural ritual for the spiritual 
purification of all contenders of the general elections, thus becoming a softly symbolic 
measure to cast out evil spirits during the vicious political contests and an attempt to 
rebalance the social and spiritual disharmony that result from the fierce contest of the 
general elections (Pemilu). Here it can be argued that the ruwatan is a cultural medium 
for releasing unforeseen threats, banning bad luck, and thwarting conflict. It is used as a 
sort of spiritual relief when people feel endangered by destructive powers which might 
appear during the event of the Pemilu. The similarities of the slametan and the ruwatan 
rest in large part on the wishes of the people to obtain security, social prosperity, 
cultural well-being, and freedom from all sorts of difficulties or grievances either 
created by human beings or resulting from the supernatural. 
Furthermore, through the ruwatan ritual, the secular events of general elections 
and political processes of power struggles are transformed into spiritual rites of passage 
by contextualizing them within a supernatural dimension. The ruwatan ceremony 
acknowledges the power of the supernatural as participants search for protection from 
God by requesting security and prosperity in order for them to be able to carry out 
political activities smoothly. The ruwatan rituals of SBY’s presidency and the Pemilu 
clearly illustrate, borrowing Geertz’s words, how “political debate and religious 
propitiation [are] carried out in the same vocabulary” (1973:166). Like the slametan, the 
ruwatan ritual itself usually takes place at local level, but it maintains national 
orientations beyond the borders of the localities. As James Siegel has described: “the 
ritual makes gestures to authorities outside the boundaries of the village, whether 
Islamic or Hindu, for instance, or national, since the different beliefs of the slametan are 
associated today as they were in the 1950s with various national political organizations” 
(2006:141).  In this regard, it is argued that the importance of the ruwatan lies in its 
representing the symbolic authority of the supernatural, towards which the participants 
address their supplications for protection from any sort of dangers, misfortunes, 
catastrophes, and the like during the political processes. Relying on the supernatural 
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indicates that politicians have strong tendencies to believe and practise mysticism, as 
the way in which they want to reach power.   
 
1.4 Mysticism, Politics, and Pathways of Power 
 
In what follows I continue to illustrate how mysticism and politics are intertwined and 
what sorts of pathways of power are taken by politicians at the time of political contest. 
During the months of the 2009 general elections, politicians were competing with each 
other to be elected as legislators. They stood in the legislative election held on 9 April to 
secure seats at the House of Representatives by employing a wide range of ways in 
order to obtain political positions. Among the very common methods of gaining popular 
votes and of being elected as an MP were public campaigns through the use of 
advertisements in both electronic and print media; or through the distribution of leaflets, 
brochures and street banners. Other methods of political campaigns were in the form of 
meeting people directly in constituencies and of mobilizing supporters in the districts 
through public congregation. To attract participants, they carried out various social 
activities, such as mass circumcisions, bazaars or markets with low priced foods and 
goods, social services at orphanages, and others. 
Interestingly, many politicians also took rather unusual actions that seemed 
bizarre in the view of the ‘rationalists’. They came to sacred sites and performed 
meditation in order to receive some help from ancestors and those occupying the 
supernatural world, hoping that they would be able to reach their political objective. To 
examine such phenomena, I approached an informant, named Bahasim, who was 
running for legislative election through the Golkar Party, as he had particular experience 
of observing mystical practice performed by politicians at the time of the 2009 general 
elections. Bahasim is an activist associated with the Nahdhatul Ulama in which he has 
been one of the executive board members for several years. The NU has become the 
primary basis for him to develop social network links with the grass roots and to 
maintain popular support, both of which are very important for political activities in the 
constituencies. During the parliamentary election, Bahasim was standing for election as 
an MP representing the districts of Bantaran, Sindangan, and Babatan (all 
pseudonyms)—all part of the East Java province. At the time of the public campaigns, 
he stayed in those districts for two months intermittently to mobilize popular support 
which was critical for winning the political contest. Bahasim maintained very close 
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relations with some key figures in those regions to help him socialize his agenda for the 
constituents and appeal to them to vote for him. When he visited Babatan, some local 
contacts mentioned that the political contest for the legislative election was very fierce, 
since politicians usually employed various means to win. They suggested that it would 
be good for Bahasim to come to ahli hikmah—a devout Muslim who acquires spiritual 
knowledge, asking for jimat (amulets) for spiritual backing. Bahasim shared his 
experience: 
I was told by some of my contacts in the locality that the use of magical power was very 
commonplace in political contests such as the event of general elections. They then took 
me to some key spiritual figures to get some advice on how to protect myself from 
demonic forces and help me achieve my political goal. They suggested that I should have 
some talismans for self-protection. Besides these, amulets were also important for me in 
support of my efforts so that I would be successful in the political contest and able to 
achieve what I wanted. (Quoted from interview, 29 January 2009) 
 
 
Figure 1.3: A talisman appears in the form of keris (wavy double bladed dagger) with an 
Arabic-looking calligraphy. It is believed to be very powerful for accumulating magical 
energies for those carrying it. 
 
Figure 1.4: A talisman of attraction appears in the form of Arabic words and numbers. It 
is believed that one who carries it will find people become attracted to the bearer and 
supportive of that person’s efforts. 
 
Figure 1.3     Figure 1.4 
                              
 
Bahasim was advised that by carrying talismans and amulets, he would be able to 
concentrate power in order to overcome any sort of difficulties during the furious 
political struggle at the time of election campaigns. As amulets and talismans represent 
the supernatural qualities, Bahasim’s local contacts suggested that those magical items 
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would make him feel secure and protected. This is actually a very common belief, as the 
anthropologist Gonzales-Wippler has explained, and people usually employ them for 
protective purposes or for strength and self-assurance; while the main intention of 
carrying them is “to attract good luck, to dispel evil, and to banish fear,” since they are 
considered to be “the most potent weapon against fear” (Gonzales-Wippler 1991: xv).  
Similarly, Stanley Tambiah, writing of the cult of amulets among the Thai people, has 
observed that it is very commonplace to find “people carry some on their person in 
some other way and also keep a number in their homes to be cherished, looked at, and 
asked for protection or good fortune according to need” (1984:196). The amulets are 
worn not merely to represent ‘superstition’ or ‘idolatry’ on such magical objects, but 
also to indicate that the wearers desire power. Tambiah suggestively wrote:  
Many amulet wearers would usually ... say a sacred formula (gatha) to the amulet and 
then using both hands transfer its virtue and power to their own heads. Moreover, in 
order to replenish the potency of the amulets, wearers would present them for further 
sacralization by famous monks or holy men, who would touch them with their hands, say 
words, and sprinkle them with holy water (tham hai saksit, meaning to render powerful). 
(Tambiah 1984:196) 
 
Tambiah’s observation suits what Bahasim had experienced, mentioning that in the 
course of a political contest, the amulets, especially when blessed by the spiritual 
figures or the ahli hikmahs, were avidly sought by many politicians as they believed that 
the ahli hikmahs acquire and maintain what is called ma’unah (extraordinary spiritual 
knowledge and skills) and karomah (extraordinary spiritual grace).  
 In addition, some local contacts of Bahasim also showed him mystical practice 
performed by some politicians for the sake of political power. One day in February 
2009, they took Bahasim to Alas Agung (alas means jungle) in the district of Babatan to 
observe a ritual meditation performed not only by local residents but also by people 
coming from other cities and regions. Bahasim witnessed many legislative candidates 
for local parliaments and the House visiting three most sacred caves—Gua Istana, Gua 
Mayangkoro, Gua Padepokan—which are located inside Alas Agung, to perform 
meditation seeking for spiritual hints in order to smoothen their way towards gaining 
power. In the tradition of Javanese mysticism, it is commonly recognized that for 
centuries Alas Agung has been a sacred space, drawing mystics from elsewhere in Java 
to experience its spiritual powers, as they believe that spirits inhabit rivers, rocks, and 
trees. In kebatinan (Javanese mysticism), mystical belief centres on inner and outer 
spirituality, looking into the connection between the natural and the supernatural, as 
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both are believed to be intertwined.  In Javanese mysticism, people are convinced that 
there is a continuum line between the natural world and the spirits that occupy the 
supernatural world, and they seem to have found favourable sacred places in Alas 
Agung to practise mystical belief. 
It is widely acknowledged that, according to Javanese cosmological belief, Alas 
Agung in East Java, Alas Roban in Central Java, and the coastal area of Ujung Kulon in 
Banten are centres of mystical powers, having become powerful spirit-sites where 
supernatural beings dwell. According to such belief, spirits residing in those three 
places are believed to be the guardians of Java. This is why many politicians perform 
meditation there, to obtain some kind of mystical powers. These places are considered 
to be the most promising sacred sites to search for so-called wangsit (spiritual hints).  
The wangsit was critical, indicating that someone would gain power, so politicians 
needed to reach it in order to help them spiritually to secure seats in the House during 
the 2009 legislative election. There were some requirements that needed to be met by 
those who wanted to carry out such a ritual. Before performing their meditation they 
were required to bathe first in the Tempuran River, which links two rivers, Parangireng 
and Sendangsuro, which are regarded as the twin sources of magical energies. Bathing 
in the Tempuran River is spiritually believed to make people become sympathetic, 
lovely, and attractive to others. In addition to bathing, those who intended to perform 
meditation were also advised to carry with them magical heirlooms (pusaka) such as 
keris (Javanese dagger), batu delima (ruby, garnet), and the like which are believed to 
make them spiritually become strong. The pusaka are very important because they are 
connected with the possession and preservation of power, as Woodward has expounded: 
“Pusaka are the primary means through which the power of the past is preserved. They 
are objects associated with particularly powerful persons in Javanese history. Pusaka 
can be used to perform magical acts requiring power greater than that which can be 
generated by living humans” (2010:80).  
These phenomena show how politicians make a great deal of effort in order to 
achieve political goals by using all possible measures including mystical ones, in 
addition to their regular efforts of public campaigns in support of their political contest. 
Nevertheless, mysticism is not merely practised for political purposes, but more 
importantly it matters in everyday life within society as it is an essential element of 
Javanese culture and identity (e.g. Geertz 1960; Mulder 1978; Koentjaraningrat 1985a; 
Woodward 1989; Mulder 2005 [1998]; Beatty [1999] 2003).  For the Javanese, the 
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belief and practice of mysticism are to recognize the harmony of the material and the 
spiritual, and the unity of nature and the supernatural, as Mulder puts it:  
[M]an actively and inevitably participates in the all-encompassing unity of material and 
spiritual existence. The spiritual aspect is superior, more true as it were. ... Harmony and 
unity with ultimate essence is the purpose of all life. ... Nature and supernature mutually 
influence each other, and causality is implied in their coordination. When coordination 
occurs or is brought about, events and conditions have to follow. This is valid both for 
pure mysticism and for magic. (Mulder 2005 [1998]:36) 
  
Nevertheless, Javanese mysticism has appeared as the subject of controversy especially 
among puritan Muslims—those who strictly follow pure Islamic orthodoxies. They 
consider that Javanese mysticism, particularly in the form of kejawen/kebatinan, is ‘un-
Islamic’ since it contains some elements of Hindu traditions and values that are viewed 
as opposed to and in contradiction with Islamic faith. In this sense, for reformist 
Muslims, many ‘Javanist’ or ‘mystical’ practices are highly controversial, and they view 
that there is a disharmony between kejawen/kebatinan and Islam. For them, Javanese 
mysticism is to be problematic and contested since it is regarded as being incompatible 
with Islamic teachings. Indeed for puritan Muslims, being ‘Javanist’ and those 
practising Javanese mystical beliefs are seen to be not  good Muslims who are supposed 
to strictly follow the teachings in the Qur’an and the Hadith and practise religious 
beliefs and values according to the doctrines with reference to the Prophet Muhammad’s 
example. Therefore, although notions of ‘supernatural power’ remain important for 
many Javanese, they cannot be unproblematically assumed to be of continued 
importance for all Javanese people. Here, it can be argued that the idea of supernatural 
power gained from zealous mystical practice can be contested by the Javanese 
themselves coming from different traditions at different times. 
 To compare cases, I approached another informant, named Budiyanto, who was 
a legislative candidate associated with the National Mandate Party. After completing his 
tertiary education, Budiyanto initiated his professional career as a journalist, which gave 
him the opportunity to develop personal relations with a large number of political elites 
and to establish social networking.  He found them very helpful in facilitating him to 
enter the world of politics. I met Budiyanto in his office in Jakarta as he was willing to 
share his personal experience about political contests with the use of the mystical way. 
During the 2009 general elections, he stood for parliamentary election to be an MP 
representing the districts of Bidara, Gambiran, Pagarati, and Rembulan (all 
pseudonyms), in the Central Java province.  At the time of the election campaigns, he 
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spent two months in the field to visit constituents and meet potential voters.  During the 
months of public campaigns, Budiyanto worked hand in hand with a number of local 
legislative candidates across political parties who were running for local parliaments, 
since he himself is not native of any of those regions. A local contact of Budiyanto in 
Bidara then facilitated him to meet an influential local leader, Mbah Sutarto, who is 
believed to be a spiritual figure to whom many local legislative candidates turned for 
help. Mbah Sutarto advised him that regular campaigns to encourage voters were not 
enough; he should combine these with other efforts through the supernatural way along 
with performing a series of rituals in order to win the legislative election.  
 
Figure 1.5: A keris (dagger) appears in the shape of a ballpoint which is believed to have 
belonged to President Soekarno and contains magical power, as Soekarno’s name is engraved  
on its handle and an Arabic inscription of kalimat syahadat (the confession of Islamic faith) is 
engraved on its sheath. 
 
 Upon foreseeing Budiyanto’s fortune, Mbah Sutarto gave him three items—
keris, salt, and tumeric rice (beras kuning)—which had been placed under a spell, while 
convincing him that they would spiritually help him to achieve his political goal. The 
salt was to be cast in the yard of his house; the tumeric rice was to be eaten whenever he 
left home; and the keris would protect him from dangers and give him spiritual strength. 
Besides this, he was advised to perform a ritual purification by taking a bath at midnight 
together with his wife along with seven kinds of flowers, as these would purify his heart 
and avert any negative intent and lust which could damage his sincerity to serve people 
in the Parliament once he reached it. Having completed these processes, Budiyanto and 
other local legislative candidates took part in a cultural ritual arranged by Mbah Sutarto 
in his private home in Bidara. Before the ceremony began, he introduced Budiyanto to 
all the attendees, asking them to help him persuade people to elect him on the day of 
polling. After a short talk, Mbah Sutarto changed into a traditional costume used for a 
ritual. Wearing a black costume with blankon and sacred keris belted onto his waist, 
Mbah Sutarto led a ritual of meditation for about thirty minutes. Sitting on the floor, he 
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gently chanted spells in Javanese in front of incense along with kemenyan (gum, 
benzoine) and various flowers put in a basin with salted water, while Budiyanto, other 
local politicians, and a quite a large number of followers formed lines behind Mbah 
Sutarto, following the ritual process with tranquility. 
After completing it, they all travelled together to the districts where they would 
be contesting for legislative election, in order to visit constituents and meet people 
there; the journey itself lasted the whole day and night. During the visit, each legislative 
candidate poured tumeric rice in several places in some certain villages, symbolizing 
that those legislative candidates would bring prosperity and welfare to the people who 
live there, with the hope that they would vote them. The journey ended with another 
ritual at midnight, which took place at the sacred grave of Ki Ageng Pamanahan—the 
highly respected figure who was the founder of the Mataram Sultanate of Surakarta 
(Solo).  For the ritual, Budiyanto brought three bags of various flowers given to Mbah 
Sutarto as a form of symbolic offering presented to Ki Ageng Pamanahan.  During the 
ritual, Mbah Sutarto portrayed himself as a spirit medium to communicate with Ki 
Ageng Pamanahan’s spirit, asking him for his blessings to be poured upon those who 
were running for legislative election. In Javanese tradition, the practice of spirit 
communication has become a part of the culture of politics, dating back to past times 
(e.g. Pemberton 1994).  
The experiences of both Bahasim and Budiyanto clearly show that from the 
Javanese point of view the political contest during the parliamentary election was not 
merely a secular event. It was indeed related to the supernatural as politicians were keen 
to receive the so-called restu (spiritual approval) from the ancestors, since they believe 
that “[t]he ancestors were engaged by people as sources of information on their personal 
future as well as on specific political issues because they were vital to both personal and 
political success” (Bubandt 2009:295).  As described, mystical belief and practice have 
appeared on the political scene through the event of the 2009 general elections, as an 
assertion that politics cannot be detached from mysticism.  
The main argument in support of the ethnographic materials presented here 
refers to John Pemberton’s On the Subject of “Java” (1994).  He too pointed out that 
sacred grave sites of the holy figures, such as Javanese kings and Muslim saints, have 
become the source of spiritual powers and social-political legitimacy. Those wishing to 
gain political powers usually need to perform pilgrimages to those sacred sites which 
are believed to have a mystical influence to help one reach a high position with the 
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blessings of the holy figures. Drawing upon the culture of politics in Java, Pemberton 
illustrates how the Javanese people believe in mysticism and practise it for various 
intentions; and how rituals are required in order to reach mystical powers. They believe 
that the mausoleums of Javanese kings and the tombs of Javano-Islamic saints are a 
source of magical powers, as the old Javanese rulers always practised traditional rituals 
and performed pilgrimages to those sacred sites to pay respect to ancestral spirits and 
venerate Muslim saints in order to achieve spiritual blessings. On the centrality of 
sacred sites, Pemberton explains: 
Although much of the historical significance attracted to Central Java’s supernatural 
periphery derives from the spiritual campaigns of would-be kings as they retracted the 
ascetic steps of previous mythical politicos, the promise of kingship was not the only 
attraction guiding generations of pilgrims. Beyond the isolated rare instances of royal 
blessings granted lay a vast spectrum of magical powers and esoteric knowledge sought 
by professionals: shamanic dhukun, shadow-puppeteers, military commanders, religious 
leaders, court authors, and others. (Pemberton 1994:272) 
    
 In Javanese mythology, the sacred grave sites are the axis of spiritual powers, 
since kings or saints might bestow their blessings to those performing pilgrimages. With 
this kind of reasoning, the veneration of ancestors through traditional rituals at holy 
places (kramat) which are believed to be spiritually endowed is at the centre of Javanese 
culture. Such rituals are conceived as a way of approaching the ancestors’spirits with 
the hope of receiving benefactions, boons, and blessings.  In order to obtain blessings 
from the holy figures, the role of spirit mediums is therefore very important since they 
claim the ability to communicate with ancestral spirits. This kind of ability is 
traditionally inherited from the ancestors and has thrived by continuous practice over 
time, as Pemberton explains: “Spirit mediums who perform professional services at 
kramat grave sites maintain that their talents are thoroughly ‘traditional’ and rooted in 
Javanese practices of the past” (1994:300).  All these socio-cultural phenomena show 
how dominant the mystical and supernatural powers are in the political processes, thus 
indicating that they are used in support of struggling for power, as Woodward has 
clearly pointed out: “Power is acquired by the performance of tapa [ascetic meditation] 
or by merging one’s spirit with one of the sources of power in the universe. One of the 
aims of Javanese mysticism is to acquire the ability to control the flow of power in the 
universe, directing it toward one’s personal goals” (1989:166).  Therefore, it can be 
understood why mysticism is prevalent in politics, and why politicians are willing to 
practise a series of rituals in sacred sites which are considered to be the source of 
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spiritual powers. As political mysticism becomes a common phenomenon, however, it 
becomes the subject of caricatural critique in the media. 
 
1.5 The Media Representation of Political Mysticism  
 
To conclude this chapter, I look at how the media describe the phenomenon of political 
mysticism through reporting and caricatures in which mysticism in politics is depicted, 
in order to illustrate how it has become part of social life among Indonesians. The 
media bring political mysticism into public discourse in the context of democratic 
elections, asserting that it has become ingrained in the culture of society. A series of 
articles appeared in a national newspaper, Warta Kota, in the editions of 19 February 
 
and 17 March 2009, reporting that many politicians who were running for legislative 
election approached dukun peramal (a soothsayer, foreteller) and paranormal, asking for 
spiritual advice. They also visited sacred sites (e.g. graves of holy figures) to receive 
divine inspiration. In the publications, a well-known paranormal, Joko Bodo, was 
reported to have a large number of clients who were mostly legislative candidates 
asking him for help in winning parliamentary contests and to become an MP. The most 
common requests by politicians to dukun and paranormal were how to make people love 
them, give their sympathy to them, and eventually vote for them on the day of polling. 
These phenomena indicate that the world of Indonesian politics is replete with mystical 
beliefs, and show how politicians appear to have tended to rest on soothsayers in order 
to help them reach their political goals. 
In addition to these reports, it is interesting to see how the belief in the 
supernatural shows up in caricatures which are published as cynical illustrations, such 
as those depicted by GM Sudharta of the Kompas daily.  Figure 1.6 shows a politician 
(as the word politisi is written on the bag) standing for legislative election who comes to 
a dukun  asking for help, saying: “Mohon petunjuk Mbah, agar saya bisa memperoleh 
kursi” (Grandfather, please kindly give me some hints on how I could secure a seat in 
the House); and the dukun simply responds to the request: “Berjalanlah ke arah timur, 
di sana kamu temui pameran furnitur” (You should go down towards the east and you 
will find a furniture exhibition there).  Sudharta illustrates the point that the dukun’s 
response does not actually meet the politician’s request, so it is just a political joke 
showing that politician goes to the wrong person, whom he thought was a soothsayer 
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whom he initially believes to have spiritual knowledge and skills to foresee his fortune. 
The cartoon depicts the politician apparently stunned by such a response.  
 
Figure 1.6: A funny dialogue between a politician and a dukun peramal (Caricature by an artist of 
Kompas) 
  
Similarly, in figure 1.7, Sudharta allegorically describes how Oom Pasikom (an 
imaginary character) visits a fortune-teller, while a boy stares at him incredulously, 
asking her to predict his fate during the 2009 general elections, as he is running for 
legislative election. Relying on the fortune-teller’s power of prophecy, Oom Pasikom, 
representing a politician, tries to obtain her help by saying: “It’s not about natural 
disasters, Madame … But, I am deeply concerned about my fortune during the 
parliamentary election.” What appears in this caricature represents the dynamics of 
political contest during the event of general elections, showing that many politicians 
make use of all kinds of means in order to achieve their political objectives. 
 
Figure 1.7: Om Pasikom asks for spiritual advice to a fortune-teller (Caricature by 
Sudharta of Kompas) 
 
 
 It is indeed interesting to observe such phenomena in which politicians rest their 
fate on things beyond the principles of logic and rationality in support of their political 
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activities. As presented, politicians believe that paranormals and soothsayers could help 
them, through supernatural means, to achieve what they want. This kind of belief is very 
common, especially among the Javanese, and is part of the culture of the society. The 
anthropological study of Niels Mulder, Mysticism in Java (2005 [1998]), is particularly 
helpful in order to understand the culture and political mysticism of the Javanese, as he 
provides major insights into what lies behind the power play in the political and cultural 
arenas in Indonesia.  There is a tendency to rely on the belief that the fate of every 
human being could be discovered through mystical means or prophecy, as he has 
pointed out:  
The fact that life is subject to cosmic law and part of an inescapable order stimulates 
fascination with prophecy and projective action. Because the cosmic design has been 
‘fixed’, it may also be known; it remains a matter of discovering its coordinates to know 
the future. Prediction is thus possible if one has access to the great scheme by way of 
medication or mystical practice, magical calculation, or knowledge of horoscopy. 
(Mulder [1998] 2005:87) 
 
 Such phenomena indicate that although the political contest of becoming an MP 
takes place within a secular democratic election, politicians nevertheless rely on 
supernatural forces with the help of those who are believed to have spiritual knowledge. 
This shows that occult politics does exist in the country in modern times. The politico-
cultural phenomena of the occult surely suit what Koentjaraningrat has expounded: 
“The Javanese believe that not only magical energy but also supernatural beings can be 
manipulated and controlled for magical achievement of a desire goal” (1985a:413).  
Such a tendency could not simply be understood in contrast to political modernization 
and reflecting a traditional mentality. Therefore, the occult should not be considered as 
being inconsistent with or opposed to social and political modernization, since the 
occult itself is very often connected with political control and legitimacy. However, 
from the view of the ‘rationalists’, superstition and the supernatural are often seen as 
being incompatible with political modernity, which largely relies on the supremacy of 
secular science, logic, and rationality. Yet one needs to be critical of the rejection of 
occult practice, as many politicians benefit from it in support of their ambition to 
achieve political power. As the world of Indonesian politics recognizes the involvement 
of the supernatural in political processes, the occult appears to be a common social 
phenomenon. It is argued that political mysticism and occult belief and practice in 
Indonesia are deeply rooted in the history of the country.  Moreover, the occult and 
superstition are not always in opposition to the establishment of the modern system of 
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political democracy. The world of contemporary Indonesian politics clearly shows how 
modern values of democracy are adopted within the new political system, while 
traditional values of political mysticism are still alive. Indonesia has demonstrated how 
the two different values are synergized within the social and political systems, and the 
people mix them up to express their openness to political modernity and their ability to 
absorb modern democratic values, while keeping traditional values as seen in occult 
practice in parallel with political contestation during democratic elections. As political 
mysticism has become intensely entrenched in the culture of Indonesian society, it 
cannot easily be altered despite the country embracing modern democracy. Thinking of 
the parallel dimensions of the occult and political modernization, Rosenbaum & 
Siderberg, again, provide insights: 
Reliance on prophecy by those who are in need of confidence has, as with other aspects 
of the occult, mixed significance for modernization. If the source of stress is not 
specifically definable but is prompted by the general environment, then occult practices 
may positively benefit modernization. (Rosenbaum & Siderberg 1971:572) 
 
 Within the country’s socio-cultural setting, pathways of power through mystical 
practices are now challenged by modern political ideas represented in democratic 
elections which are based on secular reasoning. From the perspective of political 
modernity, politicians wishing to reach power should engage in public campaigns 
appealing people to vote for them, promote social and economic policies, offer 
attractive development agendas and programmes, and participate in general elections.  
Therefore, it is sensible for people to question why politicians should go to soothsayers 
or paranormals, and practise mystical rituals to win political contests while democratic 
elections are secular events. These unique phenomena seem to have become a strategy 
of adaptation as politicians blend the two different trends of social ideologies in order to 
survive in political contests. What appears on the political scene is a sort of cultural 
creativity in bridging the ideas of tradition and modernity; instead of presenting the two 
distinct streams of mystical belief and secular political practice as a contradiction, they 
join them together. While they embrace a democratic system that is reliant on human 
rationality, they continue to believe and practise mysticism in politics. Indeed, such 
distinctive phenomena should not be seen as, borrowing Geertz’s words, “clashes of 
opposed mentalities […] but as the substance of the struggle to create an institutional 
structure for the country” (1973:314), that allow the people to accommodate various 
values: the political aspiration of modern democracy and the cultural orientation of 
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traditional beliefs. However, the fact remains that such accommodation is to some 
extent contested, for instance by the media, in cartoons, and by political commentators, 
as this chapter illustrates. 
1.6 Conclusion 
To conclude the discussion in this chapter, it can be highlighted that Indonesian politics 
is now entering a new and unprecedented phase which could be described as modern 
democratic politics shrouded by mystical beliefs which are inherited from ancestral 
traditions. Just to follow the argument presented earlier, that tradition and 
modernization are the continuum social phenomena in the history of human societies, 
these are surely the case in Indonesian politics. Here it can be emphasized that the world 
of Indonesian politics is closely associated with mystical beliefs, and politicians seeking 
power are willing to perform sacred rituals with the help of a dukun or paranormal, who 
are believed to be able to connect them with the supernatural world. Interestingly, this 
tradition of political practice takes place alongside modern democracy which relies on 
secular rationality. This is actually the primary contribution of this study, showing how 
political mysticism goes together with political modernity. Moreover, the study has also 
shown that this kind of political practice is challenged by the aspirants of modern-
secular democracy.  
Departing from the previous studies of other scholars, such as Anderson ([1972] 
1990) who looked at how Javanese conceptualize power with reference to their cultural 
values, Mulder (1996, 1998) who observed how kebatinan (Javanese mysticism) 
becomes the very strong identity of the society practised in everyday life, and 
Pemberton (1994) who explored rituals and culture with the use of historical analysis, 
this study demonstrates how contemporary Indonesian politics becomes a medium of 
cultural contest between the ideas and practices of political mysticism and those of 
rational democratic politics. These findings have not been argued yet by those scholars 
in their scholarly works. In fact, Indonesia is a country in which ancient patterns of 
beliefs—in the forms of mysticism, the occult, superstition, prophecy, and so forth—
exist along with modern political practices and a system of modern democracy. With 
reference to this ancient tradition, it is plausible that Indonesian politics is also 
enlivened with magic and sorcery. They play a part in political contestation and make 
the power struggle dynamic and intense, as the next chapter will discuss. 
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Chapter 2 
 
WITCHCRAFT AND POLITICAL CONTESTATION AT THE TIME OF 
THE 2009 GENERAL ELECTIONS 
  
 
The central argument of this chapter is that Indonesian politics absorbs the mixed ideas 
of magic and witchcraft while it embraces a modern democratic system. This chapter 
therefore seeks to address the issues of sorcery and politics by illustrating the relations 
between the two and showing how witchcraft plays a part in political processes. 
Discourses of witchcraft and politics will be explored through the case studies of the 
2009 general elections, which demonstrate how political contest during the event is 
enlivened by the narrative of sorcery. This chapter will also examine the contesting 
ideas of being both traditional and modern, and how they appear in the political 
contestation that instigates much public controversy. The chapter will illustrate how the 
idea of witchcraft emerges alongside political transformation into the modern 
democratic system. It will elucidate how witchcraft, like corruption, is utilized as a 
channel of power. In this context, the main aim of the chapter is to introduce the 
discourse of witchcraft and power, followed by the discussion of witchcraft and 
corruption in the next chapter.  
2.1 The Media Discourse on Witchcraft and Politics 
The issue of witchcraft usually appears in public talk through accusations, thus 
becoming the way in which people develop their understanding of sorcery in the context 
of politics. To begin with, I introduce here some stories about witchcraft accusations 
appearing in public discourse which enliven political debate among politicians and 
Indonesian people in general. There are some illustrations on the issue of witchcraft 
related to political contest materializing in the media. In the months of political 
campaigns during the 2009 general elections, the issue of sorcery blossomed into public 
narrative, becoming a matter of interest to the people, as a bi-weekly magazine, 
Misteri,
6
 produced a series of articles addressing the gossip of sorcery in the world of 
                                                 
6
 In the eyes of the public, Misteri is categorized as a magazine full of rumours and gossip, but 
fascinatingly, it has a huge number of readers. Each issue produces roughly 75,000 to 80,000 copies. 
More interestingly, its readers come from a wide range of social groups: from urban-educated people, 
professionals and middle class, to domestic staff who are less educated. The chief editor is a lecturer with 
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Indonesian politics. In its four articles, the editor informed its readers about the 
phenomena among politicians of using sorcery when they were vying with each other to 
be elected as a legislator through the general elections. For example, in the edition of 5 
February 2009 the Misteri published the topic of ‘Perang Gaib Para Caleg’ (magical 
wars among legislative candidates) reporting that many politicians came to dukun 
(sorcerers) asking for help to attack their competitors with the use of black magic, and 
to pave the way for themselves to win the political contest. And for the 20 May 2009 
edition, it introduced a special piece entitled ‘SBY Jadi Target Santet’ (President 
Yudhoyono becomes the target of witchcraft attacks) depicting that the 2009 
presidential race was replete with black magic forces, and claiming that sorcery was 
used by either the candidate for president or their supporters to win the race. 
Meanwhile, for the 20 June 2009 edition it addressed the theme of ‘Pertanda Gaib 
Jelang Pilpres’ (mystical signs of the presidential election), indicating that there were 
plenty of mystical hints coming from the ‘otherworld’ domain given to each presidential 
candidate that he/she would be winning the election. Moreover, for the 5 July 2009 
edition it took up the topic of ‘Perburuan Mustika Jabatan’ (in search of magic jewels 
to gain power) describing how politicians were obsessed with magical objects in which 
they believed, and how they made efforts to reach political power smoothly by wearing 
amulets and visiting sacred sites to do meditation. However, these articles were met 
with scepticism, especially among those regarded as ‘rationalists’. They seemed to 
ignore the role of magic and sorcery in politics because they believed that the political 
contest during the 2009 general elections was a secular event. 
To learn how witchcraft is applied in politics, one needs to look at studies of the 
subject conducted by anthropologists. Generally, anthropological studies help us to 
understand the social phenomena of witchcraft and politics by explaining them in the 
context of political contestation where accusations manifested in rumours and gossip 
permeate into public space (Stewart & Strathern 2004). Witchcraft is “both a subject of 
gossip and a product of gossip; and gossip is the medium within which it lives” 
(Ashforth 2005:65). Many scholarly works by anthropologists have shown that 
witchcraft always takes place in clandestine settings and the way it works cannot be 
observed directly, nor can empirical evidence easily be captured (e.g. Siegel 2006; 
Kapferer 2003; Oldrige 2001; Geschiere 2000). Niehaus et al. argue that it must be seen 
                                                                                                                                               
a PhD degree at the National University in Jakarta—he also obtained an MA from Leiden University, in 
the Netherlands.         
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as “an idiom of social relations and processes, and questions of evidence are deemed to 
be peripheral. It is either assumed that proof is impossible, or alternatively, that tension 
[and accusations are] the only proof of witchcraft” (2001:113). Meanwhile, the main 
intentions of sorcery accusations are to achieve particular objectives and obtain 
individual interests in the struggle over political power and state legitimacy. In most 
cases witchcraft accusations are typically used to attack political opponents, weaken 
their power, and then achieve political gains during the contest. And this seemed to 
happen to politicians who were standing for legislative election in 2009.   
 
2.2 Witchcraft Narratives at the Time of the Legislative Election  
In addition to these articles, some stories related to sorcery accusations have been 
appearing in the political contest. I start with a story of Abdul Fatah, a legislative 
candidate associated with the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, the National 
Awakening Party), who stood for election to be a legislator in the 2009 parliamentary 
election. In the months of election campaigns, Fatah engaged in a series of social 
activities to approach constituents and persuade people to vote for him on the all-
important polling day. The system applied in the 2009 legislative election was that the 
process of electing a legislator depended on how many votes a candidate was able to 
garner—the higher numbers of ballots that are secured the greater chance a candidate 
has of being the winner. Within this system, political competition became much more 
fierce and vicious not only between candidates coming from different parties but also 
amongst those coming from the same party.  
Having had a long career as a politician, Fatah has been with the National 
Awakening Party for many years, since he was born into a family historically associated 
with the Nahdhatul Ulama organization, the main political basis of the party. For this 
election Fatah ran for legislator, in the House of Representatives, representing the 
region of Banten—just about two hours drive to the west of Jakarta, as he had served for 
one period of office as a local legislator; and he had the ambition to move up to become 
an MP.  Fatah is a native of Palagan (pseudonym), a district in the province of Central 
Java, and has been living in Banten for a relatively long period of time. To run for the 
post of MP representing a certain region does not require the person to be a native of 
that region; politicians are by law allowed to compete for being legislators from other 
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regions. Fatah had already made all the necessary preparations (logistics and other 
resources) for political campaigns to reach his ambition.  
The months of February and March 2009 were hectic and exhausting moments 
for Fatah, as he had to visit his constituents in electoral areas almost every day to meet 
villagers, approach them, and talk to them. That was part of his daily activities in the 
months of election campaigns. In order to meet as many people as he could in the 
district, Fatah arranged various meetings by attending pengajian (religious preaching) in 
mosques in villages, or organized social events such as mass circumcisions for boys, 
donation for orphans and orphanages, blood donations, and the like. Through these 
social activities Fatah was able to mobilize people—and they were the potential 
voters—giving him the opportunity to earn sympathy from them, and then they would 
vote for him on the polling day: 9 April 2009. In organizing all these social activities, 
Fatah was assisted by some local leaders and villagers with whom he had had a long 
friendship.  Obviously Fatah had to pay all the expenses for the meetings and activities 
including for the consumption of food, snacks, drinks, and cigarettes as well. Quite 
often, he gave attendees so-called bekel (money of about Rp15,000) in exchange for 
transportation, so he needed to have plenty of money at hand—the more people come to 
the meeting, the more money is spent. Sometimes Fatah had also provided some 
donations for building mosques and public facilities in some of the most populous 
districts from which he wanted to garner voters. Of course, Fatah needed to have ample 
money to finance all the social activities for campaigns as they cost him a great deal. 
Fortunately, he found some sponsors who provided him with some financial assistance 
especially to produce all the logistics needed for his campaigns.   
Overwhelmed by an extensive agenda of heavy work activities during the very 
long period of political campaigns, Fatah became fatigued and eventually fell ill. At the 
onset, Fatah just had fever and was exhausted with such a hectic schedule, so that he 
simply needed to take a rest to recover from his fatigue and recover his energies after 
having spent so much time on public campaigns. He had been deeply engaged in a great 
number of social activities during the very busy months of the 2009 general elections, 
since he had to focus on it in order to win the contest. However, such an illness seemed 
to be uncommon, as it became far worse in the days that followed. When he had not yet 
recovered from the fever, Fatah contracted another sickness: earache and it was much 
more serious than the fever. Just within a few days, Fatah’s ear disorder worsened, and 
he developed a swollen head, so he went to an aurist to cure it. Strangely, the 
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audiologist who treated him found nothing related to the pains he was enduring; the 
aurist diagnosed Fatah’s swollen head and detected earache on both sides, but he had no 
idea what to do since he did not find even a single cause of illness. Fatah was obviously 
such an unusual case with his ear disorder, so he went to another aurist to have a second 
opinion; and received a similar diagnosis on it. The earache and swollen head was so 
painful that it eventually forced Fatah to end engaging in campaigns and he just stayed 
at home for the rest of the weeks. He then consulted his relatives about an alternative 
way of medication through spiritual treatment by an orang pintar (which literally means 
smart person, an idiom for those who have spiritual knowledge and skills). When 
visiting Fatah at home to see the ailing legislative candidate, his cousin, Anwar, 
suspected that the earache that was causing so much pain was man-made sickness—it 
was a kind of santet (witchcraft). Anwar then suggested that it would be good if Fatah 
came to Kiai Mudzakir of Palagan, renowned for having special knowledge and skills in 
treating peculiar illnesses, to find a non-medical cure.  Fatah agreed with this advice, 
and Anwar then took him to Kiai Mudzakir for spiritual treatment. Fatah described the 
story of spiritual healing saying that it was carried out through a simple method. First, 
Fatah was given a glass of water to drink, but the water had been enchanted with Arabic 
words of doa (invocations) taken from the Qur’an. After drinking it, Fatah took a rest 
for about an half hour, and Kiai Mudzakir then did another spiritual curing by touching 
Fatah’s head very gently and putting his hands on both sides of Fatah’s ears. He kept 
touching the swollen head gently while chanting in silence. Afterwards, Kiai Mudzakir 
slowly pulled out a pair of feathers from Fatah’s ears saying that they were magical 
items and were used as a medium for transporting evil objects that caused unbearable 
pains. He mentioned that these feathers were sent by a political rival’s witch to Fatah to 
hurt him. Fatah explained that the Muslim cleric said to him: “You’ve received santet. 
Someone wanted to harm you, but I could not tell you for sure who did that to you. I 
think you may have known who it was yourself as both of you are competing to be 
elected as a member of the Parliament. I am worried the legislative election makes 
friends become enemies.” 
After having done with spiritual medication, Fatah speculated who, among his 
political rivals, might do santet on him. He suspected his own colleague within the 
National Awakening Party, Sabarudin, who did it simply because of jealousy and 
hostility as these are the two key elements of witchcraft. Anthropologists observe that 
those who employ sorcery are usually “motivated by envy and jealousy, and the 
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networks within which those emotions can plausibly circulate are identical to those of 
gossip. Witchcraft then has a necessary connection to gossip by virtue of the dynamics 
and intimacy and secrecy” (Ashforth 2005:67). Sabarudin, with whom Fatah was vying 
to become elected as an MP, is a native of Banten, while Fatah is a migrant coming 
from far away, from Palagan in Central Java. Fatah realized that such competition 
seemed to be a contest between putra daerah (sons of the region, the natives) and kaum 
pendatang (the migrants) which became much more significant in parallel with the 
emergence of local politics with the use of ‘primordial sentiments’ (Geertz 1973). The 
primordial sentiments usually take the form of ethnicity, race, kinship, religion, and 
other cultural ascriptions to which politicians become emotionally attached and then use 
them as an effective means for the struggle over power. The materialization of 
primordial sentiments take its ideal shape in political contestation in the local settings, 
since the patterns of Indonesian politics have changed considerably, making it possible 
for local actors to play a pivotal role after being neglected for years during the New 
Order era. They become the significant players of regional politics as a result of 
government reforms and political decentralization which have given them more power 
and authority. Consequently the role of regional elites appears to be of central 
importance in the whole political process (e.g. Aspinall & Fealy 2003; Hadiz 2003; 
Maribeth, Sulistiyanto & Faucher 2005; Nordholt & Klinken 2007). 
This is the reason why emotional attachments associated with those primordial 
bonds are indispensable for such political competition, as they have the potential to be 
capitalized in support of a struggle for power. In this context, regarding the putra 
daerah Sabarudin, Fatah developed his assumptions, claimed that he had the privilege 
to be an MP representing his district of origin, since he and his ancestors are all natives 
of Banten. Certainly the political contest for securing a seat in the Parliament was fierce, 
as Banten was one of the hardest battlefields, where political parties were seeking a 
victory. Such contestation to secure a seat took place in two stages: individual contest 
among candidates of different parties and individual contest among candidates of the 
same party. Therefore, it became so severe and ferocious that some candidates even 
employed a seemingly irrational way with the assistance of magic and witchcraft.  
The sorcery attacks prevented Fatah from continuing the political contest. Fatah 
keenly believed that he was the target of santet employed by his rivals; and it was 
certainly connected with political contest during the parliamentary election. What 
happened with Fatah showed that sorcery and politics are both related to each other, 
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where the former could be used to influence the latter. Indeed, witchcraft believers and 
practitioners could be associated with anyone, whether elite or commoner. Yet 
politicians and other prominent groups are not the exception, as Geschiere has 
mentioned: “Witchcraft not only dominates the relations between the new [political] 
elites and villagers, it also marks elite behaviour and their struggles in the arena of 
modern politics ... witchcraft remains, for both elites and villagers, the preferred 
discourse when it comes to interpreting the vicissitudes of modern politics” (2000:114). 
 
Figure 2.1: Magical items consisting of a shrouded doll tied with thread, a sketch of man, soil of 
tomb mixed with sand and a written acronym of PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa.  
 The story of Fatah asserts that people may practise witchcraft for various 
purposes including winning a political contest. The involvement of witchcraft in politics 
indicates that politicians do not hesitate to apply any measure in order to achieve their 
ambitions. In fact, a political contest embedded with witchcraft practice has not been 
exclusively experienced by Fatah during the parliamentary election. Sorcery narratives 
also appeared during the 2009 presidential election. 
2.3 Witchcraft Narratives at the Time of the Presidential Election  
At first, it was just gossip circulating among people that magic played a part in the 
political processes of the 2009 general elections. Such gossip about magic and 
witchcraft in politics appeared to be merely a trivial topic of talk until President 
Yudhoyono himself made statements in a public forum addressing the issue of sorcery, 
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which inevitably instigated huge controversy especially among politicians. Whereas the 
issue of sorcery in politics was previously talked about by a limited group of people in 
the form of gossip and rumours, it eventually became the subject of public discourse, 
attracting extensive attention from both politicians and Indonesian people in general. 
On Friday night, 3 July 2009, about two thousands Muslims—sympathizers of 
SBY and members of the Majelis Dzikir Nurussalam (SBY’s Nurussalam House for 
God-Invocation) who came from the cities of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and 
Bekasi)—attended a special congregation for preaching (pengajian) and invocation 
(dzikir) in President Yudhoyono’s private home in Puri Cikeas, the city of Bogor (see 
figure 2.2). Wearing baju koko (white long-hand shirt) with peci haji (white rimless 
cap), colourful scarf, and sarong (traditional cloth for Indonesians), members of 
preaching (jamaah pengajian) sat tranquilly on a pendopo
7
 with joglo architecture (a 
Javanese style structure of a house). But the size of the pendopo is too small for such 
huge numbers of the jamaah so it cannot accommodate all of them. Many of them sat in 
the front yard of the house and the surrounding areas as well. Soon after they had 
finished the evening payer, the ritual of dzikir started. Led by Habib
8
 Abdul Rahman 
Al-Habsy of Kwitang (an area in Central Jakarta where the Arab community resides), 
they made a long dzikir to God to supplicate His blessings and mercies by reciting some 
verses of the Qur’an. Since 2004—the year when SBY was elected to be president 
through the first democratic and direct election in the modern era of the country—the 
Majelis Dzikir SBY Nurussalam has regularly held congregations for preaching and 
invocations. And during the 2009 general elections, the ritual of dzikir was performed 
more often. From a theological perspective, dzikir is essentially a spiritual activity but it 
may have a political meaning and resonance since it took place in the private house of a 
presidential candidate and at the time of general elections. Such a congregation for 
dzikir held on Friday night seemed to be very special because it was just about a week 
before the polling day for the positions of president and vice president, which was due 
on 9 July 2009.  At that moment the incumbent President Yudhoyono delivered a 
speech proclaiming that he had received serangan sihir (sorcery attacks) during the 
months of public campaigns—the period when he was engaging in a series of political 
                                                 
7
 Pendopo is a large open building in front of a Javanese mansion, or attached open veranda that serves as 
an audience hall. 
   
8
 Habib is a high title for a venerated Arab descendant ulama; those who want to reach this title must have 
a very good understanding of Islam and acquire a knowledge of the Qur’an and the Hadiths.  
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activities for the presidential contestation. SBY shared with the attendees his personal 
experiences of receiving sorcery attacks:  
Ladies and gentlemen, I have a special story for you all. We are now in the time of 
general elections through which we are going to elect legislators and both president and 
vice president. Sorcery has been everywhere and seems to be practised by many 
politicians [the attendees start laughing and SBY stops talking for a while]. This is true 
… I and my family members experienced it personally … It was a truly incredible event! 
There were many ways used to attack me during the competition, not only in the form of 
black campaigns, defamation, slander and the like, but also with the use of sorcery. Last 
night, on Thursday 2 July 2009, I went to the presidential debate programme broadcasted 
by several TV channels; while preparing to go there, I, my wife and my son along with 
my guards and driver prayed together, as I was perturbed by bad spirits. Sihir assaulted 
me. But, I believe in Allah Almighty (Arabic, God) who protects me and my family 
members; and the most effective way to fight against sihir (sorcery) is by intensifying 
dzikir (invocations) as God says: بولقلا نئمطت الله ركذب لاأ “Verily, in the remembrance of 
God, [human] hearts find their rest” [Qur’an, al-Ra`d: 28]. (Reports of the event appeared 
on all TV channels on 3/7/2009, as well as online and printed media, such as Kompas, 
4/7/2009, Media Indonesia, 4-5/7/2009). 
         
 
Figure 2.2: President Yudhoyono delivers a speech in front of the jamaah of the Majelis Dzikir 
SBY Nurussalam (SBY’s “Nurussalam” House for God-Invocation) in his private home in Puri 
Cikeas, Bogor city, West Java 
 
 These revelations certainly startled the public and created controversy as people 
seemed to have various responses to the president’s statements. But it is not an 
important subject of discussion whether or not sorcery attacks experienced by SBY 
were factual; and whether or not his competitors used black magic on him. The 
interesting matter is: why did SBY bring the issue of magic and witchcraft to an open 
forum to become public narratives? His revelations certainly provoked people to talk 
about sorcery in the context of practising political democracy during elections; whereas 
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the election was supposed to be rational and secular in the sense that it must be placed 
in the secular world, not in the otherworld or the supernatural. 
For the incumbent president, to raise the issue of sorcery for public discourse 
seemed strange to some people, especially among ‘rationalists’, that is, the educated 
elite. As a result, the unusual revelations of SBY became the focus of public 
controversy and increased political tumult, thereby igniting pro-contra responses from 
either his supporters or his opponents. I bring in here some commentaries, firstly from 
the side of SBY’s devotees, mostly his close aides who responded in support of his 
revelations about the sorcery assaults. For example, Abdul Rifai, a senior political elite 
in the Democrat Party, the political vehicle used by SBY to seek a second term of the 
presidency, once said that SBY knew about sihir menacing him from kiai and habib—
they are ahli hikmah
9
 (pious Muslims who have spiritual knowledge), in addition to 
experiencing it himself. They were the spiritual advisors of SBY who always gave him 
advice in terms of religious matters and things related to spirituality. These ahli hikmah 
frequently provided SBY with spiritual guidance and mystical knowledge so he would 
be capable of dealing with any sort of magical disruptions and of banishing any black 
magic attacks.  
 In the context of Islam, Muslims usually perform dzikir (invocations) 
supplicating God for spiritual power to deal with any problems in life, including 
becoming immune from witchcraft attacks as experienced by SBY during political 
contest. This is why he always carried out dzikir either in person or collectively along 
with members of the Majelis Dzikir Nurussalam, as he considered dzikir was the best 
way to prohibit sihir so that it would not wound him. There are some verses in the 
Qur’an that are always recited by the Muslims to banish any sort of evil spirits and 
protect themselves from being the target of black magic attacks. As the Muslims believe 
in Allah Almighty (Arabic, God), Who is the owner of the universe and whose power 
surpasses everything, all magic powers could be defeated by the words of God (firman 
Tuhan). The Muslims usually chant some specific doa (invocation words) taken from 
the Qur’an verses if they deal with magic and sorcery (see Appendix).ii 
                                                 
9
 In the tradition of Sufism (Islamic mysticism), ahli hikmah are associated with those who acquire a high 
degree of spiritual knowledge and morality and always practise mystical activities; and dzikir is a part of 
them which can guide Muslims to reach spirituality. In this regard, it may be relevant to note that 
President Yudhoyono once met Mawlana Sheikh Hisyam Kabbani—a spiritual Guru and world leader of 
the Naqshbandi Haqqani Sufi Order from whom he learned about spirituality and Islamic mysticism; and 
Kabbani said: “You will be president” a few years before SBY was elected to be the country’s president 
in 2004 (see Ki Juru Bangunjiwo, Learning Spirituality with ‘the Thinking General’ [SBY], 2009).      
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Figure 2.3: The jamaah pengajian of the Majelis Dzikir Nurussalam (The “Nurussalam” House 
for God-Invocation) are photographed in the Pendopo of President Yudhoyono’s private home in 
Puri Cikeas, Bogor city. 
 
In the context of Javanese society, the use of sorcery to obtain political power is 
very common as it has been practised by many people in support of achieving 
individual objectives. Witchcraft is a common feature of life and it is ‘real’ and present 
within society. As part of social life, politics cannot be detached from the beliefs of 
magic, and practising sorcery remains alive (e.g. Geertz 1960; Koentjaraningrat 1985; 
Ellen & Waston 1993). The issue of sorcery and witchcraft in the context of political 
contest is widespread, as Slamet Prawiro, a scholar specializing in Javanese Islam and 
an expert member of staff to a Minister of Yudhoyono’s cabinet, shared his thoughts:  
Why the issue of witchcraft came under the spotlight during the 2009 general elections 
was mainly because the contest of parliament and presidency was a great political event 
as contestants competed for such prestigious positions. Those competing for political 
positions would pay all the cost and even take up magical ways. Santet (witchcraft) 
applied in the contestation usually takes various forms, such as inflicting disease like 
ayan (epilepsy) or gagu (dumbness) on contenders just for a while to make them lose 
their wibawa (charisma) for leadership. But in some cases it can also be a serious illness 
leading to death. (Quoted from interview, 30 July 2009) 
 
 What has been illustrated by Prawiro is actually an affirmation of what people 
talk about in the public sphere, saying that magic and witchcraft are part of social life.  
Moreover, people may practise witchcraft for a wide range of purposes. Geertz writes, 
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“Sorcery, [as] the Javanese conceive of it, tends to be practiced on neighbors, friends, 
relatives and other acquaintances fairly close at hand. Of course, the dukun employed 
may be a distant one and so be attacking someone far away from where he is performing 
his rite, but the actual instigator of the deed is always someone near at hand” 
(1960:110). And in the course of Indonesian history, witchcraft—along with 
accusations—usually appears in parallel with political upheavals and is part of the 
struggles over state power, as in the case of the political crisis before and after the fall of 
Soeharto’s New Order in May 1998 (Siegel 2006; Retsikas 2006; Herriman 2007). 
During that time, witchcraft accusations, combined with a series of murders of alleged 
sorcerers in the East Java region, were pervasive. Witchcraft accusations, with the 
subsequent witch hunts, showed up in the public space, describing how the regime 
seemed to have lost control of political authority, which resulted in social chaos. In the 
splendid illustrations of the tragic event in Naming the Witch, Siegel writes:  
There are historical conditions of the outburst of witch hunts, though they are inadequate to 
entirely explain the events. Witch hunts broke out in East Java at the moment when 
established political structure seemed to no longer take notice of [human] life. At that time, in 
the absence of the ability to rely on the 'aparat,' as the local authorities—the police, the 
military, the civilian officials—are called, witches appeared in the world ... [in line with] 
chaos in the political realm and a breakdown of authority. (Siegel 2006:157) 
 
 Siegel’s accounts of witchcraft accusations are well-grounded as he refers to the 
very specific time and place in Javanese history during the transition period from the 
authoritarian New Order regime to the democratic rule at the start of a new episode of 
Indonesian politics, namely the reformasi era. Siegel has clearly explored the nature of 
witchcraft accusations by laying out the very complicated logic behind them. They 
involved power struggles and political contestations, with the involvement of the 
military, political elites, and civil society groups. Most cases involved Soeharto’s 
loyalists in opposition to his political rivals, who eagerly wanted to take over state 
power after he was no longer in office. The accusations of sorcery, followed by 
witchcraft-related killings, had led to political turmoil. As the events were shrouded in 
mystery, most people suspected that witchcraft accusations inciting violent actions 
seemed to be very well-designed scenarios arranged by some elements of the state 
structures, allegedly the military, as part of what Retsikas calls ‘state terror’ appearing 
in ninja groups that carried out communal discord along with the proliferation of 
rumours of terror and fearful spectres which were connected to political change at the 
time of Indonesia’s  emerging democracy (2006:57, 84).  In addition, as the witchcraft 
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accusations spread, unidentified political actors perpetrated social conflicts, leading to 
very high tensions between the state apparatuses and local communities (Retsikas 2006; 
Herriman 2006; Herriman 2007).  
 In most cases, accusations of sorcery usually serve as an indicator of hidden 
social strife which is difficult to detect by other methods. Witchcraft accusations and 
executions have become one of the ways in which communal clashes are expressed; 
they function as an effective medium through which social conflicts take place. Indeed 
accusations of sorcery are always connected with social tensions, which lead to the 
breakdown of social stability and political control. They tend to permeate within 
situations where social relations are ill-defined and abrasive, and materialize in 
conditions where other mechanisms for resolving tensions and settling conflicts fail or 
do not work properly (Moore & Sanders 2004:7). Looking at the history of Indonesia in 
modern times, magic and witchcraft have become part of the political processes and 
appear in social spaces where political conflicts are on the increase. They have 
increasingly become instrumental means for achieving political goals and can be used to 
support the establishment of political systems, whether despotic or democratic.  
It can be argued that the connection of witchcraft with the dynamics of power 
contests represents how politicians maintain a great deal of interest in political power 
and make use of sorcery, whether as a symbolic idiom or an actual means to secure their 
ambitions. In this sense, sorcery is involved in the political transformation and the 
process of democratic power as seen in the involvement of political elites in witchcraft 
and occult rituals. Although witchcraft is often conceived as opposed to modernity and 
rational thinking, here one needs to consider a new interpretation by perceiving that 
sorcery can be contextualized with the ideas of modernism and intellectualism on the 
basis of rationality. This is particularly relevant to the fact that Indonesia is a land of 
mixed beliefs and values in which both mystical behaviour and rational orientation can 
find the best place to flourish. Such phenomena clearly materialized in the democratic 
political contestation of the 2009 general elections. Politicians employed various 
mystical ways of gaining power and President SBY himself also raised the issue of 
sorcery to the level of public discourse in accordance with the narrative of modern 
political democracy. It is a fact that SBY was re-elected for the second term of the 
presidency, thus indicating that the issue of witchcraft he raised seemed to become a 
political strategy to win the election. In this respect, it can be argued that one cannot 
draw a solid line between witchcraft as a representation of backwardness and the 
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practicality of political democracy as a symbol of modernity. What appears on the 
country’s political stage clearly demonstrates how mystical beliefs and sorcery 
materialize in polity in conjunction with modern political values.  Thus both witchcraft 
and democratic politics appear to have become a political reality in modern Indonesia. 
Nonetheless, since the 2009 election was a political event through which all political 
contestants were competing for public positions, raising the issue of witchcraft 
inevitably attracts criticisms especially from someone’s political opponents.                            
   
2.4 Critiques of Witchcraft during Democratic Political Contestation 
As the issue of sorcery was brought to the public by President SBY, it inescapably 
resulted in cynical commentaries and criticisms among political elites. This is mainly 
because they consider that the beliefs and practices of magic and witchcraft are 
attributed to pre-scientific thinking. As a result, SBY’s statements unavoidably 
prompted bitter censure from his rivals and he was accused of bringing back a kind of 
backward period, while the country has moved into the era of modern democracy. 
Indeed the people were wondering why SBY talked about sorcery in a public forum and 
what lay behind the disclosure of the sorcery assaults he received. Not surprisingly, 
political opponents severely criticized SBY’s revelations, saying that he just wanted 
sympathy from the people by showing himself as the target of magical offences 
committed by his political foes. In other words, SBY simply pretended to be a victim of 
oppression (korban kezaliman)—or being suppressed (sedang dizalimi)—by his 
contenders during the presidential race. Agung Permana, a closed political aide of 
Megawati, one of the presidential candidates, responded to this issue:  
SBY’s revelations were just a political manoeuvre to gain sympathy from the people. I 
believe that neither of his competitors—Megawati and Jusuf Kalla—employed sorcery 
against him. As part of Megawati’s team, we believe in democracy and the only way to 
reach a political mandate from the people to come into power is through a democratic 
election. As we are in the era of modern democracy, we should believe in the values of 
democracy, that people have the right to elect the leaders of the nation rationally. We 
should not practise any black magic to gain victory in a general election. (Quoted from 
public discussion
10
 in Jakarta, 7 July 2009) 
                                                 
10
 Public discussion refers to an open discussion for those interested in talking about current topics 
emerging in the national sphere. It is usually organized by social activists, civil society institutions, 
NGOs, radio and TV agencies, journalist associations, or university student groups, and takes place in 
many sites in Jakarta. This kind of discussion is usually held in response to social issues and public 
affairs, and becomes part of the public forum and social discourse among educated middle class groups. 
Speakers are invited from various backgrounds. They can be scholars, intellectuals, politicians, religious 
leaders, NGO activists, etc. 
81 
 
 
Such comments are likely to consider that witchcraft is merely seen as the paradox of 
modern democracy. Yet anthropological studies have suggested that the discourse of 
witchcraft must inevitably be connected with the idea of power and that one needs to 
take into account the notion of occult politics. Here, anthropologists suggest that state 
power and political democracy are seen as “a true breeding ground for modern 
transformations of witchcraft and sorcery” considering that “the more recent 
democratization process […] is accompanied by a blossoming of rumours on the role of 
the occult” (Geschiere 2000:6; Niehaus et al. 2001). Continuing public criticism, 
another member of Megawati’s campaign team, Agus Arifin, criticized the president, 
saying that the tactic employed by SBY looked like a soap opera through which he 
begged the public for commiseration, and that this was an odd way of gaining 
compassion from people, as he applied the same tactic in the 2004 presidential 
contestation. Arifin continued to scorn SBY by saying that it was the most ridiculous 
political manoeuvre he had ever seen. He expressed further critiques: 
I consider that a president must be sakti mondroguno (ruler with supernatural power) 
who is immune from being attacked by sorcery and cannot be harmed by any sort of 
black magic. I was surprised that SBY, as the president who holds supernatural power, 
lamented to the public saying that he had suffered sorcery assaults and was perturbed by 
black magic. He shouldn’t do that … it was a bit foolish and was not proper, either, to 
say such weird things in front of majelis dzikir. His revelations were provocative, 
pretending that someone had struck him with black magic, yet none of his rivals did 
anything bad to him. (Quoted from public discussion in Jakarta, 5 July 2009) 
 In the same tone, Muhamad Hudaya, a member of the campaign team for Jusuf 
Kalla, made similar comments, saying that it was an ‘old song’, proclaiming to the 
public that he (SBY) had received sorcery attacks committed by his political rivals. 
Such revelations were ridiculous, as SBY talked about black magic during the majelis 
dzikir, a religiously respected occasion through which the Muslims learn about Islamic 
values, which include “not believing” in magic power, as this is considered to be 
outside the Islamic faith. Surely the people became confused questioning him either 
openly or silently as to why, as a pious Muslim, he believes in magical power, while he 
is also an educated person who must be rational. Sharing other people’s concern, 
Muhamad Hudaya said that SBY is a four-star General and holds a doctoral degree so 
that he must think logically and rationally and behave non-mystically. He then 
commented: 
I don’t think anybody would hurt him with sorcery and neither of the two presidential 
contenders, Megawati and Jusuf Kalla, would take black magic to beat him in the 
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political competition. SBY should not think that his political rivals would offend him 
with sorcery. I think SBY simply wanted to gain pity and compassion from the people, as 
political contest is becoming much vicious and severe. (Quoted from public discussion in 
Jakarta, 5 July 2009) 
  
 On the whole, the notions brought by SBY’s critics illustrated above seem to 
follow the ‘rationalists’ views related to the discourse of modernity. Here, the common 
discursive analyses of witchcraft usually view it simply as contrary to modernity since it 
is conceived as an innate characteristic of ‘primitive’ culture and a representation of the 
pre-logical thinking of human societies. Magic and witchcraft are frequently seen as a 
prime index of the non-modern society and are viewed to be at odds with the notions of 
rationality and in opposition to scientific modernism, referring to Western standards 
(Moore & Sanders 2004; Tambiah 2006). Whereas those believing in and practising 
witchcraft have their own logic and ‘rationality’ as they try to translate the irrational 
into the rational, something that Kapferer (2003) calls ‘beyond rationalism’. Here, one 
needs to move away from Western concepts of rationality, in viewing the non-Western 
practice of witchcraft. Besides, there are also some basic arguments that the ideas and 
practices of witchcraft are in response to modern exigencies and that the prevalence of 
witchcraft in politics in any society seems to be the result of ‘the unlikely balance it has 
achieved with the forces of modernity’ (Geschiere 2000; Moore & Sanders 2004). 
Equally, ‘rationalist’ elite politicians think that political practice relies on logic 
and operates in real situations, so that it can be observed in empirical settings. 
Therefore, from the ‘rationalist’ point of view, politics is a rational and secular event 
which has nothing to do with something beyond rationality. Conversely witchcraft is 
considered to be illogical, a kind of ‘primitive’ science; and it is an object of the 
‘otherworld’ that is situated in a mystical realm and located in a supernatural domain 
which cannot be discerned in empirical scenarios, since it defies the logical thinking of 
human beings (Greenwood 2000; Oldrige 2001). As a result, bringing the issue of 
sorcery to become the subject of public discourses is extremely sensitive in the context 
not only of political modernity but also of religious matters, that is, Islamic beliefs. As 
politicians who believe in and practise sorcery are considered to be irrational and 
against values of modern democracy that requires rationality and logical thinking as 
well as non-mystical behaviour, they are also regarded as kafir (infidels) according to 
the Islamic faith. Practising black magic is absolutely forbidden in Islam, so is the belief 
in witchcraft. Indeed politicians believing in sorcery are the same as those who do not 
believe in the power of God. This is way critics accused SBY of presenting a bad model 
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by introducing the issue of sorcery in the context of political democracy, as illustrated 
by Abdul Rahman, a politician associated with an Islamic party, who expressed his deep 
regret about SBY’s revelations as follows: 
I could not believe that SBY as the leader of the nation could give such peculiar 
statements as to say there were sorcery attacks directed against him. He shouldn’t portray 
a bad model by declaring that black magic was involved in politics. His statements could 
be regarded as a sort of justification to practise sorcery in general elections, as if it must 
be conceived as rational and logical.  Besides, believing and practising sorcery is strongly 
forbidden; any attempt to ally oneself to anything other than God’s power is sinful and 
considered shirik (polytheism) according to the Islamic faith. (Quoted from interview, 25 
July 2009) 
 Here public discourses on witchcraft appear to thrive during political 
contestation, in which it is viewed with the standards of Islamic morality, describing 
those believing in magic and witchcraft as not being good Muslims and even 
categorizing them as polytheists. In Islam, polytheism is considered to be the root of 
evil and superstition. According to the Qur’an, syirik is the greatest and unforgiven sin; 
God will forgive any sin but a person who dies while committing shirik.
iii
 Similarly, 
relying on secular morality, public discourses on witchcraft tend to see clear distinctions 
between good and evil, and that the beliefs of witchcraft reflect the devil; and the 
practice of witchcraft is often intended to wound other people so it is considered to be 
morally wrong. In addition, there are some similar responses with the use of religious 
idioms saying that believing in magic and relying on witches to tackle problems of 
social life is categorized as non-Islamic and unacceptable, referring to the essential 
tenets of Islamic convictions. Beliefs, behaviours, and attitudes associated with magic 
and sorcery are contradictory to the principles of tawheed (the doctrine of monotheism; 
the belief in God, the One and Only) which is the central creed of Islamic faith. Afnan 
Saleh, an activist of Muhammadiyah, expressed his deep disappointment about SBY’s 
revelations: 
I was shocked to hear the president’s statements claiming that he was attacked by magic 
as seemingly he wasn’t a good Muslim who should have a strong faith in God and 
practise Islam properly by not believing in any magic power other than the power of 
God. What he has confessed about being the target of magic attacks indicates the 
weakness of his belief in iman (Islamic faith) and aqedah (the oneness of God). In other 
words, his dzikir (invocations) and his shalat (worships) are meaningless, and all the 
good deeds he has done are useless since they don’t have any effect in strengthening his 
iman and aqedah. (Quoted from public discussion in Jakarta, 7 July 2009) 
  
 Taking into account the pro-contra responses of SBY’s revelations, it is 
interesting to see how Indonesian Muslims, as seen in the views of Rahman and Afnan, 
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responded to the narratives of sorcery which were brought by President Yudhoyono into 
the public sphere. SBY used Islamic idioms, was surrounded by kiai and habib—both 
are recognized as having a very good understanding of Islam and Islamic teachings—as 
spiritual advisors, referred to the Qur’an texts in expressing his experiences of being 
assaulted by black magic, and associated with members of the Majelis Dzikir SBY 
Nurussalam who are seen to be Islamic and used that forum to start introducing public 
narratives of sorcery.  Yet his political opponents perceived the contrary, saying that 
what SBY had done was considered to be shirik which is against the very fundamental 
principle of Islamic faith and does not suit Islamic teachings by any means. It is strictly 
prohibited for Muslims to take any other creation of Allah Almighty as deities or gods, 
as the Qur’an has clearly mentioned: “Turn unto Allah (only), not associating partners 
unto Him; and whoever assigns partners unto Allah, it is as if he had fallen from the sky 
and the birds had snatched him, or the wind had thrown him to a far off place” (Chapter 
22, verse 31). All these things reflect the contradictory moral discourses of witchcraft, 
as both SBY and his political foes referred to the same source and used similar idioms 
from Islam in conceiving and debating the issue of sorcery. However, the SBY's foes 
strongly criticized him, accusing him of non-Islamic conduct in his use of ideological 
thought and religious language taken from the Qur’an, the Holy Book of the Muslims. 
This was simply because SBY talked to the public saying that he had received sorcery 
attacks, which his rivals perceived as indicating that his revelations were the same as 
believing in witches, and meaning that he had fallen into polytheism. In fact, SBY did 
win the presidential election, so one could argue that despite his critics and political 
opponents who said he had contravened the principles of Islamic faith, was not a proper 
Muslim, and so on, he maintained very good relations with and received huge support 
from the common people, among whom mystical beliefs are as strong as their adherence 
to rational and modern political values. This strongly suggests that mystic and magic 
remain rooted in the culture of politics, as mystic-related rituals are often performed 
during a political event. 
2.5 Sorcery and Ritual in the Event of Democratic Election  
In spite of all the criticism over SBY’s revelations about witchcraft assaults, magic and 
sorcery have become a key political tool used by politicians, regardless of their social 
background, and whether educated or less educated, as many of them place their 
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political fate in the hands of witches. They often come to witches asking for help to 
cope with difficulties and misfortunes during political competition with the hope of 
attaining success and fortune in the very tough struggle over power. These situations 
clearly show the ambiguity of witchcraft since it represents both the strengths and 
weaknesses of politicians contending for political power. Here witchcraft offers a 
concealed way of achieving power, but at the same time it demonstrates the incapability 
of politicians when dealing with problems in politics, as Geschiere has pointed out: “the 
political implications of witchcraft […] conjure up unexpected parallels with feelings of 
power and powerlessness that mark popular conceptions of politics in [modern] 
democracies” (2000:8-9). So, the narrative of witchcraft appears in social spaces in 
accordance with the increased anxiety of political struggle, as witchcraft always follows 
the dynamics of social and political tensions. When President Yudhoyono unveiled the 
issue of sorcery, he basically confirmed what was being talked through rumours and 
gossip behind the scene. Afterwards, discourses of sorcery came onto the stage so that 
people started commenting on it, which led to public controversy. Apparently the 
people responded to SBY’s revelations differently, as Bakasura, a paranormal, 
explained in his comments: 
SBY is indeed a true Javanese (orang Jawa tulen) and he of course believes in magical 
power as most Javanese do. As SBY claimed that he was attacked by sorcery, it indicated 
that the presidential race did not take place merely on the electoral stage represented by a 
series of political campaigns in the public sphere. Political contest took place in 
‘otherworld’ space, too, which refers to an unobservable domain; there were political 
battles among spiritualists and magicians who were the supporters of politicians or 
presidential candidates. (Quoted from interview, 2 September 2008) 
 What Bakasura argues is that traditional beliefs, expressed in the association 
with holy figures who have spiritual powers, are still alive. Here people perceive that 
gaining fortune in social life, including winning in the political contest, does not rely 
solely on practical efforts, but also depends on whether or not someone is given restu by 
the holders of the ‘otherworld’. It is therefore important to please ancestors and holy 
spirits that represent the ‘otherworld’ so that they will help a person to reach what he or 
she wants, including political power. Rituals of pleasing them can be found in a wide 
variety of forms and take place in certain locations which are considered to be sacred 
sites where blessings are abundant and people can benefit from them.  
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Figure 2.4: A cultural ritual of offering in pursuit of spiritual blessings for democratic political 
contest held by SBY’s supporters in the district of Kediri, East Java (Photo by detik.com). 
 The following ritual (see figure 2.4) describes a tradition of a cultural ceremony 
to please ancestors and holy spirits, which was performed during the 2009 presidential 
race just before carrying out a public campaign in Kediri. Led by the pemangku adat 
(local leader of cultural ceremony and ritual) a group of SBY’s supporters and 
followers, wearing blue costumes—beloved colour of uniform for the Democrat Party—
performed a special ritual of larung sesaji (drifting offerings) which took place on the 
bank of the Brantas River in the province of East Java. In the sacred ritual they 
presented a package of offerings consisting of two ducks attached with stickers of SBY-
Boediono for president and vice president, seven kinds of flowers, palm blossom 
(kembang mayang), eggs, and incense together with benzoin (dupa, kemenyan). All 
these items were then floated on the Brantas River in the Kediri region with the 
intention of gaining blessings from the ruler of the universe, so that SBY-Boediono 
would be granted a victory in the contest. And if both of them were elected—in fact, 
they won the 2009 presidential election—they would become good leaders of the nation 
and lead the whole Indonesian people to social prosperity and economic well-being, as 
symbolized by the package of offerings floating on the river. The feature of rituals in 
respect of the ancestor spirits shows how people believe that the spirits of ancestors 
have a sort of spiritual influence on the political processes in the real world and that the 
possession rituals contribute to the efficacy of political practices. Here Bubandt clearly 
explains that “spirits are being conjured up for political reasons, they partake in a 
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spiritual politics in which they are both instruments and actors. [...] Possession rituals 
construct and make intelligible a particular relationship between politics, experience and 
emerging democracy in Indonesia” (2009: 291). In this respect, the ancestor spirits are 
believed to be able to meet the interests of politicians and to realize their wishes. 
Meanwhile, possession rituals are seen as a cultural medium carried out for particular 
objectives in parallel with political transformation in the country’s modern democracy. 
The 2009 general elections showed two intriguing phenomena of political 
contest that seemed to contradict one another. There were contradictions between 
aspirations of modernization in politics and attachments to traditional beliefs and 
attitudes as seen in the cultural rituals serving the holders of the ‘otherworld’ that were 
performed along with the election processes. On the one hand, most politicians believe 
that general elections represent modern democracy through which people elect 
representatives and leaders of the nation, as Ahmad Rahmani, a senior politician and an 
executive board member of the National Mandate Party, once said:  
We have chosen democracy as the best way to govern the country after we were deeply 
discontented with authoritarianism under the New Order regime. Unlike the old despotic 
system, which was full of repression, within a modern democracy we now enjoy political 
liberty and all citizens are able to participate in politics by electing our leaders and 
representatives directly. Civil rights are respected; suffrage and the public voice are 
recognized. And people also have many opportunities to take part in politics by 
becoming involved in the decision-making process, so they can influence the outcome of 
it. (Quoted from public discussion in Jakarta, 7 March 2009) 
 
 So, with regard to general elections—both legislators and president are directly 
elected by the people—Indonesia has moved forward in terms of the development of an 
institutional structure of modern democracy. Yet the consolidation of democracy in 
Indonesia is considered to be very slow and to have a number of shortcomings. 
However, people do believe that it is the best way through which to progress towards 
becoming an advanced and modern nation. The system of democracy was chosen with a 
great deal of hope that they would be able to establish a responsible political leadership 
and constitute a good government accountable to the public (see e.g. Liddle 1999; 
Liddle 2001; Bunte & Ufen 2009). Moreover, the 2009 general elections were seen as 
the manifestation of a modern democratic system through which political parties and 
politicians applied all forms of modern means to perform the contest. Among 
modernity’s tools are the media, both print and electronic, through which citizens 
articulate their political aspirations. Unequivocally the media play a critical role in the 
delivery of election campaigns which include public debates between presidential 
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candidates, wars of words among campaign teams, even massive negative campaigns 
and the circulation of smear stories. All these things represent the world of modern 
politics, so a general election must be perceived as a political process in which rational 
modernism should be the main basis for politicians to perform and take political actions 
in the ordinary world which can be observed empirically.  
 On the other hand, the 2009 political contest was also carried out in the 
‘otherworld’ domain where politicians used supernatural magic as a means to win the 
competition, and Bakasura’s views quoted earlier and the possession rituals illustrated 
previously have described how politicians conceive that the world of politics is also 
related to the ‘otherworld’. As has always been the case in every crucial event, the 
contest of political power is often replete with uncertainty and no one has the ability to 
fully control it. Under the very high degree of uncertainty, contestants try to obtain 
spiritual assistance from those with magical power including dukun (witches) to gain 
nasib-baik (fortune) instead of getting nasib-jelek (misfortune). As Ellen notes, “the 
belief in sorcery and witchcraft depends not only on cosmology but also on the 
availability of other means of explaining misfortune” (1993:14), since one of the key 
functions of supernatural power is to provide a sense of certainty in highly insecure 
situations. As witchcraft deals with the issues of misfortune and suffering, it must also 
be conceived “with reference to alternative formulations of mystical power and 
competing explanations of misfortune in a constantly shifting ‘ecology of belief’” 
(Niehaus et al. 2001:16).  
Alternatively, because of unwanted misfortune those seeking political power 
often look for a scapegoat, accusing their rivals of using magic when the latter are 
successful in political contest. In most cases, controversies over magic and witchcraft 
have been especially prevalent in close-knit communities facing failure or misfortune, 
mixed up with social strife and scapegoating (Stewart & Strathern 2004). Accordingly, 
accusations of sorcery spread being the way in which the losers please their 
psychological conditions by blaming their political opponents as having utilized 
witchcraft to win the contest, or as Bubandt put it, “The felt prevalence of sorcery in 
politics is manifest in the general assumption that the success of politicians is possible 
because of powerful protective magic [...] and the success in democratic politics is itself 
magical” (2006:421). Indeed political fights during elections also involved the use of 
sorcery and witchcraft to hurt enemies and defeat contenders in order to win the race.  
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The use of magical power in the world of politics is not new. Thus, SBY’s 
revelations claiming that sorcery attacks were directed against him during the 
presidential race must be understood that magic might be used by anyone, in the 
interests of political contestation along with the use of democratic measures. In other 
words, if someone is obsessed with political power yet does not have the ability to 
manage the changed political circumstances within a new democratic system, she/he 
might employ magic and sorcery in order to gain a position of state power. In this 
respect, it can be said that magic and witchcraft do not necessarily mark the 
backwardness of a society; neither are they associated merely with primitive culture. 
Indeed magic and witchcraft can be part of modernity and thus must be interpreted 
metaphorically as a cultural idiom through which matters of pressing social and political 
reality are expressed, especially for people who are uncertain about the outcome of their 
action and those of others. In this sense witchcraft is seen as, borrowing the Comaroffs’ 
words, “modernity’s prototypical malcontents” (1993:xxix). In explaining how 
witchcraft represents the anxiety of the modern world, Adam Ashforth puts it thus:  
If the possibility of many forms of modernity is conceded, witchcraft today need not 
necessarily be the same as in the past, nor need the fact that some people still worry 
about witches necessarily indicate an absence of modernity. The reason they still believe 
in witchcraft, then, can be posited as resulting from the fact that discourses of witchcraft 
still work in making sense of their worlds, including the changes that modernization and 
globalization have wrought. (Ashforth 2005:116)            
 Considering all the arguments of the discursive analyses of witchcraft and 
modernity that have appeared in public space, what is interesting is to place witchcraft 
and sorcery in the dynamics of power contestation, as Kapferer points out: “Sorcery 
manifests in the dynamics of powers. Most fundamentally sorcery is power, power in its 
totalizing essence. […] Sorcery is a cultural recognition of the centrality of power in the 
everyday world of human beings and a recognition that the points from which power 
emanates are human beings themselves” (1997:261-263). At this point SBY, as a 
presidential candidate, used the issue of sorcery as a medium of political dramaturgy in 
the context of gaining and maintaining power, as well as attacking his political 
opponents with the use of the rhetoric of sorcery to win sympathy from the people and 
then win the political competition. Therefore, sorcery cannot be conceived as a crust of 
primitive culture; instead it is part of the social drama in the whole political process. Or, 
as Niehaus puts it, “witchcraft must not be seen as a residue of traditional and primitive 
culture but as a complex social drama which is deeply embedded in contemporary social 
90 
 
and political processes” (Niehaus et al. 2001).  As a result, magic and witchcraft cannot 
be viewed merely in terms of the differences between modernism and traditionalism—
as some scholarly works on the subjects have suggested—indicating that the former is 
more advanced in a broad sense than the latter, since believing and practising witchcraft 
and sorcery are part of social life and there is no clear distinction between modern and 
traditional society, as Bubandt notes: “Sorcery ... achieves its effects in the troubled 
social space where imaginaries about what it means to be ‘modern’ or ‘traditional’ 
intermingle” (2006:421). This asserts that modernity does not necessarily mean that the 
beliefs and practices of magic and witchcraft are omitted from social life. Instead, they 
are an effective means employed by politicians to achieve and possess power; and 
discourse on witchcraft is shown to be a vital part of the struggle over state legitimacy, 
as demonstrated by President Yudhoyono when he claimed he suffered sorcery attacks 
during his political campaign at the time of the 2009 general elections. With regard to 
the events, here witchcraft is brought into public narrative, becoming a sort of political 
tactic to empower one’s self and at the same time it represents the embodiment of all the 
contradictions of the experience of Indonesian modern democracy in parallel with the 
wave of globalized democratic states.  
2.6 Occult Practice and the Economic Aspect of Magic 
Most interestingly, witchcraft narrative in Indonesian politics goes beyond the border of 
the country, as the Aljazeera channel has brought it to a global audience. One day in 
early 2009 during the hectic times of election campaigns, Aljazeera broadcasted an 
interesting cultural feature of Joko Bodo (see figure 2.5), a well-known paranormal, 
who was practising supernatural magic and occult activities to make money. It was 
screened with a fervent narration claiming that he had plenty of clients with very high 
profile backgrounds: officials, politicians, artists. They came to Joko Bodo asking for 
help, such as how to reach power or how to defeat their rivals by, if necessary, 
employing magic and sorcery. He claimed that he could do it on the request of his 
clients as he showed a medium of a human puppet and a toy to transfer magical 
elements to the target. Joko Bodo was presented as offering various services for his 
clients, called supernatural consulting services, that seemed to represent occult practice. 
A wide range of services include: how to get elected in elections, how to 
succeed in business, how to recover from failure in business, how to settle a marriage 
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dispute, and how to become a successful artist. He told Aljazeera that many elite 
politicians and high ranking officials visited him with requests for potent supernatural 
magic in order to gain and maintain their positions in the power structures. He said that 
they wanted to advance their political competition for wealth and power in that they 
were willing to carry out a series of occult rituals arranged to secure their wishes and 
ambitions. In fact, the claims of Joko Bodo accord with the revelation by Bakasura, a 
paranormal, who comments: 
Most elite politicians and state officials secretly come to a dukun or mystic, searching for 
spiritual assistance and supernatural force. However, they always deny getting involved 
in supernatural magic, but they believe in and engage with the occult as a pathway for 
reaching power. They do this in great secrecy, to avoid the eyes of the people, as they 
seemingly feel ashamed of doing something so bizarre. (Quoted from interview, 2 
September 2008) 
 
Figure 2.5: Joko Bodo, a soothsayer/paranormal, gives spiritual advice to a client who seeks 
some help in dealing with problems and difficulties. (Image by Aljazeera) 
  
          
 The broadcast by Aljazeera about the occult activities of Joko Bodo in the form 
of supernatural consulting services clearly shows how magic and witchcraft have been 
transformed into a narrative of modernity with the use of a modern tool: the global 
electronic media. Moreover, it is most interesting to observe how magic and sorcery 
have become an attractive business and a potential source of economic activities as Joko 
Bodo mentioned that clients were charged for receiving spiritual services. Certainly, the 
supernatural consulting services have become a big market economy, and the charge 
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varies depending on the type of services (see figure 2.6).  For ordinary people seeking 
some spiritual advice, he charged them about $35 (equal to Rp330,000); but for high 
profile clients such as artists seeking popularity and success or politicians and officials 
seeking a political position, he charged them up to $2,000 (equal to Rp19,000,000). 
What Joko Bodo has done by making money through occult practice fits with what the 
Comaroffs have described as the ‘occult economy’, which they describe as follows:  
Occult economy may be taken, at its most general, to connote the deployment of magical 
means for material ends or, more expansively, the conjuring of wealth by resort to 
inherently mysterious techniques, techniques whose principles of operation are neither 
transparent nor explicable in conventional terms. These techniques, moreover, often 
involve the destruction of others and their capacity to create value. (Comaroff & 
Comaroff 1999:297) 
 
       Figure 2.6: A client gives a quantity of money to pay for the spiritual service she receives from  
Joko Bodo. (Image by Aljazeera) 
 
 
 As shown in various studies, magic and witchcraft are conceived as having a 
close connection with the circumstances of modernity. Noticeably, a number of 
anthropological works (see, for example, Fisiy & Geschiere 1991; Comaroff & 
Comaroff 1993,1999; Shaw 1997)—which mostly take the case of post-colonial African 
countries—even observe that the proliferation of magic and witchcraft is directly 
connected with the penetration of the neo-liberal economy and global capitalism along 
with the spirit of modernity. These alternative perspectives seem to be creative 
interpretations of witchcraft following what Evans-Pritchard mentioned many years 
93 
 
ago: “new situations demand new magic” (1937:513); and the ‘new situations’ 
happening in contemporary societies around the world are characterized by the 
proliferation of the global market economy and the influx of ‘millennial capitalism’ 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 1999 & 2001); whilst the ‘new magic’ is contextualized with 
that kind of modernity so that magic and witchcraft are inherently modern (Geschiere 
2000; Moore & Sanders 2001).  
 By connecting the occult forces with economic issues, these scholars attempt to 
explain that the capitalist economy has created wealthy groups and powerful people, 
enabling them to enjoy a high social status within society. In this respect, the reason 
why Joko Bodo has been able to make money through occult activities is because there 
is a growing demand for those kinds of services within Indonesian society. It can also 
be said that people seem to be anxious when they encounter dramatic changes in their 
lives which they are unable to control. As they want to succeed in business or become 
the winner of a political contest in elections, they come to a dukun, mystic, soothsayer, 
or witch looking for assistance. In this context, the occult economy thrives within 
society as “... people subject to neoliberal interventions can only comprehend these 
transformations by resorting to magic and mystification. Those who have seen their 
lives disrupted in dramatic ways resort to supernatural forces to make sense of these 
changes” (Rudnyckyj 2009:115). As a result, magic and occult practice then become 
cathartic solutions for those who cannot deal with the complexities of social, economic, 
and political problems. The unbearable problems coupled with the uncertainties of daily 
life mean that people tend to rely on mystical and supernatural magic because these 
may, in terms of psychological need, satisfy them, through the occult forces and rituals. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
To conclude the whole discussion of this chapter, it can be re-stated that power struggle 
and political contest in the world of Indonesian politics do not merely take place in the 
secular world, as magic and witchcraft play a part in social and political processes.  
Politicians may come to power with the help of magic and sorcery by using them as a 
political tool to smoothen their path towards power. Magic and witchcraft are viewed as 
important vehicles as a political party to gain and possess power, despite Indonesia 
having adopted modern democracy. In this context, Indonesian modernity appears to be 
a mixture of rational and magical beliefs and values in which sorcery is used politically 
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as a means of obtaining power. However, in the process both the ‘modern’/‘rational’ 
and the ‘traditional’ also become reified categories which are constructed through 
discourse and practice as “opposed to” each other. Those categories that seem to be in 
contradiction are essentially constitutive and interpretive and are articulated by those 
involved in such discourse. With reference to the previous scholarly works, for instance 
Siegel (2006), Bubandt (2006), and Herriman (2006, 2007), this research seeks to enrich 
the arguments of these studies by asserting that magic and witchcraft are closely 
connected with the imagination of political power. The occult politics emerges in social 
space to be used as a means of securing public positions along with the newly-
established modern democracy.  However, this research is slightly different from those 
earlier studies in terms of the context of the research. Bubandt’s study observes sorcery 
and the occult in local politics and both Siegel’s and Herriman’s studies examine how 
witchcraft is used as a mode of violent conflict resulting from a fierce political game at 
national level, but the contest takes place in local-rural settings. Instead, this research 
observes witchcraft in the context of urban politics becoming part of political 
contestation which takes place at national level and involves urban elite politicians who 
make the political magnitude of the contestation become highly attractive and 
controversial.  
Yet it is important to note that witchcraft is not the sole pathway to power. 
Politicians may also be involved in corruption to achieve the same goals of 
accumulating wealth and increasing power. Nonetheless, one may think that witchcraft 
and corruption are hazardous for human societies and that those who deal with 
corruption may put their own lives at a very high risk, and these two subjects will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
WITCHCRAFT AND CORRUPTION: THE RISK TO HUMAN LIVES 
 
 
The main task of this chapter is to explain that witchcraft and corruption represent the 
collective imagination of power and material wealth. Yet they also reflect moral 
ambivalences, as people respond to these social phenomena differently. The chapter 
therefore seeks to explore the issues of witchcraft and corruption by illustrating how 
both appear in public narratives, and how they are replete with controversy. It will also 
address how witchcraft and corruption play a part in the shaping of the social imagery 
of power and wealth. The primary topic discussed in this part concerns the ways in 
which witchcraft affects public efforts to eradicate corruption. It will show the dangers 
of witchcraft appearing in the form of threats to human lives, by bringing case studies of 
prosecutors and activists who suffer black magic attacks while they engage in the fight 
against corruption. It will also illustrate how witchcraft is used as a way of attacking 
prosecutors, obstructing a prosecution process, and intimidating activists who work for 
anti-corruption campaigns.               
 
3.1 Narratives of Witchcraft and Corruption  
In popular narratives, witchcraft and corruption share some features in common, as both 
can be manipulated in the interests of power and wealth. Such narratives usually claim 
that those who maintain a very strong wish to gain power and amass wealth often take a 
shortcut by becoming implicated in corruption or by practising sorcery, as Simon 
Turner writes: “A central characteristic of corruption is that someone enriches him- or 
herself at the expense of others, creating a kind of parasitic wealth, similar to the power 
and wealth created through witchcraft” (2007:127).  Both witchcraft and corruption can 
thus be utilized by an individual who desires to possess power and acquire wealth. As 
witchcraft and corruption are closely bound up with power and wealth, both are 
inherently connected with threats and dangers, especially for those who engage in 
efforts to eradicate corruption. This is exactly the case of social activists and public 
prosecutors who dedicate themselves to investigating corruption.  
In this regard, I talked to Dian Megawangi, a senior prosecutor serving at the 
Attorney General’s Office (AGO), who has been working on corruption investigation 
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for many years and has experienced sorcery threats while in service. Soon after 
completing her study in Law at the University of Padjadjaran, Bandung, Megawangi 
joined the AGO in the early 1990s, which led to her being dispatched to a number of 
regional prosecutorial offices across the country, where she very often dealt with 
corruption cases. She was of course aware of the risks when performing her official 
duty, particularly if those who committed corruption were politicians or officials 
holding state powers, as she observed that witchcraft was often employed against people 
who were fighting corruption. Megawangi mentioned that one of the very serious risks 
was how to contend with witchcraft, since many corrupt politicians and officials were 
not averse to applying any means necessary, including magic and sorcery, to counteract 
prosecution. The application of witchcraft is of course very dangerous, as prosecutors 
may be killed. Taking into account the perils of magic and sorcery, Megawangi 
fervently confessed: 
Whenever any state prosecutors speak overtly, they have always been threatened by 
magic and witchcraft when they are posted to localities—anywhere across the country. 
Those who are dispatched to a district with a very high risk of witchcraft must prepare 
for a spiritual battle, since they might become the target of sorcery attacks. (Quoted from 
interview, 3 February 2009) 
 
 Megawangi’s views seem to suggest that witchcraft and corruption can be 
conceived as a sort of ‘malevolent consumption’, to borrow Kari Telle’s (2003:98) 
phrase, in that both can devastate the lives of human societies. In this sense, 
witchcraft consumes the lifeblood of human beings while state officials committing 
corruption seize public resources belonging to people. It can be argued that both 
witchcraft and corruption represent the immoral attitude of those who strongly 
desire power and material value. Again, Megawangi expressed her views: 
Corruption can be addictive for those who are obsessed with power and wealth, as both 
symbolize social prestige. With money embezzled from public office, state officials increase 
their power in order to accumulate more wealth, as the increase of power will have the 
consequence  of the accumulation of wealth, and vice versa. Not surprisingly, corrupt 
officials tend to keep power in their hands even with the use of magic and sorcery, despite 
public denunciation of these immoral behaviours. (Quoted from interview, 3 February 2009) 
   
 As widely acknowledged in the course of contemporary anthropological 
research, witchcraft is commonly linked to personal obsession with political power and 
the imagination of the state (e.g. Geschiere 1991; Niehaus 1997; Niehaus at al. 2001). 
As found in many anthropological studies, it is often conceived in connection with the 
accumulation of wealth, money, and social production as people usually take a simple 
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way of attaining material benefits (e.g. Fisiy & Geschiere 1991; Shaw 1997; Geschiere 
2001; Oslen 2002). In this respect, people are often attempting to reach political power 
by using witchcraft and committing corruption, and these result in social controversy, as 
Bubandt states: “Sorcery and corruption are part of the same political imagination 
because both speak ambivalently to the problems of power” (2006:413). This is the 
reason why the issue of morality becomes the central subject of public talks and gains 
social significance in the discourses of witchcraft and corruption. As witchcraft is 
regarded as form of evil behaviour, so is corruption in the sense that both are morally 
wrong and socially unacceptable. This is why they are censured by most people, and 
those practising sorcery and committing corruption are considered immoral and 
decadent. Corruption seems to share some characteristics in common with witchcraft, 
thus reflecting the paradoxical relationship between condemnation and fascination, as 
Giorgio Blundo has expounded:  
Corruption as much as witchcraft and the actors involved in it are dependent on 
ambivalent representations that oscillate between stigmatization and indulgence and 
between fascination and rejection. This ambivalence is reflected in the paradox of 
corruption being ubiquitously condemned while practiced everywhere on a daily basis. 
(Blundo 2007:31-2) 
    
 It is important to note that both witchcraft and corruption have some similarities, 
as seen in the ways in which people talk about them, mostly in the form of allegations, 
with the use of the social medium of gossip and rumours. This is because witchcraft and 
corruption always take place in concealed settings which are of course beyond empirical 
observation; no one is able to view and examine the practices of the two directly but just 
gossip about them (e.g. Sedlenieks 2004; Shore & Haller 2005; Bubandt 2006; Nuijten 
& Anders 2007). What appears in the social space is therefore accusations of witchcraft, 
which are generally made when people see such a dramatic success by others especially 
in accumulating wealth or in gaining power, to explain why some people suddenly 
become rich while others remain poor, as Geschiere writes: “discourses on the occult 
can serve to protect or reinforce the accumulation of wealth and power” (2001:46). 
Some anthropologists argue that this is a sort of cultural interpretation to explain the 
spread of devil beliefs, since they “form part of an egalitarian social ethic that 
delegitimizes persons who gain more money and success than the rest of the social 
group” (Taussig 1980:15; Olsen 2002).  
Likewise, accusations of corruption are widespread when people suddenly 
become wealthy and possess power, since corruption can be the way of reaching both of 
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these. As a result, witchcraft and corruption accusations are seen as the ways in which 
people try to understand and interpret spectacular achievements related to power and 
wealth, as Blundo puts it: “in order to explain the trajectories of quick wealth, someone 
can be suspected just as easily of corrupt behaviour as of having resource to magic and 
witchcraft” (2007:31). As found elsewhere, anthropological studies have shown that 
accusations of witchcraft and corruption are “described as responding to and addressing 
the social, moral, and emotional consequences of selfishness, greed, and excessive 
accumulation in societies organized around obligations of reciprocal exchange” (Smith 
2007:142). The fact that witchcraft and corruption stimulate controversies in public 
discourses asserts that they are conceived ambiguously by people in the social sphere. 
Though some people strongly criticize witchcraft and corruption, both of these are part 
of social life as they can be found in the daily activities of society. 
   
3.2 The Dangers of Witchcraft in the Context of Corruption Eradication 
 Subjective experience of prosecutors: the cases of Sirajudin and 
Fatimah 
This section recounts the bitter experience of people dealing with witchcraft when they 
are fighting corruption. I start by introducing a personal story of a state official working 
with the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) who experienced bizarre events when 
investigating corruption scandals. A weekly magazine, Gatra, released a report that one 
day in January 2006, a senior prosecutor with a high ranking position at the AGO, 
Herman Suparman, made some odd revelations which seemed to be uncommon for the 
public. While he was filing corruption cases involving several important public figures 
and tycoons, he felt that black magic was disturbing his work—a sort of occult force 
attacked him. It was reported that Herman found large numbers of caterpillars in the 
bedroom of his private home. They were piled up to the ceiling and spread into every 
corner of the bedroom, but he had no idea from where those nauseating insects came; 
they appeared and vanished mysteriously for weeks. Herman unveiled this weird event 
when he was accompanying the Attorney General, as they held a public hearing in 
Parliament to evaluate the progress of the investigations of corruption cases being 
tackled by the AGO. Since the revelations seemed peculiar, most legislators considered 
that they were just fictitious stories; they did not believe in Herman’s revelations about 
the occult attacks when he was coping with corruption incidents. Instead, they suspected 
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that Herman exposed such weird stories to the public as the way of covering his 
inability to deal with corruption and of hiding his incompetence to handle the 
prosecution processes of those implicated in it.  
 For the ‘rationalist’ legislators, Herman’s revelations seemed to show magic 
practice which is considered as unlikely to be done in modern urban settings.  However, 
it is important to take into account Koentjaraningrat’s observation that “… in Javanese 
society destructive magic and sorcery (sihir or tenung) are still practiced frequently, not 
only in rural communities but also in urban environments. The practitioners of Javanese 
destructive magic are specialists who have learned the magical techniques of harming 
other people” (1985:419). With reference to this explanation, the occult forces attacking 
Herman were possible and the revelations should not be judged as fictitious or 
‘irrational’ since magic and sorcery could take place in any situation. In this respect, one 
needs to move beyond the conventional approach in understanding sorcery and 
witchcraft. Moreover, one should not interpret witchcraft and occult actions merely 
through the perspective of the analyst’s own rationality. Instead, he/she should view 
them based on the local framework of rationality (Kapferer 2003). In fact, Herman’s 
stories did not stop there and what he disclosed to the public was just one of many 
stories of prosecutors who suffered sorcery assaults but these were uncovered by the 
media. Some of them shared with me their personal experience of suffering witchcraft 
attacks in relation to their jobs. The followings are among the reports of public 
prosecutors in regard to black magic and occult actions. 
I talked to one of them, named Ahmad Sirajudin. He graduated in Law from the 
Jakarta Islamic University in 1985 where he taught for several years after finishing his 
studies. As an opportunity to be a civil servant with the status of prosecutor was offered, 
Sirajudin then joined the AGO in the early 1990s. Since then he has been stationed in 
many local offices across the country such as South Sulawesi and West Java, which 
allows him to learn about beliefs and cultures of Indonesian society including how 
magic and witchcraft are practised by many people in the country. With such long years 
of experience as a prosecutor working with the AGO, Sirajudin frequently coped with a 
number of corruption cases involving politicians and state officials. When dealing with 
corruption, he very often confronted obstruction and resistance from those implicated in 
it, since those who were being prosecuted relentlessly tried to halt the prosecution 
process in various ways. Sometimes they offered bribes with huge amounts of money or 
other forms of inducements, for instance, a package for traveling (tickets, allowance, 
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accommodation, entertainments, etc.).  However, they could also commit bad actions 
such as black magic, to make Sirajudin sick and prevent him from performing his 
official duties; or, to bring misfortune and plight so that his life would be always in 
misery and anguish. Sadly, that was what he experienced since he was not tempted to 
take such inducements. And here is an upsetting story of the dedicated prosecutor who 
lost his soul mate, his beloved wife, due to the perceived occult forces. 
One day in early 2003, Sirajudin was shocked when he found blood spilled on 
the floor of his house and abundant black maggots creeping around it. They spread 
everywhere reaching the tables, chairs, shelves, cabinets, and walls. Very shortly, they 
swamped every corner of the house. Considered that such circumstances were so 
strange, he thought that it might be santet (witchcraft) as those occurrences had never 
happened before. After that, Sirajudin had a series of terrifying events when he was 
investigating corruption incidence. The most horrible event occurred when he was in 
service stationed in the city of Anugerah Alam—a region which is very well-known as 
one of the most powerful places for black magic in the West Java province—between 
2003 and 2007. During these periods he was authorized by his superior to tackle a 
number of corruption scandals. Of the sixteen corruption cases in which Sirajudin was 
responsible for bringing a legal process, there was a large one in which the amount of 
public money embezzled from the local government budget was about four billion 
rupiah. Besides this, the case was politically risky since it involved a number of 
influential politicians associated with several large parties. These politicians occupied 
important positions at the local parliament: one as chair of the DPRD (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, the local legislative body) and the other two as deputy 
chairs. As Sirajudin started to prosecute those politicians with the consequence that they 
could be removed from their positions, they became angry and directed their vengeance 
at him personally, as they considered that Sirajudin wanted to finish their political 
careers as local MPs. When he was cross-examining them pertaining to the allegations 
of corruption, he was threatened by one of them in the following menacing words:  
You have made a big mistake since the prosecution process you are doing now has 
stopped me from being a legislator. How brave you are to deal with me! You will regret 
it when you know with whom you are dealing. It is because of you that I have lost my 
political career; all my political resources have gone. I swear … I will take revenge for 
all I have lost, and you and your family will suffer the consequences. You’ll bear the risk 
as you are prosecuting me … You are humiliating me in the eyes of the public … You 
have my words! (Quoted from Sirajudin’s words, interview on 20 December 2008) 
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Since Sirajudin had the responsibility to prosecute those who were suspected of 
corruption, his life was in sorrow as he faced long dark days together with his family 
members.  The threats he had received seemed to come true.  At first, Sirajudin just had 
a fever and headache which he thought were not very serious, as those were very 
common illnesses for anyone. On other days, however, he contracted another sickness, 
bellyache, which was followed by half-paralyzed hands and legs, which lasted for days. 
His wife, Fatimah, suggested he must go to the doctor for medical treatment and he did 
so, but after a series of diagnoses the doctor could not find any symptom of sickness. It 
was unbelievable that scientific medical treatment could not examine the illness he had. 
Weirdly, he suffered very much pain and what was so strange was that the suffering and 
pain came out on certain occasions and these were very disturbing since he could not 
work properly. As Sirajudin thought that what happened to him was uncommon, he 
believed that somebody must have done santet (sorcery) to him. On how sorcery is 
applied, Geertz explains:  
[…] santet is sometimes used for inducing foreign objects into the stomach of the 
victim, but, strictly speaking, it refers to the kind of sorcery in which the dukun must 
actually approach the victim and rub pepper grains (or something of the sort) against him 
while repeating a spell soundlessly in his mind. (Geertz 1960:108) 
  
 Believing that what Sirajudin had was santet, his superior, Megawangi, advised 
him to take an alternative treatment. He then visited the orang pintar or dukun (person 
who acquires spiritual or mystical knowledge), named Ki Agusman, in the city of 
Anugerah Alam (pseudonym) to obtain what is called ‘prophetic faith-healing’ 
(Ashforth 2001:214). Ki Agusman examined Sirajudin’s body with the use of spiritual 
envisioning, a sort of metaphysical method to detect what was going on inside the 
physical structure of the body; and he said that santet was being employed against 
Sirajudin by those who were very angry with him—the people who had deep feelings of 
hatred because Sirajudin had created problems for them. Ki Agusman then took 
Sirajudin into a private room for spiritual healing by carrying out a series of rituals to 
exorcize the devil spirits from his body. He laid Sirajudin down on the bed and then 
gently washed his face with salted water mixed with seven kinds of flowers. With the 
use of a small keris (Javanese knife, double-bladed dagger), Ki Agusman gently sliced 
the skin on both sides of Sirajudin’s temples, and by chanting some words of mantras 
silently during the process of spiritual treatment he then slowly pulled out some odd 
stuff from his head without any bleeding, unbelievably. Such treatment was, however, 
very painful and it was several days before the pain vanished. Certainly, Sirajudin was 
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so amazed by what the dukun found as things came out from his head one by one and all 
were some bizarre objects: a half-rusty nail, debris of multi-coloured glass, a piece of 
razor blade, a pine needle, a nut and bolt, and a small piece of steel. The healing process 
then moved on toward Sirajudin’s stomach and again the same weird materials were 
found, and when collected all together they filled a bowl. Ki Agusman told Sirajudin 
that occult powers were actively working; and the strange stuffs were inserted into his 
body through a magical means located in his house. Whenever he felt not so well or 
became tired, those magical materials went through very easily into his body which 
caused weakness of physical resilience; and if he lost strength, then he fell ill. And that 
is the way in which the occult forces work everywhere.  
Sadly santet also affected Sirajudin’s wife, Fatimah, and it was even much 
worse and more dangerous than what he had, whereas the sickness he suffered had not 
gone yet. Without knowing the cause of the painful conditions in her body, Fatimah 
moaned with the unbearable illness in her head and stomach, just as Sirajudin had. 
Again, it was so strange as the severe pain and suffering showed up only at certain 
times, mostly in the evening until midnight. Deeply concerned by the ordeal, at first 
Sirajudin took his wife to hospital as he considered that medical treatment from the 
doctor might help at this time. But after being hospitalized for several weeks nothing 
had improved; medication for the strange illness did not make any difference. What 
made Sirajudin so distressed was that Fatimah’s head grew bigger and bigger, doubled 
in size day by day and became flabby, resembling a water-laden balloon. As the medical 
treatment was hopeless, Sirajudin decided to come back to the same orang pintar, Ki 
Agusman, to obtain a spiritual remedy. As requested, the dukun did a spiritual healing 
upon Fatimah, exactly the same as he had done with Sirajudin before. Similarly, 
magical materials were found and pulled out from her head, while a small piece of 
rolled garment was taken from inside her stomach consisting of several strange items: a 
nail, a needle, a piece of razor blade, several seeds of rice, a doll, and a piece of paper 
with hand-written words:  
I hate you very much. I will crush you along with your family members. I have made a 
contract with my witch to ravage you. If you don’t want to become ill and dead, you must 
provide a ransom of Rp3,330,000. And if your witch finds and reads this note, I will 
drink his urine and eat his feces. (Quoted from Sirajudin’s words, interview on 20 
December 2008) 
 The orang pintar who performed the spiritual healing said that the witch of 
Sirajudin's opponent was continuously working by sending those magical materials one 
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after another, because he was bound by a contract to do santet upon Sirajudin and his 
wife.  Ki Agusman mentioned that they (Sirajudin’s opponent and his witch) had made 
an agreement to destroy and even kill him and Fatimah. In doing so, they had carried 
out a special ritual by sacrificing a buffalo head, which had been buried in the back yard 
of Sirajudin’s house, since this was a required ritual to serve evil spirits.  
 After finishing the spiritual healing, Ki Agusman asked Sirajudin whether or not 
those magical items should be sent back to the senders. He agreed to send them back 
without the intention to hurt the senders, but it was just to let them know that the magic 
and witchcraft they employed against Sirajudin and Fatimah had been tackled. After all, 
Sirajudin hoped that he and his wife could recover from their odd illness and regain 
their health. And returning those magical objects to where they came from needed a 
special ritual, too; and Ki Agusman requested Sirajudin to provide the required amount 
of Rp3,330,000
11
 (equal to $330) which was put on the hearth along with all the magical 
items found on the bodies of Sirajudin and Fatimah. All the magical objects were 
enfolded in several leaves of betel vine and then wrapped up in a white garment. While 
the dukun carefully cast spells around the hearth and silently voiced mantras, he asked 
Sirajudin to help him by reciting the words of shahadah—Islamic witness of faith, 
which reads in Arabic سر دمحم . الله لاا هلإ لاالله لو : “There is no God but Allah Almighty 
and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah” and by blowing on the fireplace very 
strongly. After a few moments, the hearth opened and all those magical materials along 
with the money disappeared, evaporating with the blowing wind; they had been sent 
back to those who had done the witchcraft on Sirajudin and his wife. The pathways of 
spiritual healing were taken since they believed that the orang pintar had the capability 
of communicating with spirits that hold the ‘otherworld’, as Ashforth describes: “… 
traditional healers and prophets partake in aspects of the privacy by founding their 
authority and power upon particular and personal relations with spiritual beings … they 
work through private communications with personal empowering spirits …” 
(2001:218).  
 Nevertheless, at the inception Sirajudin basically did not believe that black 
magic could affect him, but his personal experience forced him to consider that sorcery 
and witchcraft could be used for various purposes. He was convinced that witchcraft 
assaults were employed against him as a result of his duties in investigating corruption 
                                                 
11
 The amounts of money required for ritual did not have any particular meaning; it was simply part 
of the offering. 
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which involved politicians serving as local legislators. The reason why he approached 
the orang pintar was because some of his friends suggested that the santet must be 
counteracted by another santet with equal or even greater magical powers in order to 
defeat it. Having agreed with these suggestions, he then asked the orang pintar for help 
to chase away all the devil spirits that attacked him and his wife. Sirajudin had made the 
decision as the best way to save the life of his wife in the fight against sorcery. His 
effort fits what Geertz has observed: 
The only defense against sorcery is to get a better dukun, one whose spiritual strength is 
greater than that of the dukun one’s enemy has employed against him. A struggle 
between dukuns, on a mystical plane of course, then takes place, and if one’s dukun is 
indeed stronger than his adversary’s, he will turn the latter’s magic back upon him, and 
the enemy will fall ill with the disease he has wished on one. (Geertz 1960:107) 
   
 With the intention of obtaining a second opinion, Sirajudin and Fatimah looked 
for another dukun to find another spiritual therapy; and interestingly, the second dukun 
came up with the same mystical envisioning as the previous one had told them, assuring 
them that what they experienced was a kind of santet. From this mystical observation, 
the couple believed that black magic was being inflicted on them and that medical 
treatment was unable to detect such a disease because it was a man-made illness. The 
dukun then did a mystical examination of the bodies of Sirajudin and Fatimah by 
applying what is called the prana technique with the medium of a basin with clean 
water. He silently recited mantra kramat (sacred spells) while interchangeably touching 
the faces of the patients and putting his hands on the surface of the basin, and from there 
he took some magical objects: black maggots, worms, hairs, and small black stones. He 
said that somebody wanted to take the lives of both Sirajudin and Fatimah with the use 
of these magical objects. Therefore, they must be returned to where they initially came 
from. As suggested by the dukun, Sirajudin, together with his wife then floated them 
away on Laut Kidul
12
 (the South Sea) in the city of Anugerah Alam, believing that those 
magical materials were originally taken from there.  
 Despite all the types of remedies they had taken, however, the man-made 
sickness remained there and a great deal of their plight was not over yet. Since the 
                                                 
12
 Laut Kidul has been a legendary place for centuries because of its mystical attractions as Nyai Roro 
Kidul resides. Nyai Loro Kidul is a legendary Indonesian goddess, known as the Queen of the Southern 
Sea of Java (Indian Ocean or Samudra Kidul) in Javanese and Sundanese mythology. Reflected the 
diverse stories of her origin in many sagas, legends, myths and traditional folklores, she is also the 
legendary consort of the Mataram Sultanate kings, beginning with Panembahan Senopati in the sixteenth 
century and continuing to the present day. In addition, Laut Kidul has become a favourite place for 
someone who is looking for fortune or rejecting misfortune by performing special meditation and ritual.   
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conditions did not improve, the couple continued to make other efforts to heal this 
inexplicable sickness they suffered. They went to a third dukun asking for another 
spiritual remedy. They even took the dukun to their house to observe the whole building 
and he said that there were plenty of magical materials roaming in the house. The dukun 
examined all the rooms one by one to unravel the mystery and to find magical objects. 
In Sirajudin’s bedroom, he found a doll with a big head and palm-fibre hair similar to 
his wife’s bloated head which was affected by witchcraft. Inexplicably, the doll’s head 
was skewered by a rusty nail and its stomach contained all the magical items which 
were also found in Fatimah’s swollen belly. Moreover, there was also a handful of soil 
which, according to the divine knowledge of the dukun, was taken from a cemetery. 
Those magical objects, particularly the soil, seemed to be mystical signs that the death 
of his wife would likely come very soon; and therefore the dukun suggested that they 
must be burned in order to secure his wife’s body from any disease caused by occult 
rituals. Yet as a local proverb says, malang tak bisa ditolak, untung tak bisa diraih 
(misfortune cannot be averted, while fortune cannot be reached), Sirajudin could do 
nothing but accept the fact that he had such misfortune. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: A dukun performs a ritual healing at a private home of a prosecutor (see photo hung on 
the wall) in Jakarta. With a white magic stick and a couple of sacred stone rings used as charms to 
combat evil, he chants spell with mantras to heal the prosecutor who has become sick through 
being affected by occult forces. (Photo by informant) 
 
 Certainly it was very sad, as misfortune eventually came to him and his family 
members who had been in such a long predicament due to occult powers. Although 
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every effort had been made and every method of treatments—medical, spiritual, 
mystical—had been taken to save the life of Fatimah, she finally died; and her death 
was assumed to be the result of witchcraft. In fact, containing an occult attack is 
believed to be highly dangerous because it might affect oneself and this is what exactly 
Ashforth has pointed out: 
[…] those who would seek to counteract evil work must gain knowledge from access to 
‘higher’ powers, beings such as ancestors or Holy Spirit who can penetrate the secrets of 
the witch’s craft without compromising their own moral character and who can 
communicate this knowledge to human specialists in turn without compromising them. 
(Ashforth 2001:218) 
  
Inevitably Sirajudin became convinced that his wife was bewitched and he believed that 
it was because he had begun to put on trial those politicians who were accused of 
corruption. The most distressing situation was the long suffering of Fatimah that led to 
her passing away, and Sirajudin was gloomy as he was unable to thwart the perceived 
death magic of his beloved wife. He was so desperate at such a predicament so that he 
emotionally lamented: 
I almost lost hope so I protested to God questioning Him why I should suffer from this kind 
of ordeal, while I was in service to fight corruption. I questioned the justice of God as I 
thought that I had done such good things. But I must accept God’s predestination upon me 
with all my heart and continue to live while avoiding any prejudice toward His intent. As a 
pious Muslim I should believe in my destiny. What people might perceive as such a bad thing 
could be a good thing in God’s view, since people might not be able to capture the spiritual 
message behind a bad event. I must have a strong endurance in accepting this plight and my 
wife’s ordeal. After deep reflection, which brought me to total self-abandonment to God’s 
will, she passed away after suffering from a mysterious illness created by witchcraft. (Quoted 
from interview, 20 December 2008) 
   
Indeed the dangers of witchcraft are evident, as many prosecutors were very 
often under serious threats when they were in service to perform official duties. 
Coincidently, other senior prosecutors, Joko Pambudhi and Dian Megawangi, who were 
Sirajudin’s superiors in the successive period of office between 2003-2005 and 2005-
2007 had bitter experience of witchcraft assaults, although they did not receive the death 
magic as Sirajudin’s wife did. Nonetheless, a great deal of occult actions occurred to 
those two state prosecutors when they took the lead to investigate corruption; and the 
abnormal sicknesses they had were also similar to those of Sirajudin and Fatimah. In 
this respect, those prosecutors put their own lives at risk when coping with corruption, 
so that it can be said that witchcraft is as dangerous as corruption in the sense that both 
can damage people’s lives. The former creates people's suffering with the use of evil 
spirits, while the latter produces hardship for them by embezzling public wealth and 
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stealing economic resources as these are supposed to be allocated for citizens. Taking 
into account the parallels of witchcraft and corruption in terms of risk, Joko Pambudhi, 
who holds a high position at the AGO, shared his views:  
For a prosecutor, fighting corruption can be dangerous for his own safety because corruptors 
will not let one bring them into court. They will take all measures necessary to prevent 
themselves from being put on trial, including the use of magic and witchcraft. When a friend 
of mine was prosecuting officials who committed corruption, he became mute and paralyzed. 
I myself contracted a bizarre illness for months; a rusty nail was inserted in my back which 
made me sick and caused unbearable pain. (Quoted from interview, 13 December 2008)  
  
 What has been discussed above clearly shows the paradoxes of witchcraft and 
corruption, as both represent the ambiguous relationship between “concealment and 
publicity and the hidden continuities between the illegal and the legal and the moral and 
the immoral” (Anders & Nuijten 2007:19). As a result, people seem to be morally 
ambivalent when they react to the social phenomena of witchcraft and corruption. In 
this sense, the issue of morality becomes the subject of contestation among those who 
are involved in witchcraft and corruption, since people maintain their own moral values 
and ethical basis.   
  
   Subjective experience of social activist(s): the case of Ahmad Ghulam  
In fact, sorcery attacks were not exclusively suffered by prosecutors. NGO activists also 
had a similar experience while they were involved in social activism against corruption. 
Here is the personal story of Ahmad Ghulam, a social activist associated with the 
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), who once suffered witchcraft assaults which, he 
believed, were caused by his activities in the fight against corruption. Like other social 
activists in general, Ghulam is a typical young idealist NGO activist who has a great 
deal of concern about making Indonesian politics better in the sense that the country 
should be free from corruption. Such idealism has been for years very commonplace in 
public narratives brought up by social and political activists as they keenly expect 
democratic power and the democratically-elected national leaders and rulers to be 
committed to eradicating corruption while at the same time providing better social 
services for the people. After graduating from the State University of Jakarta, Ghulam 
decided to join the ICW in the early 2000s as he felt that the nature of the job seemed to 
suit the spirit of his social activism, concentrating on anti-corruption initiatives. Before 
taking up a position of vice chair of the agency, he served for several years as a 
coordinator of the division dealing with political corruption. His daily activities were (1) 
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to document and verify reports on corruption either given by citizens or obtained from 
other sources for further investigation, (2) to supervise and organize volunteers in public 
consultancy for promoting anti-corruption initiatives, (3) to assemble and reunite other 
NGO activists for social advocacy on anti-corruption movements, and (4) to examine 
and probe presumed corruption in public agencies, for prosecution processes by the 
authorities. 
Ghulam shared his personal story saying that at the time of the witchcraft attacks 
he was scrutinizing a secret report on alleged corruption at PLN—Perusahaan Listrik 
Negara (the state-owned electric power company) totalling tens of billions of rupiah. He 
was responsible for ensuring the validity of the report before the ICW disclosed the case 
to the public. In order to probe the corruption allegations, Ghulam, together with several 
members of the ICW staff, collected ‘evidence’ from the ground by gathering adequate 
information and filing a large number of documents which were taken from various 
sources. All the ‘evidence’ gathered strongly corroborative of the alleged corruption 
scandals; and what he found was that there were indeed very strong indications of illicit 
practices at the state-owned electric power company which implicated its director 
general. With a set of dossiers in their hands, the ICW activists bravely unveiled the 
allegations of corruption scandals in a press conference attended by a large number of 
journalists in Jakarta. As the corruption scandals exploded and the media put them in 
the headlines for weeks, the Police were forced by the public to investigate them and 
some officials of the PLN were charged with corruption.  
However, Ghulam was not so happy with the action taken by the Police who 
forcibly prosecuted those suspected of corruption; he asserted that, according to past 
experience, corruption cases were always political in the sense that there was a strong 
tendency to link up with political power so that those implicated in it often tried to 
obtain political protection from those holding power. In fact, the prosecution process of 
the PLN corruption scandals went nowhere and the case became blurred since a number 
of political elites were involved in it and they tried to intervene in the investigation 
process. Gossip and rumours abounded saying that it was because those suspected of 
corruption had a very close relation with power-holders and the ruling party that the 
juridical processes were then put on hold and eventually all charges were annulled, with 
some reasons given by the Police that there was not enough evidence for any further 
prosecution processes. It seems that through such activities the ICW had frequently 
created bitter social relations and political tensions because politicians and state officials 
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became irritated, which in turn put Ghulam and other activists at risk. Ghulam was 
deeply concerned about the risk, pointing out that: 
Being social activist of anti-corruption is highly risky because we deal with those who hold 
state powers and dominate political resources. They can abuse such powers for anything to 
meet their own interests. With their powers they can jail activists who criticize rulers for 
political reasons; injure activists who reveal illicit activities of rulers through, for instance, a 
car crash; or suppress activists who oppose and rebuke the power regime. State violence is a 
common feature of political life as this approach was always used by the New Order regime. 
During that time many activists were kidnapped and disappeared; they went missing and have 
never been found. (Quoted from interview, 10 August 2009) 
  
Within Indonesia, state violence became part of the political landscape of the New 
Order regime. This violence took the form of what came popularly to be known as 
preman (thug, gangster). These individuals were connected with elite politicians and 
affiliated with various social organizations led by influential political figures and 
military officers (Ryter 2005). The preman were very powerful since they were 
protected by military officers who provided them not only with immunity from 
prosecution and legal sanction, but also a variety of privileges related to economic and 
political resources. In fact, the preman maintained political significance, as Loren Ryter 
has rightly pointed out: “All the talk about preman politics supported the idea of a 
regime, a unified state whose power originated with Soeharto and extended like blood 
vessels through neat chains of command, and finally downward and outward through its 
preman capillaries.” State violence continues in the post-New Order era.  The poisoning 
of a prominent human rights activist, Munir Thalib, while he was on board the Garuda 
Indonesia aircraft flying to Amsterdam on 7 September 2004, is a macabre example.  
This murder was believed to be politically driven as a result of Munir’s involvement in 
the disclosure of a series of human rights abuses committed by the military. Many 
political activists strongly believed that military intelligence officers were involved in 
the murder, as a secret document emerged in the public arena indicating that the 
authorities felt Munir was a dangerous activist and a serious threat to the military as a 
direct result of his political activities and relentless struggle for human rights. The 
document identified three strategies for taking the life of Munir: (1) by crushing him in 
a car/motorcycle accident, (2) by employing witchcraft against him, or (3) by poisoning 
him. Tragically, Munir, a high profile, passionate activist with a strong commitment to 
promoting democracy and human rights in the country, died from arsenic poisoning in 
mysterious circumstances on an international flight.  
 
110 
 
Actually such risk can also be in the form of magic and witchcraft attacks. 
Witchcraft itself can be conceived as a form of ‘state violence’, or a form of occult 
power which the powerful can mobilize to protect themselves from various threats that 
may destabilize the power establishment. Yet it should be noted here that while 
witchcraft can be used to produce an evil political battle and create state violence 
against one’s opponents, accusations of witchcraft are the way in which the powerless—
as in the case of the prosecutor or the activist—seek to react to power, or rather, to the 
occult actions and spiritual attacks by the powerful. A number of studies in African and 
Asian countries (e.g. Geschiere 2001; Ashforth 2005; Siegel 2006; Herriman 2007) 
have shown that witchcraft can be manipulated for political interest in support of the 
state power and witchcraft violence is then very easily transformed into state violence. 
Moore & Sanders point out that “the oppressive nature of the state combined with 
corruption and the continuing impoverishment of populations raises questions about 
how wealth is produced through the exercise [of] illegitimate or illicit power” (2001:18) 
in which witchcraft is taken as a form of political action. These anthropologists have 
provided an understanding of the dynamics of social processes and political formation 
in which occult activities play a part within society, as they observe how people manage 
their fear of such evil forces as witchcraft and sorcery. They also examine the dynamics 
of insecurity in everyday life within society, by demonstrating how occult violence as a 
form of spiritual insecurity has become part of the establishment of the state power. 
Given the kind of setting, it is not surprisingly if NGO activists often face occult 
violence when they are working on unveiling corruption scandals, given that their 
actions could threaten power-holders. And this is exactly the case of the ICW activist, 
Ghulam, who experienced this occult power. One day in June 2008, amidst the hectic 
schedules of daily activities, Ghulam asked permission from his colleagues at the office 
to go home early as he did not feel so well. At first he just felt fatigued so he decided to 
take a couple of days off and relax at home for a while; but a week later he contracted a 
very bad fever with a cold and cough. Despite having taken some medicines, the illness 
did not go away; rather, it became chronically worse day after day. In the weeks that 
followed, Ghulam sensed there was something wrong in his belly as it slowly inflated 
with severe pain, and his throat became inflamed, preventing him from speaking. As his 
health became worse, Ghulam’s parents took him to hospital for medication and a series 
of medical examinations were taken, such as checking his body temperature and blood 
pressure, testing urine and blood samples, and some other tests. While waiting for the 
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results, Ghulam thought that he would soon be hospitalized as he felt that his health 
conditions were worsening. Weirdly the results of the clinical checks showed that 
everything was fine, since all the important aspects of his body which had been tested 
were in good condition so that doctor simply advised him to take some more medicines 
and have more rest. Although Ghulam felt a very strong stomachache, he could do 
nothing but follow the advice of the doctor, who suggested he should take some 
medication at home. However, some very bad things unexpectedly happened. At night 
after returning home from hospital, the pain and suffering were unbearable and Ghulam 
vomited dark blood with lugut (itchy-bristles of bamboo) indicating that occult powers 
had affected him. Since medical treatment did not help at all, Kareem—Ghulam’s 
brother—then asked an ahli hikmah (person who acquires divine knowledge) whom he 
knew very well, named Abdul Gaffar, to heal Ghulam's abnormal physical disorder 
through spiritual treatment. Having seen Ghulam’s physical health, Kareem believed 
that he was being attacked by somebody with the use of teluh (sorcery); he was in 
serious danger as black magic assaulted him and it must therefore be counteracted by 
supernatural powers. In Islamic spirituality, it is believed that the ahli hikmah who 
acquires ilmu putih (white magic) has the capacity to defeat ilmu hitam (black magic) 
because the person has the so-called barakah—a sort of divine favour or benediction 
given by Allah Almighty to a pious Muslim. Containing religious elements, white 
magic is usually practised for a person's benefit to help them overcome man-made 
disease, so it is also known as public magic since it is beneficial for people.  As 
Koentjaraningrat put it: 
Public magic is often performed as a part of public religio-magical ceremonies […]. 
Because productive magic generally has a benevolent character, it can be considered as 
what is called white magic … which is usually performed for the benefit of a large group 
of people and for the community as a whole, and it may therefore also be called public 
magic. (Koentjaraningrat 1985:413) 
    
 In the context of practising white magic, barakah is central, and is generally 
conceived as a spiritual power, a blessing from God, which can be granted to certain 
people, places, or objects and is always seen as benevolent since its ultimate source is 
Allah Almighty—the One True God who possesses all the universe. On the acquirement 
of barakah, Muslims have no choice but to rely entirely on the grace of God, since 
“God makes his choice manifest through the possession by the elect of the crucial 
attributes of pacifism, inculcating generosity and hospitality, and prosperity” (Gellner 
[1981] 1995:121). Relying on the interpretations of Islamic tradition, Muslims think of 
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barakah as divine blessing, grace and mercy; protection from dangers and threats that 
affect the live of human societies; a charismatic quality for leadership that makes a 
leader more influential and authoritative; or a spiritual power to protect and cure. The 
barakah is transferable; if one gains this kind of spiritual power, he or she can pass it on 
to other people, places, and objects. It can also be inherited by other Muslims who meet 
the qualifications as seen in a high degree of what is called saleh (faithfulness, piety). 
Some Muslims even consider barakah as a mystical force which can be induced by 
ritual and manipulated for human benefit; they think a personal spiritual power based on 
a relationship with Allah Almighty can become an impersonal force and they can then 
use it for the benefit of human society (Lenning 1980; Gellner [1981] 1995). An 
interpretation of barakah is also given by John Esposito, who refers to it as: 
Blessing conferred by God upon humankind. … One of the most visible manifestations 
of barakah in popular Islam is the ability to perform miracles [and to produce spiritual 
favours] ... and barakah has long been viewed as hereditary. It may be associated with 
specific places, things, and acts, such as certain foods, animals, plants, events, words, and 
gestures. (Esposito 2003:37) 
  
As requested, Abdul Gaffar performed a long-distance ritual healing—at that 
time he was far away from Jakarta—to contain the occult forces that assaulted Ghulam; 
and with the help of divine knowledge, he removed the evil spirits that were trying to 
crush Ghulam. The ahli hikmah also told Kareem that there were magical objects placed 
in a ditch in the alleyway close to his house through which Ghulam was affected by 
witchcraft as he passed through it every day when leaving and returning home. The 
magical items consisted of gabah (unhulled paddy separated from the stalks, rice seed), 
sea sand, itchy-bristles of bamboo, and dried blood. To neutralize the occult forces of 
these magical items, the alleyway and the surrounding areas of the house must be 
covered with salt. There is a cultural belief especially among Javanese people that salt 
can thwart demonic magic and counteract occult actions. A few days later, therefore, 
Abdul Gaffar visited Ghulam at home, bringing him some herbs and perfume—all these 
items had already been enchanted—and suggested that he, along with his family 
members, should bathe with water containing these substances in order for them to be 
able not only to ban occult attacks but also to repulse the evil powers. Taking a shower 
with the enchanted herbs and perfume was part of the ritual for healing and that was 
very important because the occult powers might affect whoever among the family 
members was in the weakest condition. As Ashforth has indicated, “witchcraft can refer 
to the malicious manipulation of the powers of herbs and other substances … used for 
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healing medicines, to pacts with devils and demons, to innate supernatural powers, or to 
collective actions by persons engaging all of these forces” (2001:207), so one should 
take the same way to counteract the occult practices. This is why Abdul Gaffar 
suggested that Ghulam had to perform a ritual healing. The ahli hikmah said that 
Ghulam was indeed the target of the occult forces and they had been working for about 
a month and half; and that is why before he had a swollen belly, he also had a fever, 
cold and cough for days to camouflage the magic attacks. Ghulam believed that he was 
lucky to be saved from the sorcery assaults, since the magical materials sent by the 
witch were highly dangerous. Fortunately, he was strong enough to survive, given that 
the sorcery attacks were carried out by a witch with a very high level of black magic 
from East Java, which is well-known as one of the centres of witchcraft.  
Ghulam believed that the sorcery attacks he suffered were connected with his 
activities in the battle against corruption; and that such a threat was not only in the form 
of occult forces but also that of physical violence. Certainly, anti-corruption social 
activists like Ghulam, associated with the ICW, often experienced threats of violent 
action, and became a target of criminalization. Moreover, it is believed that witchcraft 
assaults were part of the threats and carried out by those who were accused of 
corruption, since they did not want to be prosecuted by the authorities. Here, magic and 
witchcraft were used by the alleged corruptors as a sort of self-defence mechanism. In 
other words, those implicated in corruption would act at all costs to prevent the 
investigation process, as Ghulam put it: 
Generally officials and politicians agree that corruption is dangerous for both the state and 
society and must be fought. They fervently state to the public that corruption is a serious 
threat to social life, but it is a fact that every single corruption scandal always involves state 
officials and politicians. If they are implicated in it, they talk ambivalently about corruption 
and even use any means to avoid a prosecution process—including black magic. So practising 
witchcraft is commonplace and sorcery is used so as to endanger those dealing with 
corruption. Witchcraft attacks are not just very dangerous for the victims – they can even take 
one’s life. (Quoted from interview, 10 August 2009) 
 
Generally speaking, the uses of magic and witchcraft are closely tied to resentment and 
someone might take revenge by employing an irrational way, an occult action, as what 
happened to the couple Sirajudin and Fatimah and the ICW activist Ghulam. Their 
bewitchment seems to fit with James Ferguson’s observation: “It is easy to agree with 
the classic writers on the subject [witchcraft] that the apparently irrational, superstitious 
fear of bewitchment is not so irrational after all if we consider the way that imaginations 
of harm-doing are linked to all-too-real social hatreds and resentments” (1999:118). As 
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a result, it can be asserted that such bitter experiences as those of Sirajudin and Ghulam 
who suffered witchcraft attacks and even the demonic forces which were perceived to 
result in the death of Fatimah might threaten anyone who is engaging in efforts of 
corruption eradication in which magic and witchcraft become very common phenomena 
in social life. Sorcery may only be a subjective superstition, but it is socially efficacious. 
People may not believe in witchcraft, yet they feel it is better to protect themselves from 
it to avoid any danger. Thus, prosecutors and social activists feel they have to look after 
and protect themselves from the possibility of being attacked by magic and witchcraft. 
3.3 Ways of Understanding Witchcraft and Corruption  
As already discussed at length, the main nature of witchcraft is that it is always the 
subjective experience of an individual. Niehaus (2005) argues that subjective experience 
is linked and filtered through culturally specific modes of action and apprehension of 
lived reality, such as mysterious deaths, strange sicknesses, nightmares, auditory 
hallucinations, and others. Because witchcraft is part of the cultural imagination, 
personal experience can be interpreted through this ‘filter’ which attaches the idea of 
witchcraft to the felt reality of the individual. Moreover, the subjectivity of witchcraft 
refers to the fact that its activities and actions always take place in domestic areas. But 
to limit the fears of witchcraft among individuals, it must be brought into public space 
as James Siegel has suggested: “Witchcraft should be part of public life in order to 
defend against the fears that it brings” (2006:13). In this sense, witchcraft has an impact 
on public affairs; its impact on social life is seen in the two cases of prosecutors and 
social activist(s) who were engaged in public services and represented public interests. 
As prosecutors and anti-corruption social activists represent the public interest, 
attacking them with the use of black magic and other occult forces is perceived as 
disturbing public order and social stability within society. This is what Fisiy & 
Geschiere have also pointed out: “… witchcraft is shifted from a domestic affair to an 
offence against public order and tranquility” (2001:239).  
In this context, witchcraft attacks experienced by prosecutors and social 
activists, as seen in the cases of Sirajudin and Ghulam, clearly represent a personal 
vendetta and retaliation. Both of them suffered sorcery assaults after they began to 
investigate corruption allegations involving officials and politicians who were the 
subjects of prosecution which could lead them to be imprisoned if found guilty. At this 
point, the officials and politicians were very angry with the prosecutors and NGO 
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activists who revealed corruption scandals which brought these officials and politicians 
into court and resulted in their being imprisoned. They lost their political career and 
position in public office, due to the prosecution processes, so they took revenge by 
applying witchcraft against those causing such problems in their lives. In those cases, 
hatred and anger seemed to be the primary motives for practising sorcery, although this 
remained undisclosed since only the politicians and officials themselves knew the 
motives. In support of these explanations, Adam Ashforth says:   
Given the motive for witchcraft is secret, and considering the perpetrators have a strong 
incentive to conceal their motives, one way to determine the identity of the agent behind a 
particular act of witchcraft is to assess the possibility of particular persons possessing the 
motives of jealousy and hatred. There are two basic ways of doing this: first, to assess the 
distribution of jealousy across particular social roles and correlate it with access to other 
means of causing harm, most notably violence; and, second, to assess the possible motives of 
particular individuals by inference from other words and deeds. Broadly speaking, capacities 
for witchcraft and capacities for violence are typically perceived to be inversely related. 
(Ashforth 2001:216)        
  
 An alternative way of understanding witchcraft and corruption is by connecting 
the two with the increase of material worth and the enlargement of power. As is widely 
known, those implicated in corruption are mostly political and economic elites; and 
corruption is, in the end, about accumulating wealth and capital in order to gain and 
maintain power. Meanwhile, occult powers in the form of witchcraft and sorcery are 
often intended as a means to amass wealth, material worth, and all kinds of economic 
resources. All these things are attributed to social and political positions, symbolizing a 
high social status within society. In this respect, corruption shares some similarities with 
witchcraft, in the sense that both of them ‘are crucial for the operation of power’ and 
‘they tend to be directed toward people who have suddenly and inexplicably increased 
their wealth or power’ (Anders & Nuijten 2007:19) which often results in allegations. 
That is why accusations of sorcery and corruption are commonly attributed to those who 
have a strong desire for power and wealth. 
 Following the same line of reasoning, Clough & Mitchell state: “Accusing 
somebody who appears to be over-accumulating—and is therefore guilty of excess—of 
entering into devil pacts, or of being a witch, is seen as a way of ensuring an equal 
distribution of resources and discouraging economic inequality. [...] Such accusations 
represent a positive acknowledgement of the power entailed in accumulation” (2001:2). 
Not surprisingly, people who are deeply obsessed with power and wealth are very often 
accused of having a strong tendency to rely on magic and witchcraft. In the context of 
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public discourse, people frequently talk about corruption and witchcraft with limited—
or an absence of—proofs or hard facts. Here, the parallels of corruption and witchcraft 
can be seen in the fact that both lack empirical evidence so that what appears in public 
discourse on corruption and witchcraft is mostly in the form of accusations. As 
accusations of monstrous witchcraft rituals, devil worship, demonic powers are 
widespread, so are allegations of corruption, as they come to the centre of public 
narratives through rumours and gossip and both of them are conceived as a sort of 
‘empirical evidence’ in support of the allegations. Thus Blundo writes: 
 [T]he empirical evidence of corruption and sorcery is constituted above all by a discourse 
that crystallizes around rumours rather than around facts that could be easily documented, [so 
that] one is led to question the nature of rumours (accusatory or justificatory) and what it is 
that they actually convey. Corruption, just as much as sorcery, functions in a system of 
circular beliefs that are private and feed themselves, and that can explain unhappiness, 
disgrace, the failure of an administrative step, and the loss of a case in court … Corruption 
and witchcraft are thus mechanisms to interpret, explain, and attempt to manipulate the world. 
(Blundo 2007:31) 
 
The accusations of witchcraft and corruption indicate that people seem to be in great 
doubt since they are unable to claim any empirical evidence in support of such 
allegations. Without evidence, such baseless accusations would easily lead to 
ambiguous attitudes, as people would be in contradictory positions in response to those 
practising sorcery and committing corruption.  
 
3.4 Corruption and Moral Ambiguity  
As social controversy always surrounds illicit deals, moral ambiguity seems to be the 
main characteristic of both corruption and witchcraft. While people denounce 
corruption as being the source of social difficulties and hardship for others, those who 
occupy public powers and are implicated in it, enrich themselves with public money, as 
Jordan Smith points out: “People frequently condemn corruption and its consequences 
as immoral and socially ruinous, yet they also participate in seemingly contradictory 
behaviour that enables, encourages, and even glorifies corruption” (2007:5). Likewise, 
people censure sorcery because it represents an uncivilized culture and creates social 
disorder, yet some of them practise magic and witchcraft as a way of avoiding 
misfortune, possessing power, and accumulating wealth. Interestingly, anthropologists 
have observed corruption and witchcraft in connection with social inequality within 
society, so public discourses on the subjects are always related to the issue of how 
wealth and public resources are not distributed equally among people. In other words, 
117 
 
some citizens do not share evenly the material worth belonging to the public as they 
have a right to do. Again, Jordan Smith raises his concern about the issues of witchcraft 
and corruption by arguing that witchcraft accusations seem to be a sort of critique of 
corruption in the sense that both are connected with and represent the moral 
ambivalence with regard to massive social inequality, as he writes: “Stories of evil 
rituals and occult practices in the pursuit of wealth point to tensions and ambivalence as 
people experience corruption … that underlies structures of inequality in society” 
(2007:162). 
Moral ambiguity is clearly shown in pro-contra responses to corruption within 
society. Although corruption is widely condemned by the public, there are some groups 
of people who support those committing corruption. Interestingly, moral support is 
given by spiritualists through a series of cultural rituals, as demonstrated by a well-
known paranormal named Ki Sidharta. Such rituals for helping those who are charged 
with corruption are very commonplace, and are even done in public space. One day in 
November 2007, Ki Sidharta performed a cultural ritual (see figure 3.2) called khadam 
ruh—a typical ritual for purifying a person’s mind and heart so that she or he can do 
good things and behave with good manners.  
          
Figure 3.2: An event of the khadam ruh ritual is conducted by a paranormal/spiritualist at a 
court in Jakarta to protect a corruptor who stands for trial, being charged with corruption. 
(Photo by detikfoto.com) 
The ritual of khadam ruh took place in a special court for corruption in Jakarta and was 
carried out in support of Hasan Rais, bupati (district head) of Kutai Kertanegara, 
Kalimantan, who stood in the public court to answer corruption charges. The intention 
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of the khadam ruh ritual was to purify the minds and hearts of the judges who led the 
court session to prosecute Hasan Rais so that they would be able to make a just decision 
for him. For this ritual, Ki Sidharta used a white plate with words written in Arabic 
(which seemed to be a sort of talisman), an empty glass, a knife, a banana, white papers 
with words written in Arabic, and a cigarette. Helped by an assistant, Ki Sidharta began 
to light those white papers and throw them in the glass; and then the glass was put on 
the plate which was held by the assistant who sat in front of him (see figure 3.3). While 
chanting some mantras in Arabic, the paranormal placed the knife in the glass as smoke 
filled the small waiting room of the court. Ki Sidharta then took the cigarette, wrapped 
in tissues, and he connected the roll of tissues to the glass while continuing to chant 
sacred mantras. He repeatedly voiced the name of Hasan Rais, and suddenly from his 
mouth splattered blood into the glass several times; he then tried to pull out the knife 
but it seemed very hard to do so. A few minutes later he was successful, plucking the 
knife from the glass and then putting it on the plate. Ki Sidharta claimed that the ritual 
he did was Islamic and said that the blood coming out from his mouth was dirty, 
representing dirty hearts of the judges and political opponents of Hasan Rais who 
wanted to hurt him. Such a ritual was important to guide the judges and prosecutors so 
they would prevent themselves from having dirty intention and avoid false allegations 
of corruption toward Hasan Rais. Despite the khadam ruh ritual he carried out, Hasan 
Rais was in fact found guilty and given six years in prison. The verdict was based on 
valid evidence and so the judges were able to send him to jail.    
  
Figure 3.3: A paranormal/spiritualist performs the ritual of khadam ruh at public court in 
Jakarta to protect a corrupt official who stands trial on charges of corruption. (Photo by 
detikfoto.com)   
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 It can be said that a ritual to obtain help from a spiritualist who plays the role of 
a medium with the use of divine knowledge does not represent an exotic society which 
is often associated with pre-modern culture. Rather, it is a very common social 
phenomenon taking place in a contemporary society which is integrated into social, 
political, and economic systems in the modern era. Such rituals reflect a moral 
expression based on a person's perception of what may or may not be categorized as 
corruption, in the sense that the standards of morality may be different among different 
people since they have their own values in which they believe. Here, Mark Auslander 
states: “… ideologies of ritual agency, witchcraft, spirit mediumship, and divination … 
are not archaic or exotic phenomenon—somehow isolated and disjointed [through the] 
historical processes of global political and economic transformation. Rather, these are 
moral discourses alive to the basic coordinates of experience, highly sensitive to 
contradiction to economy and society” (1993:168). In this sense, witchcraft can be used 
as an additional way in which power holders can impose their power; it seems to be a 
tool of the powerful, in addition to that of corruption, to gain and maintain power. In 
other words, they first commit corruption (at the material level) and then—if it is 
detected—they still have witchcraft (at the spiritual level) to try and avoid being 
prosecuted or losing their jobs. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The discussion of this chapter can be concluded by asserting that corruption has 
received wide public attention as it has become so pervasive and chronically ingrained 
within state agencies. It attracts the deep concern of people and is seen as a major 
source of the misfortune that affects them. Corruption has produced great controversies 
since it generates the pros and cons of various views especially when it is associated 
with those occupying public offices and holding state powers. This clearly shows 
society's moral ambiguity in response to corruption, since people respond differently to 
those committing corruption; they are often in limbo between condemnation and 
fascination. In the same vein, the way people react to witchcraft is similar as they are 
ambiguous between denunciation and commendation. Yet the social effect of witchcraft 
must be taken seriously especially in connection with corruption eradication. Those who 
engage in efforts to fight corruption frequently deal with occult powers, as in the case of 
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state prosecutors and social activists. The safety of their lives is under threat, as appears 
from the magic and sorcery assaults, because of their involvement in combating 
corruption.  The occult powers experienced by prosecutors and activists have clearly 
demonstrated the dangers of magic and witchcraft in the fight against corruption. Here, 
therefore, paradoxical values are embedded in corruption, and in magic and sorcery. 
The paradoxes of corruption and supernatural magic may be observed through 
the idea of modernity. Noticeably, magic is one of the major subjects of Weber’s 
empirical studies in that it could be challenged by rationality—the main characteristic of 
modernity. In this regard, rationality is viewed as opposed to enchantment and the 
enchanted world is indicated by the primacy of magic and the supernatural. Therefore, 
to be rational means one needs to move away from these circumstances and should not 
rely on magical and occult forces. Weber argues that modernity rests on the 
rationalization process of human life and it must be placed at the centre of an 
individual’s behaviour. The rationalization will eventually lead to demystification as 
rational action replaces myth, mystic, and magic—all of them representing traditional 
values. At this point, Weber suggests that rationalization requires one to do what he 
calls ‘disenchantment’. This term refers to the prevalence of rational thinking and 
scientific knowledge, indicating that the beliefs of mystical authority and magical power 
may fade away as human rationalism and intellectualism take over (Weber 1946). In 
this respect, one way to contextualize the idea of rationality is through a modern 
organization, in order to carry out rational action. Weber indicates that rationality may 
take the form of bureaucratic institutions that are based on rational-legal legitimation. 
This is exactly the agenda of Indonesian civil society in regard to the ideas and practices 
of anti-corruption, as will be discussed in the next part of the thesis. Indonesian civil 
society views corruption as being against the basic principles of rational bureaucratic 
institutions in the context of public governance.  
Although corruption has created great controversy, some groups in Indonesian 
society hold the view that it cannot be tolerated for any reason. Yet those who respond 
to corruption with ambiguity usually maintain some kind of interest in power or are 
associated with some sort of patronage relationships with officials or parties involved in 
it. However, other groups of Indonesian people strongly reject any views that tolerate or 
accept corruption. Instead, they firmly consider that corruption is dangerous for the state 
and society as it greatly impacts on the low quality of people’s life and affects public 
affairs. That is why public criticism against corruption, bringing it into the spotlight, is 
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mostly pioneered by religious-Islamic organizations, civil society institutions, NGOs, 
media agencies, popular cultures, and others. They ground their criticism against 
corruption on both Islamic ethics and secular values, because they believe that 
corruption is undoubtedly against any morality, whether religious or secular. For this 
reason, the following three chapters will address these issues by examining the ideas 
and practices of anti-corruption as promoted by civil society associations, both religious 
and secular.   
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Chapter 4 
 
RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 
 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss activism against corruption with reference 
to religious movements. It aims to show that religious groups speak firmly and without 
ambiguity, against corruption, asserting that it breaches religious values. This chapter 
therefore seeks to explain the role of religious activism in the battle against corruption 
by addressing the issues of morality and ethics derived from Islamic doctrines, as they 
are utilized as the basis for activism. I will discuss the Islamic roots of corruption 
discourses by focusing on Islamic ideas that drive anti-corruption movements and by 
looking at theological doctrines used as the main sources for anti-corruption reform. In 
discussing this, I will examine Muslim organizations, as they have a strong commitment 
to supporting collective efforts to eradicate corruption by taking part in anti-corruption 
initiatives. This chapter will show how Indonesian Muslim society has become involved 
in social activism against corruption and contributes, from the perspective of Islamic 
practices and teachings, to flourishing public narratives on corruption.   
4.1 Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah: Representation of Indonesian  
‘Civil Islam’ 
 
This part explores an introductory account of Indonesian Islam and the two most 
influential Muslim organizations, as they play a key part in public life and Indonesian 
politics. Much scholarly research has illustrated that Indonesia is the world’s largest 
Muslim nation. Historically, Islam first came to the country through a pacific route, as it 
was brought by Muslim traders and travellers from the Arabian peninsula and from 
Gujarat on the Indian subcontinent as early as the thirteenth century (e.g. Reid 1993; 
Ricklefs [1981] 2001; Azra 2004). Interestingly, Indonesian Islam has some unique 
characteristics that are different from those of the Middle East and South Asia, since it 
has adapted to local cultures and indigenous values that are not necessarily Islamic. 
Even Islam in Java appeared to be syncretic, as Clifford Geertz (1960) decades ago 
described this version of Islam as abangan (nominal, less strict Muslims) in contrast to 
santri—pious Muslims who practise a more orthodox version of Islam. The abangan 
are Javanese Muslims who are more inclined to follow a local system of beliefs called 
adat (local customs) than Islamic shari’a; and their belief systems combine Hinduism, 
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Buddhism and Animist traditions as these were the major religious faiths in the old 
Javanese kingdoms. Many historians and anthropologists (e.g. Pigeaud 1960; Geertz 
1960; Pigeaud & de Graaf 1976; Koentjaraningrat 1985; Woodward 1989; Beatty 2003) 
have explained that pre-Islamic Java was dominated by those religions and local beliefs 
which significantly influenced how Islam appears in modern times. In fact, Indonesian 
Islam is so colourful with its various cultural values and is highly diverse, characterized 
by “mutual influences of normative Islamic piety, Javanese mysticism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and folk tradition upon each other” (Beatty 2003:1).  
Whereas abangan is attributed to religious syncretism, santri is ascribed to 
Islamic reform, which is mostly associated with the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdhatul 
Ulama (NU), although both represent different streams of Indonesian Islam. Generally 
the first often claims to be modern, progressive and more reformist, as it has become the 
major proponent of modernist Muslim movements (e.g. Noer 1973; Nakamura 1976; 
Peacock 1978), while the second is usually called traditionalist and conservative (e.g. 
Barton & Fealy 1996; Feillard 1997; Bush 2009). Nevertheless, such distinctions are 
merely in the ways of practising Islam, not in theological doctrine. The former is more 
puritan by strictly following the Qur’anic texts and the Hadith of the Prophet 
Muhammad, while the latter is more adaptive to cultural rituals, adopting the so-called 
bid’ah (innovations) which do not necessarily fit in with Islamic norms and values. Yet 
both are very similar in the ways in which they deal with the issue of corruption, and 
even work in cooperation, functioning as critical elements in anti-corruption initiatives. 
Becoming the home to santri Muslims, they appear to be the two largest and most 
influential Islamic organizations in the country, with an important role to play on the 
national stage. The NU is the largest Islamic institution, and was first established on 31 
January 1926, in the city of Surabaya, East Java, with an estimated 35 million members. 
It is devoted to providing social and economic services, covering Islamic education 
(pesantren, madrasah), orphanages, Islamic banking and micro-finance credit units. 
Claiming not to be a political organization, the NU still has political significance as it 
plays a critical role in the country’s politics, as seen in the ascendancy of Abdurrahman 
Wahid, the former leader of the NU, into power, becoming in 1999 the fourth president 
of the Republic of Indonesia. Despite this claim, the NU is usually linked to two major 
Islamic parties: the National Awakening Party and the United Development Party. In 
fact, the NU members have traditionally become the primary constituents for them in the 
modern history of Indonesian politics.  
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Meanwhile, the Muhammadiyah is the second largest Muslim institution, and 
was established on 18 November 1912, in the city of Yogyakarta with an estimated 25 
million members. The vast majority of its members are well-educated people who work 
with government bureaucracies or become entrepreneurs and merchants. The 
Muhammadiyah has for many years been devoted to carrying out economic, social and 
educational activities by running banks, clinics, hospitals, schools and universities 
scattered across the country. Although its leaders and members are often involved in 
shaping the politics of the nation, the Muhammadiyah is by nature not a political party. 
Yet it inevitably plays an important part in Indonesian politics, as seen in many of its 
elites who occupy strategic political positions in the state structures. One of them is 
Amien Rais, the former leader of the Muhammadiyah, who served as head of the MPR 
(the People’s Consultative Assembly) from 1999 to 2004. Although the Muhammadiyah 
claims not to be a political party, it has had a very close association with a Muslim-
based party called the National Mandate Party from the time when that party was 
founded by Amien Rais—along with other political activists of the reformasi 
movement—in 1998 and then headed by him until 2005.  Not surprisingly, the 
Muhammadiyah members are the major constituents of the National Mandate Party. 
Still, many of them are also linked with an Islamic party called the Prosperous Justice 
Party and a nationalist party called the Golkar Party, as some elites of the two parties 
were leaders and activists of this Islamic organization.    
As religious institutions, the NU and the Muhammadiyah are key civil society 
agencies which obtained political significance in the process of democratization in 
Indonesia (e.g. Nakamura, Siddique & Bajunid 2001; Bruinessen 2004; Bush 2009). A 
number of studies have shown that educated middle class groups of Indonesian Muslims 
have greatly contributed to promoting political transformation and democratic 
government, which allow the people to participate in public life and open up much 
wider opportunities for citizens to become involved in politics and public governance 
(e.g. Hefner 1993 & 2000; Porter 2002). As the system of democracy was established in 
the country in 1999, the NU and the Muhammadiyah appear to be the major proponents 
of Islamic civil society that encourage the public to take part in social and political 
processes. Hence strengthening civic associations among Islamic institutions is 
important, so public participation becomes more effective. In this respect, the NU and 
the Muhammadiyah represent what the American anthropologist Robert Hefner (2000) 
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has termed ‘civil Islam’, explaining that Indonesian Muslims are eager to partake in 
public governance within a democratic framework while repudiating the aspiration of an 
Islamic state; instead, Islam is presented as part of ‘public culture.’ Presenting Islam as 
public culture “depends on mediating institutions in which citizens develop habits of 
free speech, participation, and toleration. In all this, there is nothing undemocratic about 
Muslim voluntary associations … playing a role in the public life of civil society as well 
as in personal ethics” (Hefner 2000:13). Having a shared agenda of promoting 
democratic governance, the Indonesian Muslims consider the importance of check-and-
balance relations between the state and civil society including civil Islam associations.  
Certainly the democratic system has provided Indonesian civil society 
organizations with a much greater chance to participate in public affairs. Benefiting 
from the era of openness within the democratic system, the Muhammadiyah and the NU 
have attempted to maximize their role in public life by being involved in social and 
political processes. With the force of religion, they take part in social movements to 
fight corruption, showing that they share the concerns about corruption in the country.     
4.2 Muslim Organizations and Social Movements against Corruption  
This section describes the involvement of Islamic organizations in the anti-corruption 
movement, focusing on the NU and the Muhammadiyah. As religious institutions, they 
have been engaging in social activities related to the empowerment of the Muslim 
communities and the monitoring of public governance becoming a social control for the 
state government. As corruption has become a critical problem in the country, the two 
Muslim organizations are directly concerned with illicit practices within state agencies, 
so they are forced to become involved in social movements to battle corruption. Yet the 
involvement of the NU and the Muhammadiyah in social movements against corruption 
is a relatively new phenomenon, since their major activities are mainly related to the 
provision of social services for the improvement of ummah (Arabic: ةمأ‎, Muslim 
community) by focusing more on da’wah Islamiyah (Arabic: ةيملاـسلإا ةوـعدـلا, 
proselytizing for Islam). However, they feel that there is a need for them to engage in 
anti-corruption initiatives, as they consider that participating in the battle against 
corruption is a form of moral duty. This is to show that they are cognizant of public 
issues in the country and concerned with social problems within society. Both of them 
wanted to demonstrate what Salvatore & Eickelman (2006) call ‘public Islam’ with the 
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intention of achieving ‘the common good’. The term ‘public Islam’ refers to “the highly 
diverse invocations and struggles of Islam as ideas and practices that religious scholars, 
self-ascribed religious authorities, Muslim intellectuals, Sufi orders, and some others 
make to civic debate and public life” (p. xii).  By presenting public Islam, these 
religious organizations attempt to articulate Islamic ideas concerning public life, so they 
develop an active engagement with social realities in society by connecting between 
Islam and the problem of social life. Public Islam then becomes “a way of envisioning 
alternative political and religious ideas and realities, reconfiguring established 
boundaries of civil and social life” (p. xii).  
The NU and the Muhammadiyah have asserted that Islam strongly rejects any 
sort of illegal deals committed by those who occupy public office and hold state powers. 
Both of these Islamic institutions have demonstrated a strong commitment to 
strengthening anti-corruption movements by engaging in various kinds of public 
campaigns against corruption. Expressing public anxiety about the severe problem of 
corruption, the leaders of the NU and the Muhammadiyah took the initiative to 
encourage the Indonesian Muslim communities, along with other civil society groups, to 
partake in social movements in fighting corruption. Working in cooperation with a non-
state agency called the Partnership for Governance Reform, on 15 October 2003, in 
Jakarta, they declared the ‘National Movement on Anti-Corruption’ to launch the anti-
corruption reform. They signed an agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU), asserting that they would work together with other civil society institutions to 
combat corruption. As explained by Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif, the chairperson of the 
Muhammadiyah, this cooperation must be seen as a moral force in order to strengthen 
the spirit of anti-corruption movements in the country. He stated: 
It will be more of a moral movement. Yet, at least, through this movement we can inject 
more boldness and courage into government officials in charge of handling corruption 
cases. We have witnessed so far that what the Nahdhatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah 
have done in the fight against corruption has been echoed in some ways. (Quoted from 
public discussion in Jakarta) 
  
 On the other hand, Hasyim Muzadi, chairman of the NU, stated that the whole 
nation has for a long time been unhappy with the fact that corruption is so pervasive 
across the country while efforts to eliminate it seem to be very difficult because many 
public officials and state apparatuses are untruthful. At this point, the main objective of 
the cooperation between the Muhammadiyah and the NU was to encourage people to be 
optimistic about what they call perjuangan besar (great struggle) to combat corruption, 
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although there are many obstacles and resistances to it. Expressing a deep regret about 
the ingrained corruption, Muzadi lamented: 
The prevalence of corruption is beyond anyone's imagination, as it has become 
entrenched in most of the state bodies. In spite of the claim that we are devout Muslims 
within a religious community, corruption is rampant and our nation is called one of the 
most corrupt countries. If we are good Muslims, then why do we commit corruption? It is 
time for all Muslims and religious organizations to march shoulder to shoulder in 
combating corruption in the country. (Quoted from public discussion in Jakarta) 
 
 Indeed, Indonesian people feel frustrated with such extensive corruption and 
they rely largely on non-state agencies, including religious institutions like the 
Muhammadiyah and the NU, to support anti-corruption reform, since they seem to be 
sceptical of the government’s ability to cope with it. In the case of Muhammadiyah, 
anti-corruption movements became much more intense under the leadership of Din 
Syamsuddin, who took the top position of the organization in 2004. UCLA-educated, 
Din Syamsuddin is an Islamic political scientist who has been lecturing at the Syarif 
Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, for more than twenty years. He is one of 
the most prominent Muslim leaders who has both intellectual and political credentials, 
as he was previously a high profile politician associated with the Golkar Party—the 
New Order’s ruling party. As an intellectual-cum-activist, Din Syamsuddin has been 
most active and vocal in articulating public criticism against corruption and advocating 
good governance. Having been trained in a santri Muslim institution, Pondok Modern 
Gontor in East Java, and having gained a secular education in America, Din 
Syamsuddin has acquired knowledge of both Islam and modern-secular social sciences, 
which allows him to speak out eloquently about corruption.  As such, his knowledge 
and skills help him propagate public narratives of (anti)-corruption with the combined 
use of an Islamic perspective and a secular approach. Criticizing corruption as the main 
source of weakening the state government, Syamsuddin mentioned: 
Corruption, collusion and nepotism have been widespread for years, and we all see that 
the three have become umm al-qadhayat (Arabic: نيويقلا ّمأ, mother of all grave problems), 
severely damaging public morality and weakening the government system. Through the 
da’wah movement we have to be in the forefront to stand up and combat corruption. 
(Quoted from a Friday sermon in Jakarta) 
  
 As corruption has become an acute problem, Din Syamsuddin pointed out that in 
Islamic teachings, fighting against it is considered to be a sort of jihad (Arabic: داهج‎, a 
holy struggle for the sake of Allah). The term actually has a very broad meaning, 
ranging from military battle to a spiritual fight against any human disposition or 
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tendency considered as running counter to the will of God (e.g. Rahman 1989; Esposito 
2003; Esack 2007). Conceiving the fight against corruption to be part of jihad, Din 
Syamsuddin explained:  
Jihad against corruption is part of the spread of da’wah Islamiyah (Islamic preaching) 
through amr bil ma’ruf wa nahy an al-munkar (Arabic: ركنملا نع ىهن و فورعملاب رما—to ordain 
the good and prohibit the evil). This reflects strong commitment to creating a good social 
system and promoting a good society and the state as well. Corruption must be treated as a 
common enemy because it has resulted in social inequality and economic discrepancy among 
the Indonesian people. Indeed, the incidence of poverty, hardship and suffering are largely as 
a result of uncontrolled corruption; and therefore it must be set as the main target against 
which the whole nation should fight through jihad. (Quoted from a Friday sermon at a 
mosque in Jakarta) 
 
 At this point, Din Syamsuddin seems to suggest that Muslims should move away 
from understanding jihad based on the classical meaning, which is about waging war 
through military struggle, by offering an alternative interpretation of the term. Instead, it 
must be conceived as a social struggle or social fight, contextualized within the actual 
problems in society that need to be addressed by every effort. Following this line of 
argument, it is indeed logical if Muslims include the fight against corruption as part of 
jihad as well.   
The social movement against corruption initiated by Muslim organizations has 
continued since the declaration; they have intensified public campaigns against 
corruption with the use of various measures. The commonest forms of public criticism 
are social protest and political rally, which are often organized by social activists 
associated with various civil society agencies including the Muhammadiyah and the 
NU.  This is why the Anti-corruption Day is commemorated by orchestrating public 
protest; the Muhammadiyah took the lead to arrange a political rally in commemoration 
of the Anti-corruption day on 9 December 2009. At the central office of Executive 
Board of the Muhammadiyah in Jakarta, a few days before the event, cross-social 
background activists gathered for a meeting to prepare for a series of huge mass 
demonstrations in the capital. The meeting was held to check everything: logistics, 
vehicles, loudspeakers, flags, flyers, banners, supplies, etc. which were needed to 
support the planned public protest. The D-day of the event came; thousands of people 
flooded onto the main streets of Jakarta in a peaceful rally. Departing from a number of 
different places and meeting points in the city, the protesters reached Monas (the 
National Monument)—just on the doorstep of the Merdeka Palace—where the rally took 
place. The very large crowds swamped Monas to show a public spirit of anti-corruption 
through rally speeches, posters, and theatrical acts. Although the Muhammadiyah was 
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in the forefront of organizing the public rally, the masses participating in it came from 
various civil society associations including both Muslim and non-Muslim student 
associations. They were the Muhammadiyah Students Union (IMM), the Muslim 
Students Association (HMI), the Indonesian Muslim Students Movement (PMII), and 
the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Association (KAMMI). Other religious-
nationalist activists also took part in the rally including the Indonesian Catholic 
Students Association (PMKRI), the Indonesian Buddhist Students Union (HIKMAH-
BUDDHIS), the Indonesian Nationalist Students Movement (GMNI), and others. 
Public protest became fiery with the breaking out of a gigantic scandal of 
government bailout amounting to 6.7 trillion rupiah (US$715 million) for a small bank 
called Bank Century. Inevitably, the scandal attracted a great deal of public attention, 
which instigated a political tumult lasting for several months as politicians, parties and 
pressure groups voiced their suspicions that the bailout was illegitimate and that some 
amounts of the money were allegedly embezzled by some groups for political purposes. 
The parliament was then forced by the public to investigate the scandal by conducting 
an inquiry into allegations that the bailout had benefited President Yudhoyono’s re-
election and his party victory in the parliamentary election and presidential race in April 
and July 2009 respectively. The public media widely reported that after the bailout 
many of the bank’s wealthy clients allegedly donated money to the president’s 
campaign team. The allegations of misconduct were levelled at the two officials in 
charge of handling the bailout: the Finance Minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati and the 
Governor of Bank Indonesia, the then Vice President Boediono. However, they denied 
any wrongdoing and President Yudhoyono said that the allegations were all part of a big 
political manoeuvre by his political enemies to topple him. In fact, the protesters raised 
the bailout scandal to be the main theme of the anti-corruption rally, as appeared in the 
huge banner of the protest. With a white backdrop on the right side of the stage, the 
demonstrators—led by Arip Mutopha, chair of the Muslim Students Association—all 
together recited ‘Piagam Indonesia Bersih 2009’ (The Charter for Clean Indonesia).  
 The charter consists of five public concerns about the issues of corruption. First, 
Indonesia must be clean from corruption, not only speeches of anti-corruption [by the 
president]. Second, the state agencies should be clean from corruptors as they are a 
betrayal of the people’s mandate. Third, Indonesia should be clean from the corruptors 
of Bank Century. Fourth, Indonesia must be clean from a conspiracy to weaken the 
KPK (the Commission of Corruption Eradication) and the law enforcement bodies. 
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Fifth, corruption eradication should start from the Presidential Palace, and the president 
and other state officials should declare their wealth properly and in a transparent manner 
(see figure 4.1).   
 
Figure 4.1: The commemoration of the 2009 anti-corruption day was jointly arranged by social and 
religious organizations under the name of Gerakan Indonesia Bersih (GIB, Movement for Clean 
Indonesia) in which the Muhammadiyah took the lead, as chairperson of the organization, Din 
Syamsuddin, became the central figure in it. 
 
At the time of the political rally, expressing their collective anger protesters 
burned pictures of Vice President Boediono and Finance Minister Sri Mulyani 
Indrawati, while the other demonstrators presented various theatrical shows. Among 
other images was one from the theatrical act (see figure 4.2) performed by activists of 
the Muhammadiyah Students Union (IMM) which depicted Boediono and Sri Mulyani 
Indrawati
13
  as vampires, symbolizing that they were sucking the blood of the people. 
The demonstrators also brought a coffin covered by a white cloth with the word 
koruptor (corruptor) written on it, while four protesters wrapped in bloody bandages sat 
in front of the casket. That was a satirical expression of public criticism over corruption, 
and the theatrical act had a very harsh message that all corruptors must be sent for burial 
because they had caused the country's economic difficulties and created the social plight 
                                                 
13
 A number of sources to whom I spoke stated that they believed neither Boediono and Sri Mulyani 
Indrawati had committed corruption; nor did they misuse their power to enrich themselves, their relatives, 
or their cliques. However, the bailout policy they introduced had in fact been abused by other people for 
illegitimate political activities. After four months of investigation, the House concluded that the bailout 
was against the law as there were many irregularities and unaccountable spending of the funds. Therefore, 
the lawmakers forced the authorities—the Police, the AGO, and the KPK—to take legal action against 
those who were responsible. Nevertheless, the bailout scandal of Bank Century is still blurred and to this 
day it has not ended.  
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among the Indonesian people. As the people were deeply disappointed by the 
entrenched corruption within state agencies, the public outrage illustrated by those 
protesters seemed to be reasonable. Certainly, a theatrical act of that kind was an 
expression of public resentment and abhorrence toward corrupt officials. 
In fact, the issue of corruption has united all elements of Indonesian society 
since they consider it as the common enemy against which they should fight 
collectively. Here, both religious institutions and secular NGO agencies have been 
working collaboratively in battling corruption through, among other means, social 
protest. However, since social protest often contains individual political interests among 
the parties involved, religious and secular NGO activists at some point might disagree 
about the political agenda. If this is the case, they will go their own ways. In other 
words, they will work together for as long as they are in agreement or not in conflicting 
political interest with one another. This kind of relation is called conditional cooperation 
between secular NGOs and religious institutions. However, generally speaking they are 
very supportive of each other through activities such as social advocacy, workshop, or 
training related to public governance.    
 
Figure 4.2: Activists of the Muhammadiyah Students Union (IMM) take part in a public rally 
commemorating World Anti-corruption Day on 9 December 2009 in Jakarta
 
    
 
 However, more broadly, I argue that the role of religious organizations in the 
public criticism of corruption is obviously crucial, as they have become the critical 
elements of civil society associations which effectively articulate the heartfelt voice of 
the people (suara hati rakyat). This is not only because they drew larger numbers of the 
masses during the social protest, but also because those religious institutions have acted 
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as moral guardians for the public. They have shown that religious ethics should not be 
kept in the private domain; rather, they must be transformed into social space, becoming 
public ethics. Therefore, it is necessary to take into consideration the importance of 
religious morality in public affairs.   
   
4.3 Religious Morality as the Basis for Anti-Corruption Movement  
 
This section addresses the issue of morality in the context of public governance and the 
anti-corruption movement that appeared in public criticism during the social protest. At 
the time of the social protest, the chairman of the Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsuddin, 
criticized the state government, as many politicians and state officials involved in 
corruption scandals have not been brought to justice. He spoke urgently of how those 
political elites and national leaders had a mental illness, known as ‘moral illiteracy’ 
(buta aksara moral), which can be more dangerous than ‘conventional illiteracy’ (buta 
aksara biasa). In fact, Din Syamsuddin has been a fierce critic of President Yudhoyono 
who in his view—which the public seem to share—has not made serious efforts to 
eliminate corruption during his period of office. Having held the office for six years, he 
simply used words and promised that he was committed to combating corruption very 
seriously, but the public seem to be doubtful because some evidence shows the reverse. 
Din Syamsuddin accused the Yudhoyono government of applying double standards in 
fighting corruption and of doing what is called tebang pilih (literally, cutting down 
selectively—an idiom used to describe the unfairness of the way the authorities impose 
the law). A number of examples were then exposed. State officials and legislators 
committing corruption and associated with the President Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party 
have not yet been brought into court, including the lawmaker Johny Allen Marbun who 
is serving as Vice Chair of the Democratic Party, some governors and mayors, and the 
district heads of some local governments.
14
  
Having mentioned those facts, Din Syamsuddin urged the public to force the law 
enforcement bodies to combat corruption from the Presidential Palace downwards. He 
spoke allegorically, quoting a popular proverb, ‘If someone needs to clean the floor of a 
                                                 
14
 According to the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW)’s reports (2010), which have recently been 
disclosed, tens of public officials and politicians both at central and local levels of the state government 
have been named as being suspected of corruption by the Attorney General’s Office. However, the AGO 
seems to be facing some obstructions to prosecuting them, since President Yudhoyono has not yet issued 
a ‘letter of permit’ which allows the authority to take them into court.  Moreover, most of the public 
officials and politicians are Democrats; some critics have since accused the Democratic Party of being the 
‘bunker of corruptors.’   
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house, they shouldn’t use a dirty broom; otherwise, the floor will get much dirtier.’ He 
also quoted another aphorism, saying ‘If someone needs to paint wall of a house, they 
should start painting from the top and then go downwards, not the other way around; 
otherwise, the bottom of the wall will get dirty as the paint drips onto it.’ Indeed, these 
sayings have become moral wisdom for Indonesian society, and frequently appear in 
public narratives of (anti)-corruption to show the importance of having trusted leaders 
with high standards of morality and integrity, since these are central to political 
leadership. The Islamic concept of leadership suggests that all leaders should have 
moral qualities, two of which are al-amin (trustworthy) and as-shiddiq (truthful) as 
these are attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. These qualities are essential in showing 
that leaders are entrusted with governing public affairs in a truthful manner (see e.g. 
Lings 1983; Beekun & Badawi 1999; Adair 2010). In this context, Beekun & Badawi 
(1999:vii) wrote: “Leadership in Islam is a trust. Often, it takes the form of an explicit 
contract or pledge between a leader and his followers that he will try his best to guide 
them, to protect them and to treat them fairly and with justice.” These views are of 
course derived from the Qur’anic concept of amanah (responsibility) which is clearly 
presented on surah An-Nisa [chapter 4] verse 58: “Verily! Allah commands that you 
[people] should render back the trusts (al-amanah, هناملاا) to those to whom they are due; 
and that when you judge between men, you judge with justice. Verily, how excellent is 
the teaching which He (Allah) gives you! Truly, Allah is Ever the All-Hearer and All-
Seer.”  
On the other hand, President Yudhoyono responded very sensitively to the 
public rally during the commemoration of the Anti-corruption Day. Although he 
expressed his respect for any efforts to campaign against corruption, he indicated that 
the rally was not purely a moral movement. Instead, he alleged it was a sort of political 
ploy in the sense that the social and political activists who organized the social 
movement had political plans to subvert the state power.  He accused his political 
opponents of having a hidden agenda behind the anti-corruption movement, saying that 
they had camouflaged their political motives by arranging a public rally to 
commemorate the Anti-corruption Day. He believed that the public protest was partly 
aimed at destabilizing his government. By mobilizing thousands of protesters, he 
claimed, his political opponents wanted to perpetrate a social riot leading to political 
upheaval, and then they would take over power. President Yudhoyono addressed this 
issue at the Presidential Palace, saying: 
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We all are very displeased with the fact that corruption has been so far-reaching and the 
government is relentlessly fighting it with any measures available. As the president, I 
myself will deliberately lead the combat against corruption, since it has obstructed our 
collective efforts to bring prosperity for the people. I value all kinds of public campaigns 
against corruption initiated by civil society groups, but a political rally to commemorate 
the Anti-corruption Day seems to be different. The state intelligence sources have told 
me that it would not be a purely moral movement of anti-corruption. Rather, it might 
have the political intent to create instability in the government. And my logic says these 
political movements want to discredit, shake and topple me in the short term. (Quoted 
from Metrotv’s Breaking News Programme) 
 
 President Yudhoyono’s statements illustrate how anti-corruption movements 
have become a political theatre for moral and power contestations between the state and 
civil society which seem to be typical of social, political and religious activism. Here, 
the moral movement for anti-corruption has politically threatened the power 
establishment of the incumbent. Thus, the importance of the political rally was to show 
publicly the power of civic groups in criticizing the misuse of public powers that have 
resulted in corruption and other illicit practices. As always, the public rally was utilized 
as a medium for contesting power, as the state—represented by President Yudhoyono 
himself—was challenged by some groups of joint social activists associated with 
religious organizations and other civil society institutions in the struggle over political 
influence within the public sphere in relation to the corruption problem. On the issue of 
power domination between the two, Ernest Gellner writes:  
[…] civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong 
enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its 
role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless 
prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society. (Gellner 1994:5) 
 
 
Figure 4.3: A mocking caricature appeared in the Jakarta Post daily on 8 December 2009, 
illustrating how President Yudhoyono was in great fear of the political rally commemorating 
the anti-corruption day, as he accused the protesters of attempting to seize his power. 
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With regard to religious activism against corruption, I ground my argument in the 
concept of ‘public religion’ (Casanova 1994). With reference to this concept, I argue 
that religious-based anti-corruption movements show how religious leaders make use of 
the teachings of a religion to be a moral force for controlling public behaviour. The idea 
of public religion relies on the need for connecting religion with public affairs. Rather 
than keeping religion merely as an individual’s personal business, one should look at its 
social effects in public life, as Casanova points out: “The unexpected public interest 
derived from the fact that religion, leaving its assigned place in the private sphere, had 
thrust itself into the public arena of moral and political contestation” (1994:3). In this 
respect, it seems that the religious leaders feel strongly that religion should not be 
contained within the private sphere. Such discursive interpretation leads to the process 
of ‘the “deprivatization” of religion’ (Casanova 1994), showing that religious practices 
in everyday private life are transformed into social and political space. This is because 
“in the modern world religion often defines cultural identity, [so that] it is often difficult 
to sustain a simple and neat division between the public and the private” (Turner 
2010:12). In line with this argument, the involvement of religious institutions in anti-
corruption reform is unequivocally significant, asserting that religious communities 
seem to be willing to respond to a moral call to fight corruption. Alongside the 
emergence of what Eickelman & Anderson (1999) call a “new religious public sphere” 
within democratic politics, religious institutions appear to have played a role as a 
partner—and sometimes as a counterforce—for the state powers in dealing with the 
issue of corruption. In support of the discursive analysis, the idea of ‘public Islam’ 
(Salvatore & Eickelman 2006) mentioned earlier is also relevant for furthering the 
argument. In the context of public Islam, I argue that in parallel with the growing 
numbers of Muslim educated middle class groups, the religious public sphere has grown 
much greater, and they now have a wider opportunity to participate in the dynamics of 
the social and political processes. In essence, public Islam represents the expansion of a 
critical mass among Muslim educated elites who, being strategic social actors, are 
concerned with the public interest to promote what is called al-maslahah al-ammah—
the common good (Zaman 2006:130-155) through the creation of accountable public 
governance for the betterment of the nation. In this sense, public Islam “includes the 
participation of a wider spectrum of citizens than had heretofore had access to or helped 
to shape either the normative expressions of Islamic belief and practice or the larger 
political system” (Salvatore & LeVine 2005:15).    
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Despite the fact that religious groups are very supportive of an anti-corruption 
movement, their involvement in it seems to be less structured. Anti-corruption 
initiatives made by religious institutions have not been well-consolidated yet in terms of 
specific action plans and programmes, as they have not yet been able to translate ideas 
and concepts of anti-corruption reform into systematic and continuous activities. This 
condition is different from that of secular NGOs as these work consistently through 
well-structured activities carried out with the use of specific approaches. They combine 
public advocacy, investigative reports, research, public watchdog and social protest, as 
seen in the case of the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), the Transparency 
International Indonesia (TII), and university-based centres for (anti)-corruption studies.  
However, the involvement of religious groups in the anti-corruption movement 
is definitely indispensable since they have much wider social networks with solid 
constituencies. The importance of the religious groups rests on the ways in which they 
communicate to people through religious sermons and Islamic preaching (da’wah) 
delivered by ulama (Muslim scholars) and kiai (Javanese ulama). The da’wah and 
religious sermons through majelis taklim (community-based forum for learning about 
Islam) seem to be the main activities by which they are able to proliferate anti-
corruption reform and propagate the dangers of corruption for the public. Such an 
approach is very effective to raise public awareness because it applies religious terms 
that touch the heart of the people. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration 
the role of the ulama since they represent religious institutions, while preserving Islam 
and giving moral guidance to Muslims in public life as well as providing ‘religious 
legitimacy for the de facto power holders’ (e.g. Kechichian 1986; Bruinessen 1990; 
Zaman 2002). The ulama and other religious leaders do play a critical role in the 
dynamics of social and political life, since they can articulate the public interest by 
bridging the gap between public aspiration and political authority. John Kelsay 
expressed it this way:  
The ulama, with their power to bind and loose, still provide an entree into civil society in 
Muslim societies; they represent the dynamic, associational power of religion, and 
understand themselves as dedicated to the preservation of an Islam that cannot be simply 
identified with any existing governmental regime. (Kelsay 2002:13) 
 
 The ulama and other religious leaders can place themselves in different positions 
that are not always in harmony, depending on the social contexts and political 
circumstances they face. While articulating the public interest, they can be in opposition 
to the state establishment, as Eickelman & Piscatori have illustrated: “While the ulama 
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continued to cooperate with the political authorities, the religious sphere acquired its 
own identity, institutions, and discourse. In effect, a religious establishment emerged as 
a complement—and sometimes as a rival—to the political establishment” (1996:47). In 
the context of Indonesian politics, the religious public sphere produces religious 
movements of various forms as seen, among others, in the Islamic group called Hizbut 
Tahir Indonesia (HTI), which promotes an Islamic system of political governance.  
 
4.4 The HTI: Islamic Shari’a-based Anti-Corruption Protest  
This section deals with HTI, which is similarly involved in anti-corruption movements 
but with the spirit of shari’a (Islamic law). The Hizbut Tahrir (Arabic:ريِرَْحتلا ُبْزِح‎, the 
Liberation Party) was originally founded in Jordan in 1953 by a Palestinian religio-
political figure, Taqiyyuddin al-Nahbani, and spread across the Muslim nations in the 
world. The primary mission of the Hizbut Tahrir (HT) was the re-establishment of the 
Islamic caliphate system—a single political leadership of the Muslim world—and the 
application of Islamic shari’a law.  This political agenda refers to the success story of 
the Islamic caliphate system which used to exist in the ancient period of Islamic history 
as seen in, among others, the Ottoman Caliphate of Turkey (see e.g. Taji-Farouki 1996; 
Karagiannis 2010; Sankari 2010). Called a pan-Islamic political organization, the HT 
was brought to Indonesia in the 1980s—during which the wave of transnational Islamic 
movement was on the increase—by Indonesian students who studied in the Middle East 
countries especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Over the years, the HTI grew greatly and 
eventually this Muslim organization successfully held an international caliphate 
conference in Jakarta’s Gelora Bung Karno stadium on 12 August 2007, which was 
attended by about one hundred thousand supporters and sympathizers.  
Most HTI members are educated middle class groups based on university 
campuses across the country. In fact, the social and political activism of the HTI has 
become very active and fervent, especially since Ahmad Yunus, an intellectual and 
lecturer, took over the political leadership of the HTI in 2002. Having graduated from 
Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, in Geology and then switched to Islamic 
economics for his postgraduate studies, Ahmad Yunus has been engaging in Islamic-
based political activism for years while teaching at the Hamfara Institute of Islamic 
Economics in Yogyakarta. He is also the director of the Shari’a Economics and 
Management Institute—a private institution focusing on research and development, 
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professional training, consulting, and publishing. While keeping the very strong Islamic 
ideology in social activism, Ahmad Yunus is deeply concerned with general public 
issues including political governance and corruption. With regard to this problem, the 
HTI participated in social protest to criticize corruption in the state agencies. Like the 
public protest organized by the Muhammadiyah and other cross-background activists, 
the HTI held a political rally with the same theme as that of other groups: the 
scandalous bailout policy. 
 
Figure 4.4: A huge public rally in Jakarta organized by the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) 
denounces pervasive corruption and demands the investigation of the Bank Century’s bailout 
scandal (Photo by Media Indonesia, 6/12/2009). 
  
At the time of the public rally (see figure 4.4), the very large crowds of the HTI activists 
and sympathizers marshalled in M.H. Thamrin Jakarta, the heart of the capital, protested 
about the Bank Century bailout scandal, accusing the state officials of corruption. 
During the political rally, the masses of the HTI uncased a large number of flags with 
Arabic words (kalimat syahadat, the Testament of Faith, الله لوسر دمحم الله َّلاإ هلإ لا), the 
symbol of the organization, and a large banner with the striking slogan “Skandal 
Century Bukti Kebobrokan Kapitalisme—the Bank Century scandal is a proof of rotten 
capitalism.” The jargon of the protest indicates that capitalism is perceived to be the 
cause of social ruin along with extensive corruption in public institutions. The HTI 
criticized the ideology of neoliberal capitalism for having created a chain of corruption 
by economic and political elites within the government system. The anti-corruption 
rhetoric emerged in the public sphere along with public denunciation over the capitalist 
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economy, which manifested itself in the form of crony capitalism—as it became the 
main characteristic of the New Order state—and therefore was to blame for various 
illegal practices that resulted through bureaucratic collusion within state agencies (see 
e.g. Robison 1987; Crouch 1988; Robison & Hadiz 2004; Collins 2007).  
There is a common belief that unregulated capitalism will become inherently 
corrupt since the instincts of the capitalist economy’s practitioners tend to be corrupt, as 
appeared in Elizabeth Collins’ Indonesia Betrayed (2007) which studies the country’s 
South Sumatra province arguing that neoliberal “development” policies have produced 
extreme poverty and allowed corruption to thrive. Having observed that neoliberal 
“development” projects have reproduced inequality and injustice, Collins suggests that 
neoliberal capitalism must be recognized as a utopian ideology. This is the essence of 
her criticism that claims that capitalism lays the emphasis on the ideals of individual 
freedom and liberty, but divests people of their right to justice and equality. In line with 
this view, Ahmad Yunus of HTI expressed his bitter criticism: 
Capitalism is a secular ideology that causes a great deal of misfortune for Indonesians. It 
drives illicit transactions among those who operate the economic system and those who 
occupy public powers. We should therefore change our minds by embracing the Islamic 
system. Islam should become an alternative ideology as the true path through which 
Indonesian Muslims can reach justice and prosperity. This country is facing a 
multidimensional crisis and the root of it is a moral crisis. We should get back to the moral 
and ethical guidance given by Islam on how to manage public life including the economy 
and polity. The system of Islamic shari’a will liberate the people from the shackles of 
capitalism and corrupt and exploitative rulers. (Quoted from interview, 10 June 2009) 
 
 The views of Ahmad Yunus must be construed in the context of the ideological 
beliefs of the HTI. This Muslim organization is struggling to impose Islamic shari’a, 
which is fervently believed to be the only means of coping with the manifold crises in 
Indonesia. Obsessed with the caliphate system, the HTI strongly rejects the democratic 
system along with the capitalist economy since both are derived from secular 
ideologies. Within HTI, secular ideologies are conceived of as a result of what is 
cynically called modern jahiliyya (Arabic: ةيلهاج, the state of ignorance of guidance 
from God), referring to the dark period of Arab history prior to the advent of Islam. It is 
a mix of views, ideas and practices that entirely defy and refuse the guidance given to 
all human beings by Allah Almighty, as found in the Qur’an and the Hadith of the 
Prophet Muhammad. The state of jahiliyya shows the kind of situation in which human 
societies live with the absence of Islamic shari’a; whereas, it is believed that Islam is a 
perfect and complete system that must be implemented as a way of life. Conversely, all 
aspects of jahiliyya—values and beliefs, ideas and thoughts, rules and regulations, 
140 
 
manners and behaviours—are considered as evil and iniquitous and against the essential 
teachings of Islam (e.g. Qutb 2000; Khatab 2006). 
It is important to note that the main difference between HTI and the other two 
Islamic organizations—Muhammadiyah and NU—lies in their preferred choice of the 
political system that must be established in the country. Disbelieving in democracy, the 
HTI firmly disagrees that this should be applied; instead, it is in favour of Islamic 
shari’a being employed in the quasi-secular state of Indonesia. In contrast, the other two 
believe in democracy and consider that it is not necessarily important to impose Islamic 
shari’a as a logical consideration. This is mainly because Indonesia is a very pluralistic 
country with a very diverse society alongside various religious beliefs, so it is 
inappropriate to apply Islamic shari’a for the whole nation. Despite the fact that 
Indonesia is mainly a Muslim country, both the Muhammadiyah and the NU consider 
that it is improper to enforce Islamic shari’a as the sole way of tackling the grave 
problems in the society. This is because the concept of Islamic shari’a itself is highly 
controversial, and the minority aspiration for imposing it in such pluralistic societal 
settings of the nation has been for years contested by the dominant Indonesian Muslims.  
 
Figure 4.5: A group of Muslim women activists marshal support for a social protest against 
corruption in Jakarta with a banner which strikingly reads “Corruptors Go to Hell”. 
 
Yet it is acknowledged that the HTI movement has appeared to be an alternative mode 
of public criticism, and with a strong ideological orientation the HTI activists galvanize 
Islamic militancy in the fight against all secular systems that conceivably cause social 
problems in the country including corruption. The HTI’s alternative mode of discursive 
141 
 
debate of the capitalist economy and the promotion of shari’a law can be seen as a 
‘counter-publics’ (e.g. Warner 2002; Hirschkind 2006). The basis of the counter publics 
is an unbalanced, unequal status between a dominant group and a subordinate group. 
Here, Michael Warner illustrates vividly: 
A counterpublic maintains at some level, conscious or not, an awareness of its 
subordinate status. The cultural horizon against which it marks itself off is not just a 
general or wider public, but a dominant one. […] The discourse that constitutes it is not 
merely a different or alternative idiom, but one that in other contexts would be regarded 
with hostility or with a sense of indecorousness. (Warner 2002:86) 
Having been an ardent religio-political movement, the HTI challenges the dominant 
ideology and hegemonic group by trying to impose shari’a law for the Muslim 
community. That the HTI activists are trying to apply Islamic shari’a law seems to 
challenge the social-political hegemony enjoyed by secular groups within Indonesian 
society.  In this regard, it is relevant to revisit Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as 
political dominance applied by—using his phrase—a ‘fundamental group’ (an 
euphemistic term for ‘class’) over another or other classes (Gramsci 1971).  With 
reference to the Marxist approach, Gramsci proposes that hegemony is a form of social 
control exercised by a dominant class or group and refers to a process of moral direction 
and intellectual leadership through which consent to domination by ruling classes is 
given by the dominated, subordinate groups. Hegemony therefore implies the 
willingness of the dominated groups to accept their inferior positions without being 
forced or coerced. Indeed, hegemony represents social-political domination in which 
some groups of society give their approval to follow the direction and rules imposed on 
their lives by the principal, fundamental group.  In the case of the HTI, counter publics 
should be seen as a challenge to the existing socio-political hegemony, since this group 
appears to have represented the other variant Indonesian Islam which is slightly 
different from mainstream Islam in the country and the other dominant groups of 
Muslim Indonesians. Yet, the difference relates to minor ideological beliefs and 
political orientations, rather than principal doctrines and theology of orthodox Islam. 
The counter public movement brought by the HTI is similar to Charles Hirschkind’s 
(2006) work on religious cassette sermons, a form of Islamic da’wa amongst Muslim 
Egyptians. Like the HTI activists who persistently encourage the Indonesian Muslim 
community to follow shari’a law as the main source of ethical code both in private life 
and public affairs, Islamic cassette sermons call for Muslim Egyptians to obey the 
original Islamic teachings as laid down in the Qur’an and the Hadith. In Egypt, religious 
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cassette sermons are used as “a tool of ideological indoctrination and a vehicle for the 
transmission of militant directives” (p.3) becoming part of public critique for a 
dominant ideology. Nevertheless, the main purpose of Islamic cassette sermons is not 
political (e.g. challenging the state establishment, power-holders and the like) but rather 
ethical, as Hirschkind clearly points out: 
The form of public discourse within which this critique takes place, however, is not 
oriented toward militant political action or the overthrow of the state. Rather, such 
political commentary gives direction to a normative ethical project centered upon 
questions of social responsibility, pious comportment, and devotional practice. 
(Hirschkind 2006:5) 
 
In regard to the discursive debate of the political system of secular democracy, the HTI 
is persistent to apply the caliphate system which is regarded as being more Islamic, even 
though it instigates controversy within Indonesian Muslim community. Yet, as the HTI 
favours the caliphate system that tends to be monolithic, it contradicts the democratic 
political system and the secular state, whereas the system of political democracy, as 
experienced by most developed countries, is the necessary basis for capitalist 
development: democracy and capitalism are intertwined with each other (e.g. 
Przeworski 1986; Bowles & Gintis 1987; Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens 1992; 
Bowles, Edwards & Roosevelt 2005), which is something the HTI activists strongly 
disapprove of. They always construe the ideas of democracy and capitalism vis-à-vis the 
ideas of Islamic shari’a which they consider should be the basis for economic activities 
and political governance.  
We learn from Ahmad Yunus’ views that under the capitalist system illicit 
exchanges can be done between power-holders and capital-holders. The former would 
be inclined to make economic policies based on favouritism and the latter would be 
willing to give them bribes and ‘refreshments’, mostly in the form of money, material 
worth, and other benefits, in return for preferential economic policies. Within these 
kinds of collusive transactions, it is important to consider the meaning of ‘money and 
the morality of exchange’ (Parry & Bloch [1989] 1996) in the whole capitalist system. 
In this context, Charles Tripp points out:  
For many, however, the prime concern has been for the moral economy as a whole—
often based upon an idealised picture of the past, both recent and ancient. This has 
prompted efforts in the Islamic world to devise a discourse of equal power that would 
break the circle of capital–market-exchange–profit–capital which so dominates social life 
and dictates the culture of exchange under capitalism. (Tripp 2006:6) 
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 It is interesting to observe how Muslim activists raise the issue of the capitalist 
economy as the main theme both in social movement and in public narrative. However, 
perception of the capitalist ideology varies among Indonesian Muslims. The HTI 
activists perceive secular capitalism as a source of the country’s multiple crises, 
manifested in extensive corruption. In contrast, other Muslim groups—many of whom 
are workers and professionals working with private companies and state-owned 
enterprises—view the capitalist economy as offering an opportunity to develop a work 
ethos through competition and to become more productive, as appears in Rudnyckyj’s 
works on Spiritual Economies (2009) and Market Islam (2010). Set in an urban area, 
these studies show how some groups of Indonesian Muslims try “to merge Muslim 
religious practice and capitalist ethics” (2010:177). Instead of condemning capitalism, 
they consider it as part of reality; they accept capitalism as something that has been 
dominating the global market economy for years while they try to obtain as much 
benefit as they can from it by reconciling “markets and social justice for Muslim 
Indonesians” (see Hefner 1998:224-250).  
Regarding the discursive debate of Islam and the neoliberal economy, I argue 
that the urban Muslim groups—some of whom are associated with the Muhammadiyah 
and the NU—seek to interpret Islamic teachings beyond orthodoxy, which enables them 
to remain faithful to their Islamic belief whilst engaging with economic activities that 
are associated with capitalism. They also endeavour to find the positive aspects of 
market capitalism and search for compromise and interaction with it. This phenomenon 
fits with what Hefner has observed: “market growth has been accompanied by religious 
revival,” but religion is not “uniformly used to mobilize resistance against the 
individualizing or alienating tendencies of capitalism and urban life” (1998:26). Nor do 
Muslims use religious belief as a spiritual cover for rejecting capitalism, or a pathway 
for escaping from it, or a defence mechanism in response to the threats of the neoliberal 
economy. What they do is encourage spirituality to flourish, and they also strengthen 
Islamic piety so that they will be able to ban all the negative aspects of the capitalist 
system. Here, improving the quality of being a good Muslim by emphasizing religious 
devotion is the most important aim. They prefer to do the so-called tazkiyah al-nafs 
(purification of the soul, or spiritual purification) by deepening Islamic teachings, 
increasing good deeds, reinforcing the Islamic faith, and purifying the worship of Allah 
Almighty. While doing tazkiyah al-nafs, they keep engaging in economic activities; 
they do not separate economic activities and Islamic ethics, since the separation of them 
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seems to be unproductive. All these dimensions of spiritual purification would 
hopefully impact on the improvement of social and economic activities in public life. 
The concept of spiritual purification seems to be similar to that of ‘spiritual reform’ 
proposed by Rudnyckyj, as he expounds vividly: 
The proponents of spiritual reform consider the separation of religious ethics from economic 
practices as the cause of Indonesia’s economic crisis. In their eyes, this disjunction resulted in 
rampant corruption, a lack of accountability, and labour indiscipline. The concept of spiritual 
economies elucidates how two domains, religion and capitalism, are brought together to 
create a new ethical orientation toward oneself, one’s work, and one’s collectivity. Islam is 
not merely a vehicle in this process, as spiritual reform is taken to both enable Islamic virtue 
and effect dispositions that enhance corporate productivity and competitiveness in an 
increasingly global market [capitalism]. (Rudnyckyj 2009:106) 
 
 Within this context, spiritual purification is conceived as the process of 
transforming personal desires that are inclined to defy religious ethics and disobey 
God’s rules into the level of purity, piety and submission to the will of Allah Almighty 
through various Islamic practices. Spiritual purification will then lead a person to 
become a good Muslim and he/she would be more devoted to following the teachings of 
Islam and sincerely obey God’s commandments. All Muslims should therefore behave 
with good manners in all dimensions of life whether social, economic or political. In 
this respect, they will not commit corruption, since it clearly breaches Islamic morality. 
Anything that violates the principle of Islamic morality will damage the purity of the 
soul so that a Muslim needs to cleanse the self through spiritual purification. Indeed 
spiritual purification is very important in order to protect Muslims from any 
wrongdoings or the tendency to do such bad deeds as corruption. Here, I argue that 
spiritual purification is essential for the improvement of Islamic spirituality; meanwhile, 
Islamic spirituality is a critical factor for resolving a multidimensional crisis, as 
Rudnyckyj puts it: 
 […] [P]roper Islamic practice necessarily entails greater productivity, less corruption, 
and more diligent work habits. … Participants in spiritual reform directly connected their 
own previous moral failings to the political and economic problems in Indonesia at large. 
Perhaps due to past acts of corruption … they see the problem of resolving this moral 
crisis as an impetus to work on themselves in order to improve both themselves and the 
larger community. (Rudnyckyj 2010:178) 
 
As illustrated, the issue of the capitalist economy has instigated different responses and 
views between the HTI activists and other Indonesian Muslims. Such distinct reactions 
have clearly shown the moral ambiguity among them, indicating that there is no single 
perception on capitalism. Given the kind of ambiguity, Tripp points out:  
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It is not simply that the morally offensive aspects of capitalism provoke, but also that its 
transformative potential attracts. It is this which helps to explain the ambivalence of 
Muslim responses to a phenomenon which some see as an existential threat, but others 
see as an opportunity for Muslims to re-inscribe themselves into world history. (Tripp 
2006:6) 
  
 The different attitudes toward capitalism reflect the fact that ideological belief 
and political orientation among Indonesian Muslims vary and are far from being 
monolithic and hegemonic. Yet, regardless of what sort of ideology they orientate, they 
consider that corruption is against Islamic morality as they refer to the same theological 
doctrine.     
 
4.5 Theological Doctrine: Islamic Narratives on Corruption  
This part looks at how the Muhammadiyah and the NU examine corruption with 
reference to theological doctrine. To do this, they established a joint task force to study 
corruption from an Islamic perspective and introduced what is called Fiqih Korupsi 
(Islamic jurisprudence on corruption). By introducing fiqih korupsi, they view 
corruption in the light of the Qur’anic concept and based on sabda (words) of the 
Prophet Muhammad as recorded in the Hadith. In doing so, they apply a methodology 
called ijtihad al-qiyas (legal interpretation based on analogy) with reference to scholarly 
works of ulama salaf (old Muslim scholars), as there is no equivalent term for 
corruption in Islamic jurisprudence.  The Muhammadiyah formed a special committee 
chaired by Abdul Munir Mulkhan, a senior lecturer at the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic 
University, Yogyakarta, to ponder the issue of corruption through a forum called 
Majelis Tarjih.  The NU created a special committee led by Rozy Munir and Syaiful 
Bahri—both were members of the executive board of the organization—to address the 
problem of corruption through a forum called Bahsul Masa’il. Traditionally, both 
Majelis Tarjih and Bahsul Masa’il are religious forums through which the ulama and 
leaders of the two Islamic organizations discuss all the problems related to social and 
religious affairs among Muslim communities. Upon the very serious studies through 
those forums, which were conducted separately, they concluded that corruption is 
considered as dosa besar (great sin) and corruptors are kafir (infidels, disbelievers). 
Having studied corruption, they produced a book entitled Koruptor itu Kafir: Fiqih 
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Korupsi Muhammadiyah-Nahdhatul Ulama (2010),15 which has become a source of 
Islamic legitimacy for religious activism against corruption.  
With regard to this issue, I approached Mahmud Akmal of the Muhammadiyah 
and Abdullah Misbahudin of the NU to interview them about how Islam perceives 
corruption. They shared the view that corruption is undoubtedly against the Islamic 
faith, by referring to the famous saying of the Prophet Muhammad: “a person will not 
steal if he or she is faithful to Allah Almighty.” They also mentioned bribery, which is 
strictly prohibited and considered sinful behaviour, by quoting the very eminent Hadith: 
La`na Allah `ala al-raasyi wa al-murtasyi wa ma bayna huma, which can be translated 
as “Damned is the bribe-giver, the bribe-taker, and the broker who acts as a middleman 
between them.” These two Hadiths have become the theological basis to explain the 
immorality of corruption because it affects public life very badly. In short, both the 
Muhammadiyah and the NU categorize corruption as a form of fasaad (Arabic: داسفلا, 
mischief) and all Muslims should take the responsibility to combat it whether 
individually or in a group, since evil deeds might affect them as a whole.  
Islamic narratives on corruption therefore suggest that it not only breaks the 
secular precepts of transparency and accountability, but also violates ethical conduct 
and the moral code according to Islamic principles (e.g. Lewis 2006; Iqbal & Lewis 
2009). Indeed they are very important elements of public governance and if they are 
absent, those holding public power “will not be reluctant to pursue [their] interest by 
lying, cheating or stealing by simply outweighing the risks [by the] benefits in breaking 
the law, as there is a widespread proverb ‘rules are made to be broken’” (Mevliyar 
2008:34). Islamic teachings have provided Muslims with a set of moral standards of 
behaviour, as they are obliged to behave with good manners or al-ma’ruf (Arabic: 
فورعم‎, good deeds that Islam orders one to do), while avoiding all bad conduct or al-
munkar (Arabic: لاركنم , evil deeds that Islam has forbidden). Indeed there is a very rich 
tradition in the Islamic heritage of high moral standards, values and norms of 
demeanour that direct personal and public life. Ethics and morality as the bases for both 
individual and social behaviour are clearly paramount in Islamic teachings (e.g. Izutsu 
2002; Asad 2003; Rahman [1989] 2009). Therefore, it is important to pay attention to 
how Islamic value systems construe corruption and how the Qur’an and the Hadith 
                                                 
15
 This scholarly work is a blend of the two proceedings of the studies on corruption conducted separately 
by the ulama of the Muhammadiyah and the NU through different religious forums: Majelis Tarjih and 
Bahsul Masa’il respectively. The old version of the studies was first published in 2006 through a sponsor 
of a Jakarta-based NGO called the Partnership for Governance Reform.  
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provide an ethical code to show that corruption is completely repugnant to Islam.  As 
reflected in Islamic scripture, corruption is classified as al-akhlaq al-madzmumah 
(Arabic:  ةمومذمقلاخلأا, blameworthy, disgraced morality—traits or attributes that are 
shameful and bad). Mahmud Akmal even claimed that corruption is: 
A form of shirk (polytheism) in the sense that corruptors are deeply obsessed with money 
and material worth, worshipping them as they worship God. They perceive the power of 
money as similar to that of God. They venerate wealth, capital and other material goods, 
placing them as objects of adoration that they deify in place of God. (Quoted from 
interview, 2 September 2009) 
 
 Unlike secular discourses that place corruption at the centre of the controversial 
subject of political and economic debates (e.g. Heidenheimer & Johnston 2001; Rose-
Ackerman 2006), Islamic discourses show very clearly that corruption is indisputably 
against the moral code of the Qur’an and the Sunnah (Arabic: ةنس‎, authoritative 
tradition, habitual action and norm referring to the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and 
practices). However, there is no specific term for corruption in Islamic texts, but 
Muslims, as Misbahudin mentions, usually perceive corruption by referring to the 
Qur’an (Al-Baqarah [chapter 2]:188): “Do not eat up one another’s property unjustly 
(in any illegal way, e.g. stealing, robbing, deceiving), nor give bribery to the rulers 
(judges before presenting your cases) that you may not knowingly eat up a part of the 
property of others sinfully.” With reference to classical Islamic texts, Misbahudin 
conceives of corruption by comparing it to what is called Ghulul (Arabic: لولغ, unlawful 
taking from the war spoils [ghanimah] before they are distributed among the fighters or 
handed out to the Muslims’ common treasury). He asserts that corruption is a modern 
term for ghulul, used in the ancient Islamic period, as the term ghulul, like corruption, is 
a form of misappropriation. In explaining the term ghulul, Misbahudin quotes the 
Qur’an: 
It is not for any Prophet to take illegally a part of the booty (ghulul), and whosoever 
deceives his companions as regards the booty, he shall bring forth on the Day of 
Resurrection that which he took (illegally). Then every person shall be paid in full what 
he has earned; and they shall not be dealt with unjustly. (Ali Imran [chapter 3]:161) 
 
 
 Considering the iniquity of corruption, leaders of the NU issued a controversial 
fatwa (edict, Islamic legal opinion) suggesting that corruptors should not receive 
religious rituals or Islamic prayers when they die. Although the fatwa is not legally 
binding on all Indonesian Muslims, it shows the extreme degree of depravity of 
corruption. It seems that the NU leaders wanted to assert that those committing 
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corruption deserve both social and moral sanctions—in addition to severe punishment—
from the Muslim communities by not performing prayers for them, as Misbahudin 
explains: 
Corruption is a grave practice which not only destroys religious faith and truth but also 
badly affects social life for everyone, and Islam considers it a great sin. This is why the 
NU proposed a fatwa saying that corruptors should not receive Islamic prayers when they 
pass away. Let the family members of the corrupt pray, but not our imams and all 
Muslims. (Quoted from interview, 13 January 2009) 
      
 The views of Misbahudin actually represent those of the NU scholars who often 
highlight the judgment in the afterlife for corruptors. In illustrating the severity of 
corruption, he refers to a saying of the Prophet Muhammad: “Every flesh and bone that 
grew from illicit fortune shall not be accepted in heaven,” so that the organization also 
forbids blessing the remains of a corruptor and warns that none of the corruptor’s deeds 
will be accepted unless the person has sincerely repented. Expressing anxiety over the 
moral syndrome of corruption, Misbahudin states: “We need to re-orientate society’s 
value, and place corruption as not only illegal but also immoral. Corruptors have acted 
shamelessly by swindling money from people as if they have no responsibility at all.” In 
this context, refusing to perform prayers and Islamic rituals, as social and moral 
sanctions for corruptors, reflects an expression of religious disapproval of those 
implicated in shameful misconduct.  
It is clear that the involvement of the NU and the Muhammadiyah in the fight 
against corruption is motivated by religious beliefs. Public narratives on corruption 
voiced by these Islamic organizations represent what Heinzpeter Znoj (2007) calls 
‘civic religious discourse’. As representatives of Indonesian Muslim society, they are 
involved in public campaigns against corruption in support of establishing good and 
responsible government for the sake of people’s prosperity. Looking at the kind of 
(anti)-corruption narrative, Znoj writes: 
[…] a well-articulated civic religious discourse […] demands a strong civil society in a 
secular state and […] regards the various religions as indispensable sources of a general 
moral attitude, out of which civic virtues are expected to grow. It deems a religiously 
inspired, morally firm civil society [to be] the only source of successful resistance against 
the “social disease” of corruption. (Znoj 2007:58) 
 
 
Znoj illustrates how the public place their trust and hope in religious institutions 
as the last resort to fight corruption. Indeed, most Indonesians have strongly urged the 
NU and the Muhammadiyah to redouble their efforts to combat corruption so the public 
could maintain their hope, with the expectation that civic morality and social virtue 
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would flourish and such depravity as corruption would be banished. Definitely, Islam 
condemns corruption and the things that lead to the spreading of it, since corruption is 
not only against public morality but also wounds the sense of justice. As corruption 
causes social distortion and seizes public interest, preventing people from accessing 
public resources, it is certainly contrary to the principle of social justice—which is the 
ideal that Muslim organizations are fighting for. 
As the two largest Muslim institutions—the Muhammadiyah and the NU—have 
joined the social movements against corruption, anti-corruption reforms advocated by 
Indonesian civil society have grown much stronger and created a political significance 
in the course of the anti-corruption programmes. Their involvement in eradicating 
corruption has asserted that the endemic problem of corruption has become of interest to 
every single element of the nation. In this sense, Islamic organizations have shown the 
public that they do play a significant role in the context not only of religious matters, 
but also of public affairs as in the case of promoting anti-corruption initiatives in which 
the general public are deeply involved. The Muhammadiyah and the NU have 
demonstrated that such a prophetic role in fighting corruption has a very strong religious 
basis with reference to theological doctrine. They ground religious activism in the battle 
against corruption in Islamic values and beliefs so that their involvement in social 
movements against corruption basically reflects Islamic teachings. They actualize them 
in real life by promoting clean government and governance reform through corruption 
eradication programmes. In the context of Indonesia, this research seems to be an 
original contribution to the study of anti-corruption that demonstrates how Muslim 
organizations take part in promoting social reform against corruption. Religious leaders 
do not conceive of Islam to be practised merely in private life, but rather it must be 
applied in public life as well. Islamic teachings are therefore transformed into social 
practices in order to realize the common good. Their engagement in anti-corruption 
movements is part of the call of religious doctrines and credos. 
 
4.6 Conclusion      
As a conclusion to the discussion in this chapter, it can be asserted that corruption has 
multiple dimensions: economic, social, and political, as well as ethical and moral. 
Certainly moral standards are crucial elements in support of anti-corruption initiatives. 
In an Islamic context, fighting corruption must be rooted in Islamic values and norms to 
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ensure the legitimacy of the anti-corruption activities. At this point, the role of Muslim 
civil society has been very helpful in support of anti-corruption reforms. The 
involvement of religious organizations like the NU and the Muhammadiyah in anti-
corruption movements is expected to encourage public spirit and increase the power of 
civil society to force social and political reforms on public governance. Most 
importantly, these Islamic institutions are crucial for providing religious legitimacy in 
support of social movements against corruption. The socio-political significance of the 
Muhammadiyah and the NU, along with other religious groups, is because they have 
moral credentials and political leverage as they represent such a huge number of the 
Muslim communities who have become a focal point for an effective anti-corruption 
movement. 
Within this perspective, collaborative work between religious groups, secular 
NGOs, and other civil society associations is hoped to become much more meaningful 
and to strengthen social movements to combat corruption. It is hoped that the synergy 
among them will energize social and religious activism in the battle against corruption 
for the sake of all Indonesian citizens, thereby creating prosperity and justice for all. 
Nonetheless, with regard to a great deal of corruption in the country, the efficacy of 
these Islamic civil society associations in alleviating this acute social disease still needs 
to be achieved.  To do this, it is important to take into consideration how secular 
NGOs—in addition to religious organizations—play their part in the fight against 
corruption, as the next chapter will discuss. 
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Chapter 5 
 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN THE BATTLE AGAINST 
CORRUPTION 
 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to show how anti-corruption activism is grounded in 
grass-root movements, especially those involving educated people. Public resistance to 
corruption is mostly orchestrated by middle class groups, who take initiatives to 
mobilize social and political resources to fight corruption. This chapter therefore 
explores the non-state initiatives of anti-corruption movements pioneered by social and 
political activists associated with NGOs and other social groups. The main issues 
addressed here are the nature of social and political activism in the fight against 
corruption, what ideological thoughts ground such activism in support of anti-corruption 
movements, and how social political activists, along with civil society agencies, play a 
vital role in the battle against corruption. This chapter will also look at how anti-
corruption movements blossom within a democratic system, but how, ironically, 
political democracy also instigates corruption that results in public disappointment.  
 
5.1 State Actions to Fight Corruption  
Before addressing the role of NGOs and civil society in public campaigns against 
corruption, I first introduce what actions have been taken by the government in dealing 
with this problem. Despite the fact that corruption takes place in state structures and 
involves officials and politicians, the state has a political duty to take action to eradicate 
it. In this respect, the government has established various commissions or bodies which 
are in charge of tackling the grave problem of corruption. As the nation has learned 
from the bitter experience of the New Order state, which was dubbed a highly corrupt 
regime, Indonesian people strongly demanded institutional reforms that would 
encompass all important aspects of the government systems. The new government 
during the reformasi era has taken a series of governance reforms through the provision 
of a legal basis and the establishment of operating agencies in an effort to curb 
corruption and prevent it from becoming widespread.  
Governance reforms in support of corruption eradication were first launched by 
President B.J. Habibie soon after he came to power in May 1998. In response to 
political pressure to tackle massive corruption, the Habibie government introduced Law 
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No. 28 of 1998 on Penyelenggaraan Negara yang Bersih dan Bebas dari Korupsi, 
Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (Clean Administrative Government that is Free from Corruption, 
Collusion, and Nepotism). This Law was followed by the establishment of Komisi 
Pengawas Kekayaan Pejabat Negara (KPKPN, the Commission of Scrutiny of 
Officials’ Assets), but unfortunately it did not perform as well as expected. In fact, this 
Commission became ineffective as the Habibie presidency lasted only a very short 
period—his government ended in October 1999, and during his administration, very 
little was done to tackle corruption. The successor of B.J. Habibie, President 
Abdurrahman Wahid, then created a task force called Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan 
Korupsi (TGPTPK, Joint Team on Eradication Corruption) by issuing Presidential 
Decree No. 19 of 2000.  However, this team, like the previous commission, appeared to 
become powerless and ended with unsatisfactory results.  
During the Megawati presidency, a new institution called Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi (KPK, the Commission of Corruption Eradication) was founded. Designed as 
an independent state agency with reference to Law No. 30 of 2002 on the KPK, this 
body was established on 29 December 2003; and its establishment was in line with Law 
No. 20 of 2001 on the Alleviation of Corruption Crime. As well as this Law, the 
government enacted Law No. 15 of 2002 on Money Laundering Crime.  Following this 
Law, in 2003 the government founded Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi 
Kekuangan (PPATK, the Centre for Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis) whose 
main task is, among others, to trace the transfer of money resulting from white-collar 
crimes such as corruption. These two laws have become a strong legal basis in support 
of corruption eradication.  The KPK was the product of institutional reforms in response 
to widespread political pressures demanding that the eradication of corruption must be 
handled by a new body, since the public greatly distrusted the existing state agencies 
(e.g. the police, the judiciary). The major tasks of the KPK include (1) to coordinate 
state agencies, especially the National Police, the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), the 
General Audit Office (GAO), and the PPATK in eradicating corruption; (2) to supervise 
the involved actors—the National Police, the AGO, and related institutions—in 
collective efforts to fight corruption; (3) to investigate and prosecute cases of 
corruption; (4) to undertake prevention programmes of corruption eradication; and (5) 
to review procedures and institutions prone to corruption and to recommend respective 
remedies. Even though the KPK maintains its status as a state body, it is not part of the 
executive structure, nor under the authority of the president. It is not always easy, 
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however, for this anti-graft agency to achieve its objectives, since there are a great 
number of political obstacles which lead the KPK into conflict with those who hold 
state powers. (This issue will be addressed later in this chapter). 
Over the years, state-led corruption eradication appears to have become less 
effective, since state actors and politicians are very often involved in illicit practices. 
Their involvement in corruption has created the so-called gridlock situations which 
cause considerable difficulties for the authorities (e.g. the KPK) in dealing with 
corruption scandals or in taking legal action over them. This is because such people 
often apply a self-defence mechanism by revealing their opponent’s corruption 
scandals, as a strategy of avoiding a prosecution process. These apparently hopeless 
situations, in relation to the possibility of state action to eradicate corruption, result in 
very deep disappointment among the Indonesian people. However, political pressures to 
fight corruption have emerged from non-state actors, most notably NGOs and other civil 
society associations.      
 
5.2 Indonesian NGOs and Anti-Corruption Initiatives    
This section presents an overview of the emergence of NGOs and how they have 
become important non-state actors in the world of Indonesian politics. Historically 
NGOs originated in the 1970s and then mushroomed in the 1980s as a consequence of 
the increasing demands for people’s involvement in public affairs. They emerged to 
become a counterpart of the government in the delivery of development programmes 
through three approaches: ‘(i) high-level partnership: grassroots development, (ii) high-
level politics: grassroots mobilization, and (iii) empowerment at the grassroots’ 
(Eldridge 1990:512). NGOs claimed to be ‘independent agencies’ having a strategic 
mission to bridge the gap between the government’s interests and the people’s 
aspirations. They dedicated their efforts to social advocacy while voicing the 
importance of civil society as the basis for promoting participation in politics and the 
involvement of the public in the policymaking process (e.g. Mahasin & Ibrahim 1996; 
Bunnell 1996).  
 Noticeably, NGOs appeared to flourish in the Indonesian political landscape 
alongside the growing number of educated people who campaigned for democratic 
participation based on the people’s sovereignty (e.g. Eldridge 1995; Billah 1996); while 
the idea of democracy itself began thriving even in the times of the authoritarian New 
Order when the regime was still powerful and unchallenged by non-state contenders. 
154 
 
Anders Uhlin observed this phenomenon some years before the autocratic military rule 
came to an end, saying: “In Indonesia, as in most other authoritarian states, there has 
been a marked increase in demands for democracy during the last couple of years. New 
pro-democracy groups have emerged and activists in older NGOs have become more 
outspoken on democracy issues; various middle class activists and intellectuals demand 
more political freedom” (1993:517). NGOs are therefore recognized as having played 
an important role in the process of democratization (e.g. Eldridge 1997; Hadiwinata 
2003); and such a role relates to greater demands for what the Indonesian media refer to 
as keterbukaan (openness), keterlibatan (participation), and kebebasan (liberty). These 
are among the key components of democratic politics and public governance. 
Indonesian NGOs then gained political significance when ‘the third wave of 
democratization’ (Huntington 1991) swept across developing countries in the late 
twentieth century. Moreover, they have made a valuable contribution to promoting what 
Aspinall calls a ‘new hegemony of democratic ideas’ which are essential as ‘the 
groundwork for democratic transformation’ (2005:115) in line with the proliferation of 
global discourse of democracy and political liberalization asserting that they have a 
central role to play in developing a flourishing democracy in the country. 
Having benefited from the emergence of democracy, NGOs and other civil 
society groups have moved forward to strengthen their role in public criticism. They 
have become actively involved in social and political activism against corruption. As 
the public has strongly demanded that corruption must be tackled very seriously, they 
have taken the lead to develop grassroots initiatives to combat the social disease. The 
role of NGOs is considered to be critical for fighting corruption, since they consist of 
and are buttressed by educated elites and other elements of the middle class that are 
very important in support of anti-corruption reforms. Thus the NGOs are among the 
major protagonists among the anti-corruption movements that are playing a crucial part 
in battling corruption through various programmes: increased citizen participation and 
civic monitoring with the spirit of what is called ‘integrity warriors’ (e.g. Sampson 
2005; Bracking 2007; De Sousa, Larmour & Hindess 2009).   
Even though claims about the NGOs’ ability to facilitate the political transition 
to democracy are to some extent contested, several scholars (e.g. Holloway et al. 2002; 
Antlov et al. 2005; Schutte 2009) acknowledge that their part in fighting corruption and 
promoting public accountability is central. Hadiwinata also argues that NGOs, as the 
‘third sector’ organizations, contribute to “the strengthening of Indonesian civil society 
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needed to generate demand for more accountable, clean, and transparent government” 
(2003:ix). In this sense, what emerges in public talk indicates that corruption is 
counterproductive to the creation of accountable governance. The issue of corruption 
materializes in public narrative as part of the rhetoric of transparency, accountability 
and the rule of law, as all of these have become the central foci of discourses on 
democracy and good governance in the global landscape over the past few years (e.g. 
World Bank 2003; Rose-Ackerman [1999] 2007; De Sousa, Larmour & Hindess 2009).  
Yet critics say that terms such as good governance, accountability, transparency, 
participation, and the like have become merely buzzwords (e.g. Munshi & Abraham 
2004; Cornwall 2007), since they are not easy for those occupying public office to 
implement as ideal norms and values. In this sense, corruption is seen as opposed to 
those basic tenets of governing administrative power which are indicated by the clear 
distinction between public and private. This refers to the Weberian concept of legal-
rational bureaucracy, which is characterized by standardized procedure (rule-following), 
formal division of responsibility, hierarchy and impersonal relationships (Weber [1968] 
2006). Using this model, state officials often become trapped between conflicting 
interests: public and private; and without drawing the line clearly between the two, they 
easily fall into corruption as categorized by the modern concept of public bureaucracy. 
  
5.3 ICW: Roots and Ideologies of Emerging Anti-Corruption Activism 
         
Social and political activism in combating corruption is pivotal, while NGOs have been 
proven empirically to become vocal actors in voicing popular protests and in 
articulating public criticism on corruption. Here I first introduce an NGO that focuses 
on the issue of corruption, the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), along with other 
middle-class-supporting social groups that share some concerns about the problem of 
corruption. They have the same mission, that is, the strengthening of civil society 
associations in support of public campaigns against corruption and anti-corruption 
movements initiated by non-state actors. The ICW, the first and leading watchdog 
organization, was established on 21 June 1998, precisely in the transition period from 
the New Order to the reformasi era, when the general public strongly demanded the 
investigation of corruption committed by the Soeharto regime along with his cronies. 
Indeed the misuse of public powers and illicit deals within state bureaucracies were so 
extensive that they came to be popularly known as KKN.  At that time, KKN became 
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the central issue of public censures directed at political campaigns against the New 
Order as they were the bad legacy of the regime. KKN associated with the shady-
despotic rule were blamed by the people as the main cause of the nation’s ruin (e.g. 
Vatikiotis 1998; Robertson 1999; Kingsbury 2002). According to the founders of the 
ICW, the initial idea of establishing the agency came from several societal leaders and 
NGO activists who had a strong commitment to promoting democracy and good 
governance. They were deeply concerned by the fact that the New Order regime 
bequeathed a large number of corruption problems which were ingrained in all levels of 
state bodies: executive, legislative, and judicial. Here Abdullah Misbahudin, one of the 
ICW founders, explained:  
Corruption was endemic during the New Order state but there was no space for public 
criticism as the military regime ruled the country repressively. That is why some NGOs and 
educated middle class people took initiatives to create an independent social organization in 
support of the fight against corruption soon after the New Order finished. The establishment 
of the ICW was intended to be a sort of counterbalance for the hegemonic and corrupt state 
powers. (Quoted from interview, 13 January 2009) 
 The initiators of the ICW are prominent public figures
16
 with various social and 
professional backgrounds but they have a common interest: eradicating corruption. 
Although these people came from different professions, they agreed about the 
importance of setting up an independent institution to deal with the issue of corruption. 
Most of them had already associated with their own NGOs in different areas of interest, 
but they considered that establishing the ICW was indispensable in order to consolidate 
civil society groups in combating corruption so that anti-corruption movements became 
much more organized. In the heated moments of the transition period after the collapse 
of the New Order rule and with increased public criticism of corruption, the formation 
of the ICW reached a historical momentum as the people deeply hated the corrupt 
regime. A leading figure of the ICW, Johan, pointed out:  
The foundation of the ICW was to respond to the fervent spirit of public criticism against 
corruption during the New Order era. Under this regime, the palace, the military, and the 
bureaucracy were the axes of corruption; and the oligarchic power centered on the inner 
circle of Soeharto made corruption become much more acute. These situations were 
aggravated by the absence of public control; and therefore the creation of the ICW was 
                                                 
16
 Among the founders of the body were Todung Mulya Lubis, Bambang Widjojanto (lawyers, human 
right activists); Adi Andojo Sutjipto (judge); Chusnul Mar’iyah, Robertus Robert (academics); Daniel 
Dhakidae, Alexander Irwan (social researchers); Marsilam Simanjuntak, Kemala Chandra Kirana, Teten 
Masduki (social and political activists); Sonny Keraf (politician); Masdar Farid Mas’udi (Islamic 
organization leader); Munir Thalib (human rights activist); Christianto Wibisono (economic analyst, 
businessman); Eros Djarot (film director, musician). It is important to note that some of them were 
European- and American-educated activists with a very good understanding of democracy and political 
governance; and it seems that the Western democratic cultures and values they learned during their 
studies in those countries had a strong influence on their social and political activism. 
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dedicated to become a watchdog institution as part of social responsibility. (Quoted from 
interview, 3 December 2008) 
 
 Before the ICW was established, there was not even a single NGO concentrating 
on the issue of corruption. Considering that corruption had become a grave problem in 
the country for many years, resulting in numerous negative impacts on public life, these 
social and political activists mentioned earlier arranged among themselves to set up a 
solid and strong organization in support of the anti-corruption agenda. The institution of 
the ICW was critical in order to organize what is called kekuatan rakyat (the power of 
people) and to strengthen civil society groups so that anti-corruption initiatives would 
become more effective. Indeed, the establishment of the ICW was in line with the spirit 
of the reformasi movements, that is, to ‘free’ the government from corruption since it 
had burdened the state bureaucracies socially and politically and inhibited them from 
carrying out public duties properly. The mission statements of the ICW are very clear as 
follows:  
The primary missions of the ICW are: (1) to struggle for the establishment of the systems of 
politics, the law, the economy, and state bureaucracies without corruption and based on social 
justice; (2) to enhance people’s participation in the process of public policymaking and in the 
monitoring of the implementation of public policy. In order to deliver these missions, the 
ICW plays several roles: (i) increasing public awareness and organizing citizenship in order 
to gain civil rights and better public service; (ii) facilitating the investigation and revelation 
of corruption cases to achieve clean government; (iii) mobilizing public campaigns on 
governance reforms in support of corruption eradication; and (iv) encouraging law 
enforcement and ethical standards among public officials, business groups, and other 
professionals, including accountants, engineers, notaries and lawyers. (Quoted from the 
ICW’s booklet) 
 
 Since its inception, the ICW has proven to be a most influential agency in 
mobilizing civil society to fight against corruption; and the public greatly relies on this 
body in dealing with all forms of illegal practice in the state agencies. The role of the 
ICW in support of anti-corruption movements reached political significance under the 
leadership of Johan when he successfully investigated and revealed a huge corruption 
scandal which implicated a very senior state official in the very early phase of the 
reformasi movements, at times when Indonesia was experiencing political turmoil 
during the transition period towards democracy. Tantalized by the euphoric moment of 
the reformasi era, in 1999 Johan bravely exposed a payoff, which totalled about Rp2.5 
billion, transferred by two tycoons, Ning King and Prajogo Pangestu, to the bank 
accounts of Andi Ghalib and his wife: he was a three-star General and a high ranking 
military officer who held the post of Attorney General under the Habibie presidency. 
The money transfers were allegedly in exchange for dropping charges of the misuse of 
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bailout and bank fraud that were being filed by the Attorney General’s Office (AGO). 
As the basis of the revelation of the illegal payments, Johan secretly investigated this 
scandal and found strong evidence from a number of credible and confidential sources 
which allowed him to reveal it in support of the disclosure of illicit deals between 
business groups and state officials. Inevitably, Andi Ghalib became the target of bitter 
censure by the media, and the public severely denounced him as well. A huge wave of 
mass demonstrations lasting for weeks eventually forced Andi Ghalib to leave his office 
and President Habibie had no choice but to remove him from his post. However, Andi 
Ghalib had never been charged with corruption as he took bribes from business people; 
being fired as a state official with such an important post as Attorney General was 
considered to be a serious political punishment. In Indonesian politics this sort of 
punishment is a very common and is popularly known as penyelesaian adat (which 
literally means ‘customary solution’—an idiom for closing a scandal by removing the 
official involved in it from office and leaving the case to disappear by itself, evaporating 
from public talk as time goes by).  
 What Johan had done in revealing the scandal of the Attorney General was 
significant and unprecedented in the course of the fight against corruption, and was 
made possible only in the democracy era with freedom of expression and of the press 
allowing citizens to control the state government. Since then, Johan and the ICW have 
received great respect from the public, who deeply appreciated them becoming the 
leading figure and the foremost anti-corruption body respectively. Therefore, among 
social and political activists Johan is called ‘an icon of anti-corruption’ since he is the 
prominent leader of anti-graft civil movements and of the first NGO activist pioneering 
oversight body. In addition, the ICW itself gained political credibility in the eyes of the 
public as the most effective and powerful watchdog agency, becoming a role model for 
citizen participation and civic involvement in combating corruption in the country. 
Johan is a devoted activist with a strong commitment to embracing social 
activism. Indonesian NGO activists often point out that Johan is synonymous with 
(anti)-corruption, as he is the prominent leader in civil society who dedicates himself to 
combating corruption. Educated at the Institute of Teacher Training, Johan beforehand 
served as a teacher at a Senior Higher School in Tengerang (a district in the Banten 
province, on the border of west Jakarta) for a short period of time. He then went into 
social activism as, using his words, ‘a call of duty for societal service.’  From the outset, 
Johan associated with some NGO agencies, namely the Institute for the Study of Human 
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Rights and the Jakarta-based Legal Aid Agency which concentrate on legal assistance 
and social political advocacy. When involved in activism with these NGOs, Johan 
frequently coped with labor forces; he often mediated in disputes between workers and 
employers in business and industry over labour rights: minimum wages, benefits, safe 
working conditions, etc. From there, Johan learned that workers had for a long time 
been exploited by the capitalist economy as they earned very low wages and were 
without adequate protection at work. He also found out about the common practices of 
bribery, extortion, and the like when businesspeople dealt with state bureaucracies, the 
police, or the military officers who needed to be given uang rokok (which literally 
means money for cigarettes, an idiom for a ‘buyoff’) in return for business permits and 
security protection. Johan became familiar with these illicit practices and that is why he 
decided to become totally involved in social activism focusing on corruption. Certainly, 
he is regarded as one of the prominent figures who firmly stand for fighting corruption 
and relentlessly support any sort of public campaigns to eradicate corruption. 
Johan served in the chairmanship of the ICW for more than a decade. For many 
years now, the ICW has become the hallmark of anti-corruption movements and has had 
a great impact on building collective actions to eradicate corruption. Seemingly Johan 
has enjoyed his jobs with the spirit of a social activist who has kept his idealism in 
mind, dreaming of how corruption could be eliminated from the state agencies in favour 
of prosperity for the people. Indeed, Johan is a typical idealist social activist and such 
idealism is reflected in the drawings and photographs on the walls of his modest office. 
One of the photographs displays a group of poor and homeless children residing along 
the edge of the railroad in a slum area in Jakarta, without access to education and health 
services, and with limited food to eat so they had to share with each other. The image 
clearly shows extreme poverty and the picture slogan strikingly reads, “Corruption kills 
the future of the nation. You [corruptors] confiscate their [the children's] food. 
Corruption seizes the rights of the people to live prosperously.” There is another scene 
of even stronger contrast. A satirical drawing, hung on a bare wall, shows a well-
dressed man urinating on a homeless man lying in an alley while his uniformed 
chauffeur holds his jacket, and the picture caption reads “Trickle-Down Effect Theory,” 
referring to the promise of the ideology of economic liberalism that used to be embraced 
by the New Order state but still carries on under the new government in the era of 
democracy. The ‘trickle-down effect theory’ is the belief that once the economy grows 
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well, wealth will automatically be dispersed among and be shared by all the people and 
prosperity can be enjoyed by everyone.  
Such illustrations may symbolize the social ideology held by the ICW people as 
the basis of anti-corruption movements, and Johan stated that those drawings and 
photographs represent the paradoxical conditions of daily life among Indonesians. He 
said that some people believe in the ideology of capitalist economy as it would lead the 
country to achieve social and economic welfare, while the deep gulf between the rich 
and the poor still remains unresolved. “It is very sad,” Johan commented bitterly, “that 
while poverty is still the major problem faced by many people, corruption is widespread 
across the country. I imagine how the embezzled public money could be allocated to the 
needy.” Not surprisingly, in the course of social and political activism, the ‘corruption-
causes-poverty narrative’ has become part of public discourses and is among the way in 
which people attempt to understand the phenomenon of corruption. Corruption is thus 
conceived to be a serious obstacle for the disadvantaged groups to gain public resources 
which are supposed to be distributed for them. Johan’s perspectives seem to follow ‘the 
very typical structural approach that addresses the relation of corruption to the unequal 
distribution of resources in society’ (Nuijten & Anders 2007:15). Johan then continued 
his grievance:   
Corruption reflects the loss of social compassion. Officials and politicians implicating in 
corruption have lost their hearts, since they do not have any empathy towards people who 
have a very poor standard of living. They do not feel guilty, which shows that their 
behaviour is against the basic tenets of social ethics and public civility. The social 
phenomena (how officials and politicians behave and how the poor endure hardship in 
life) clearly contradict each other, and these are only found in a society with a lack of 
sympathy towards the disadvantaged groups. (Quoted from interview, 3 December 2008) 
 
Indeed the ‘corruption-causes-poverty narrative’ has been dominantly voiced by social 
and political activists who represent the aspirations of the poor. Such narrative has 
dominated the shaping of public opinion, becoming an attractive language of public 
discourse among those who are concerned with the problems of corruption and poverty. 
The fact that poverty is as pervasive as corruption drives social activists to question the 
effect of economic development on people’s lives, as Ahmad Tumbaleka, an 
intellectual-cum-political activist associated with the University of Indonesia, 
despondently remarked:  
Economic disparity and social inequality remain the serious problem. The gap between 
the haves and the have-nots is widening rapidly. The less well-off groups are entrapped 
in poverty as allusive comments often appear in public talk: ‘the poor are forbidden to 
get sick; the poor are not allowed to go to school’ to express strong disappointment. 
Sadly, state officials and politicians repeatedly commit corruption despite the fact that it 
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endangers social life. As corruption is pervasive, Indonesians suffer long-lasting 
adversity and sadly the poor always get affected the most. (Quoted from talk-show on 
Metrotv)  
 Therefore, anti-corruption activists relentlessly voice popular criticism against 
the ideology of neo-liberalism when they mobilize social protests and orchestrate 
political rallies, as they consider that corruption is part of the practice of uncontrolled 
neo-liberalism. Corruption is perceived to be the cost that must be paid for capitalism, 
as Fahreza Nurahman, a political activist, said, sharing his views: “Corruption seems to 
be embedded in the capitalist system and the neo-liberal economy applied in this 
country, as the practice of suap-menyuap (bribe-giving and bribe-taking) has long been 
a common feature in the worlds of business and industry.” Such views apparently fit 
with what a businessman, Razak Ismail, has experienced, who says, “If you do not 
accept the corrupt system, you cannot do business. If you don’t pay bribes, nothing can 
go ahead; bribery has become the way the systems work.”  Following these views, 
corruption is closely linked with economic neo-liberalism, as it provides more space for 
illicit practices through the mechanism and procedures facilitated by the government. 
Here elements of state bureaucracies contribute to the spreading of corruption, as seen 
in the practice of bribery involving bureaucrats and in the collusion of economic and 
political elites as a result of what is called ‘state capitalism’ or ‘bureaucratic capitalism’ 
(Robison 1990; Robison [1986] 2009).  The public perception is that corruption is 
connected with the capitalist economy as the two are interrelated and often emerge in 
ordinary talk among social and political activists when they criticize the ideological 
underpinnings of the Indonesian economy. Such perceptions connect with an analysis 
offered by the neo-Marxist approach, which considers that corruption among the ruling 
class and political elites seems to be natural since they are agents of global and domestic 
capitalist economies. They are corrupt because they are part of the struggle of oligarchic 
elites to hijack democratic political institutions and maintain the system of the neo-
liberal economy (e.g. Girling 1997; Robison 2002; Robison & Hadiz 2004). 
Criticizing the ideology of capitalism, some NGO activists organized political 
rallies on the occasion of celebrating the World Anti-Corruption Day in Jakarta by 
bringing a huge banner with the striking caption, “Clean up Indonesia from Corruption 
and Neo-liberalism” (see figure 5.1) expressing the view that both have caused social 
plight for the people and placed the country in jeopardy.  Hence the need for controlling 
and regulating economic neo-liberalism, as it is believed that an unregulated capitalist 
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economy will become inherently corrupt, since the instincts of its practitioners tend to 
be corrupt. Moreover, it can only be controlled by both effective regulations and the 
functioning of a checks-and-balances mechanism within social and political institutions. 
In this context, public criticism of corruption voiced by civil society organizations, and 
anti-corruption movements organized by NGOs, are very important to prevent 
corruption from becoming widespread under the capitalist economy. 
 
Figure 5.1: A group of NGO activists take to the streets in the capital, protesting against the 
pervasive corruption by criticizing the ideology of neoliberalism which is blamed to be the source 
of illicit deals. 
 
The social and political activists who are taking the lead to combat corruption 
are mostly educated elites and middle class groups who have a very strong social 
conscience about the dangers of corruption for society and its negative impacts on 
public life. They represent typical urban-educated elites who are politically literate with 
a wide access to the media so that they are skilful in articulating public criticism on 
corruption. They are considered to be an effective channel of political pressure on 
public policy- and decision-making processes. As an independent group without 
affiliation to any party, they have a strong political autonomy and play a central role in 
promoting democracy and governance reform, as Rob Jenkins has pointed out in the 
case of India: “as they become increasingly prosperous and influential, middle class 
groups are expected to find a political voice sufficiently autonomous to demand more 
accountable governance” (2007:63). As the proponents of anti-corruption movements, 
social and political activists embrace social ideologies—something related to the ideals 
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of justice, equality and prosperity, as they believe democracy to be the best way of 
achieving all these ideals for the whole people. Full of idealism about freeing Indonesia 
from corruption and bringing social justice and prosperity to Indonesians, they are very 
supportive of anti-corruption movements. In this regard, Mohamad Fauzan, a political 
activist, shared his views:   
Corruption cannot be tolerated for any reason because it really hurts the sense of justice 
(rasa keadilan) for all Indonesian society and contradicts a civilized polity. Corruption is 
totally shameful and reflects uncivilized social behaviour as it breaches civic morality. 
Equally, corruption destroys public ethics in the context of governing the state, whereas 
the primary objective of establishing the state is, among others, to achieve social justice 
for all Indonesian people. (Quoted from interview, 4 March 2009)  
 
Figure 5.2: [Hurting a sense of justice] A businesswoman who had been convicted of bribing an 
AGO prosecutor, and who received five years imprisonment, created a ‘mini palace’ in her prison 
in Jakarta, enjoying luxurious facilities; and from there she managed her business activities and 
controlled her private companies. An official from the Taskforce of Judicial Mafia Eradication 
(Satuan Tugas Pemberantasan Mafia Hukum) made an investigative visit and described it as a 
most serious scandal. (Photo by Kompas, 10/1/10) 
 
 
 Considering that corruption hurts the sense of justice for all Indonesian people, 
social and political activists strongly criticize the incidence of corruption. They believe 
in the principles of justice and equality as the fundamental values and the moral bases 
for creating a good society. As a good society relies on the shared moral values by 
which its members are bound (Etzioni 2001), corruption obviously infringes not only 
public morality and ethical values but also breaks the law and order of that society. 
Ideological thoughts of this kind deeply influence the ways in which social and political 
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activists comprehend the issue of corruption and how it potentially destroys social 
values within society. Here Mohamad Fauzan continued his views:   
As corruption undermines the principles of justice and equality, it eventually leads to the 
distortion of social harmony, public trust, ethics and morality, and the whole value 
system of society. In other words, corruption is the master key to injustice and inequality, 
leading them to flourish, since it prevents public institutions from delivering good 
services for the people and achieving the common good for the betterment of society. 
(Quoted from interview, 4 March 2009)  
 
 Such ideological convictions reflected in Fauzan’s views assert that state 
officials and those who operate the government systems must be responsible for 
creating public welfare as the manifestation of social justice. In this respect, corruption 
is conceived to be contradictory to the idea that the state government has a moral 
responsibility for the well-being for all its citizens. Here public narratives on corruption 
bring about, borrowing Gupta’s phrase, ‘the imagination of the state in public culture’ 
(2006 [1995]) in which corruption discourse helps to construct the state by looking at 
how the government bureaucracies deliver their duties and responsibilities to serve the 
people, as he clearly explains:  
The discourse of corruption is central to our understanding of the relationship between 
the state and social groups precisely because it plays this dual role of enabling people to 
construct the state symbolically and to define themselves as citizens. For it is through 
such representations, and through the public practices of various government agencies, 
that the state comes to be marked and delineated from other organizations and 
institutions in social life. (Gupta 2006 [1995]:226) 
 
 The public discourse of corruption helps one understand how people feel the 
state government should operate. In fact, corruption centres on state power, reflecting 
what Rose-Ackerman calls “the dysfunction of administrative government” (2007); or, 
in the language of Jonathan Parry, “the ‘crisis of corruption’ is a symptom of the 
weakness of the state” (2000:52). Not surprisingly, corruption renders the government 
incapable of providing social and economic welfare for its citizens. In other words, 
those who hold public power while being implicated in corruption are considered to be 
morally wrong as they break the very basic rights of the citizens, since corruption 
removes their opportunity to achieve a better life. In line with this reasoning, Italo Pardo 
points out: “Corruption at once draws and thrives on injustice, exploitation of 
inequality, distortions of power and betrayal [of] the fundamental principles of 
citizenship, for those who do not have access to, or to refuse to engage in corruption are 
at a disadvantage” (2004:11). Thus, it can be argued that corruption is against the 
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prophetic mission of the state, which is about bringing prosperity for all people, as Dini 
Ratnasari, an activist of the ICW, puts it: 
Indonesia is endowed with abundant natural resources, but such natural endowments 
don’t bring welfare to its people because of mismanagement and corruption. We have a 
big problem with corrupt and rotten politicians who have hijacked the reform 
movements. Seeing the political circumstances currently, the public seem to be sceptical 
that corruption can be eliminated. Instead, it will continue being the major problem in the 
country. (Quoted from interview, 18 February 2009) 
 
 Taking into account the illustrations mentioned above, social and political 
activists realize that corruption is tightly intertwined with power, and so they look at 
those who hold political power and how power relations are established. This is actually 
the major concern of anthropologists in studying corruption, as Haller & Shore put it: 
“We should not lose sight of the fact that transactions of bribery and corruption always 
take place in power relationships that invariably stratify, marginalize and exclude” 
(2005:17). Mirroring views of social and political activists, Ahmad Ghulam, head of the 
ICW’s political division, explained that those who hold political power usually develop 
very strong relations with each other in order to secure their agenda and shield their 
interests, which are mostly associated with economic opportunities and political 
advantages. They form multifaceted networks encompassing many elements of the 
parties involved, which make the networks more complicated and problematic so that 
power relations among them are highly intricate. This notion is particularly connected 
with the common argument that corruption must be seen in the complexity of 
relationships among social actors within power structures, as Gledhill writes: 
“Corruption persists and may well enjoy a bright future because of the way its practices 
spin webs of complicity at different social levels” which are bound by the power 
relations that “shape both practices and the ambiguous moral discourses that 
characterize the responses of situated social actors to those practices” (2004:156).  
The fact that corruption is connected with politics and takes place in power 
structures makes attempts to fight it much more difficult. Therefore, anti-corruption 
initiatives pioneered by non-state actors are critical as a sort of political measure to 
control any potential misuse of public power. This kind of political role is precisely the 
one played by the ICW along with other NGOs and civil society associations; they work 
hand in hand to strengthen collective efforts in combating and curbing corruption. 
Among their major activities are what is called “‘deep throat’ investigation” on 
presumed corruption cases which they reveal for investigation by the authorities. They 
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conduct social advocacy to increase public awareness about the perils of corruption 
affecting social life. As well as these, they carry out a series of workshops on (anti)-
corruption and good governance for various civil society agencies. The ICW itself 
frequently holds training sessions for social activists on public governance and provides 
supervision for local NGOs on how to design anti-corruption programmes and agendas, 
so that civic participation in corruption eradication can be implemented. Although there 
are no hierarchical and structural relations between the ICW and other civil society 
associations, they have developed potent networks to uphold anti-corruption initiatives. 
Networks have also been established between the ICW, other NGOs, and centres for the 
study of corruption at several universities like Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, 
Java, and Andalas University in Padang, West Sumatra. They also conduct research on 
the patterns of corruption in public office at national and local levels and have designed 
a roadmap of corruption eradication.
17
 In conducting all these activities, they have 
developed what they call ‘strategic partnerships’ and ‘interagency coordination’ in order 
to synergize all the elements of civil society groups so that they can maximize their 
common endeavour in fighting corruption and carrying out their anti-corruption agenda. 
 
5.4 Power Contestation: the State and Civil Society 
As the relations between corruption and political power are evident, anti-corruption 
movements cannot be detached from power contestations between the state and civil 
society. A relevant feature of such contestation is presented here, that is, a series of 
public protests organized by social and political activists in opposition to the 
‘criminalization’ of two central figures of the KPK which lasted for several months and 
caused political tumult in the world of Indonesian politics. Led by the ICW, on 12 July 
2009 tens of national and local NGOs
18
 congregated in Tugu Proklamasi Park in Jakarta 
                                                 
17
 There are some works carried out in collaboration between the ICW, the Korupsi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi (KPK), and the Partnership for Governance Reform that have produced, among others, two main 
documents: (1) Fighting Corruption from Aceh to Papua (provinces of Indonesia); and (2) Roadmap of 
the KPK 2007-2011: Toward an Effective Corruption Eradication. 
 
18
 Other NGOs taking part in the public protests were: Transparency International Indonesia (TII); Center 
for Anti-Corruption Studies, Faculty of Law, Gadjah Mada University; Society for Public Monitoring of 
Indonesian Court, Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia; Center for Constitutional Studies, Andalas 
University; Center for the Study of Law and Policy Jakarta; Indonesia Forum for Budget Transparency 
(Fitra); Legal Aid Agencies of Jakarta, Padang, Surabaya; Bali Corruption Watch (BCW; Malang 
Corruption Watch (MCW); Societal Alliances for Anti-Corruption (AMAK), Indonesian Court 
Monitoring (ICM) Yogyakarta; and some others.    
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to declare what has become popularly known as CICAK (see figure 5.3), an acronym of 
Cinta Indonesia Cinta KPK (Love Indonesia Love KPK). The meeting was attended by 
hundreds of social and political activists as well as academics, journalists, and artists. 
They initiated a series of social mobilizations and political actions to counter what they 
named ‘corruptors fight back’ by proclaiming what is called perlawanan rakyat 
(people’s resistance) towards the (mis)use of the state power to undermine the KPK. 
Worried about the fate of KPK and the future of corruption eradication, Abdul Rahman, 
a former vice chair of the body and one of the CICAK initiators, shared his concerns: 
We all rely on the KPK since this agency is the only state body the public can trust, as the 
people have lost their trust in the Police, the AGO, and even the courts. The KPK has proved 
to the public that it is a credible agency being in the vanguard of combating corruption 
effectively, so this body is the only hope for the people to fight corruption. But many 
corruptors are under threat with the existence of the KPK so they try to undercut it or even to 
sweep it away. So we proclaim CICAK to defend the KPK and we stand beside it and 
strongly condemn those who undermine it. (Quoted from interview, 15 July 2009) 
 
Figure 5.3: The logo symbolizes the battle between Cicak (gecko) representing the KPK and 
Buaya (crocodile) representing the Police, and was used by social and political activists during 
mass demonstrations and political rallies against the ‘criminalization’ of the KPK officials. The 
motto reads Saya Cicak Berani Lawan Buaya—'I am a gecko … I am brave enough to fight 
against the crocodile'. 
The term CICAK was taken from cicak (gecko) which was associated with the 
KPK when the anti-graft body was involved in a long battle against the Police, 
symbolized by buaya (crocodile). Cicak and buaya were used as symbolic expressions 
to illustrate the imbalance of power between the two state agencies when they were in 
fierce strife; the crocodile of course symbolizes superiority and domination over the 
gecko. In the battle there was a very high ranking police officer who was accused of 
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receiving bribes from a merchant banker, and the case was tackled by the KPK, which 
eventually caused a bitter conflict among three law enforcement bodies: the KPK on the 
one side and the Police along with the Attorney General’s Office on the other side, as 
the two latter agencies were in complicated rivalry with the former. Such rivalry showed 
that senior law enforcers tried to frame anti-graft officials from the KPK on fabricated 
charges of bribery and blackmail. The Police and the AGO, as the story goes on, then 
worked hand in hand to strike at the KPK by detaining two of its officials—Bibit Rianto 
and Chandra Hamzah—and charging them with extortion and misuse of authority. They 
were then suspended from their positions as vice chairs of the agency. This inevitably 
sparked off accusations among social activists, who speculated that there was a political 
conspiracy operated by powerful and invisible agents, and suspected that the reason 
why the Police and the AGO targeted the KPK officials was because the anti-graft 
agency had grown to be a super-body so they wanted it to be delegitimized. Such 
speculation of conspiracy seemed to be the same in nature as corruption in which both 
appeared in the form of accusations and rumours, as Nuijten & Anders put it: 
Corruption accusations can develop a life of their own and public denial usually succeeds 
in reinforcing the impression that the accusations are true. Gossip about corrupt practices 
often takes the form of conspiracy theories that quickly absorb contrary evidence into a 
conspiracy of even grander proportions. The public imagination quickly substitutes a lack 
of tangible proof with gossip and rumours. (Nuijten & Anders 2007:19)  
 In fact, the KPK has the right to arrest and prosecute everyone without 
exception, even the inner circle of President Yudhoyono and those holding state power: 
ministers, legislators, governors, mayors, and regents, who were previously untouchable 
and above the law. The success of the KPK in putting corrupt officials on trial is 
monumental and unprecedented in the course of the fight against corruption in the 
history of Indonesian politics. The public has widely recognized such accomplishments. 
Here is an example from people’s comments:  
If I were a corrupt official, of course I would want the KPK to die. If it couldn’t be 
“killed” institutionally, I would try to weaken its power and damage its reputation. 
Losing public trust will make the KPK into the equivalent of a toothless tiger because 
trust is its lethal weapon. (Quoted from Readers’ Forum of the Jakarta Post) 
 
Certainly the existence of the KPK has created fear and scare among officials and 
politicians since corruption scandals mostly involve these people; and hundreds of 
public officials and legislators have been imprisoned by the KPK because of corruption. 
Such fear and dread among politicians are recognized by an unnamed prominent MP 
associated with the Golkar Party as follows: 
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The KPK has already prosecuted several MPs and begun investigating a huge corruption 
scandal which could suck in more than fifty (former) members of the parliament’s 
financial commission, including two cabinet ministers. The rights of the KPK to 
prosecute those accused of corruption were authorized by parliament itself. The irony is 
that few MPs thought they themselves would be the target. It’s really funny. The KPK 
was created by parliament; its bill was passed by parliament; its members were elected 
by parliament. And now they are scared of it. (Quoted from interview, 9 May 2009) 
  
 In essence, the conflict between the KPK and the Police together with the AGO 
has reflected the struggle for domination and superiority since the first one has 
effectively enlarged the newly established agency and gained credibility, being trusted 
by the public to tackle corruption, while the other two have lost trust and integrity. 
Worse, both the Police and the AGO are perceived by the public to be among the most 
corrupt state agencies. During the conflict, accusations were connected with political 
statements made by President SBY who expressed his personal apprehension about the 
growing power of the KPK by saying:  
I should give an alert in relation to the position of the KPK as this agency has become the 
super-body among other state agencies, despite the fact that it was granted by the law the 
status of an independent body. Its power must not go unchecked because that would be 
dangerous for everyone, as the agency has no external control to balance such power. 
The KPK is now only responsible to God since there are no other institutions watching 
and monitoring this body. (Quoted from Kompas 24 June 2009)19 
 
 Straight away, the president’s political statements ignited public controversy and 
he received strong criticism from many civil society groups as well as political 
observers, academics, and the media, and he was accused of being involved in, or at 
least giving covert approval to, a secret plot to undermine and paralyze the KPK. Such 
controversial statements were allegedly motivated by both political and personal 
interests because the father-in-law of President Yudhoyono’s son—Aulia Pohan, a 
former Deputy Governor of the Bank Indonesia—was arrested by the KPK and charged 
with being implicated in the bribery of legislators. He was then taken to court, tried on 
corruption charges, found guilty, and given a sentence of five years in prison. The 
public accused the president of being angry and disappointed by the punishment, and he 
then expressed his feelings through the controversial statements which were interpreted 
by the activists as part of a political scheme to demoralize the KPK leaders and weaken 
                                                 
19
 President Yudhoyono gave a press conference after meeting the executive board of KOMPAS, one of 
the most influential newspapers, just a few days away from the presidential election. Certainly his 
controversial statements heated up the political situation, which boiled over in the political contest at the 
time of the 2009 general elections.  
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the agency. Agum Badarudin, from one of the cicak activist groups, sharply criticized 
President Yudhoyono, saying: 
President SBY applies double standards in combating corruption simply because his 
close relative is involved in it. He is not consistent with the government’s programmes 
on corruption eradication and shows ambiguity in response to corruption scandals. His 
controversial statements basically indicate that his claim to having a strong commitment 
to fighting corruption is just a sort of political rhetoric to appease the public. (Quoted 
from interview, 12 July 2009) 
 
Figure 5.4: A group of people take to the streets in front of the KPK office, protesting about a 
plot to criminalize two of its officials and to paralyze the anti-graft body. (Photo by 
detiknews.com) 
 
 Indeed the president’s statements vehemently fuelled public anger. Social 
activists joined the ICW and other civil society groups and then organized a public 
protest to challenge what they called the ‘invisible hands’ to undermine the KPK.  
Taking a stand in front of the KPK office, joint NGO activists congregated for their 
social protest by bringing a huge banner (see figure 5.4) with the images of Yudhoyono 
and Aulia Pohan and the striking caption, “Parent-in-law is guilty, KPK is broken into 
parts; NKRI (Indonesia) without Corruption” which clearly reflected a deep public 
hatred and resentment towards those playing with political power. Public anger 
escalated and a wave of people’s opposition to the political plot of destabilizing the 
KPK grew swiftly. Eventually, the accusations of political conspiracy exploded into 
public view when a series of wire-tapped conversations between the police officers, the 
senior prosecutors of the AGO, and the cukong (Chinese businesspeople), which hinted 
at the framing of the two KPK officials, were listened to in a court session in the 
Constitutional Court.  
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The revelation of the wire-tapped talks shocked the public and made people so 
angry to discover that the political conspiracy was a fact. They realised that the worries 
among NGO activists about ‘corruptors fight back’ were evidently true. Expressing 
deep disappointment about such bad situations, Mulyawan Karim, a prominent figure of 
the Jakarta Legal Aid Agency shared his laments:   
In our everyday talk we often hear that law and justice can be bought by the haves. Even 
buying and selling court verdicts are popular; charges can be negotiated in the country’s 
legal systems. But I am deeply shocked by listening to the wire-tapped talks which show 
that those who are in charge of law enforcement have been rotten. These clearly reflect 
the decay of morality among officials; whereas they are supposed to impose the law and 
justice. Such bad situations are getting worse over time. Sadly, they are even worse than I 
thought. (Quoted from talk-show on Metrotv)  
 
Figure 5.5: The large crowds take part in a public rally in the capital—as part of the Cicak vs 
Buaya conflict—protesting against a political scheme to destabilize the KPK and criminalize 
its officials. 
 
 Social mobilization opposing such political plots reached its peak when 
thousands of people marshalled political rallies to support the KPK and challenge what 
is called kekuatan jahat (evil powers) and tangan kotor (dirty hands) and those who 
were disturbed by the existence of the KPK. Flocking to Bundaran Hotel Indonesia, the 
heart of the capital, the large crowds expressed public outrage at the evil powers and 
dirty hands operating within the state agencies. During the political rallies, people 
brought crocodile dolls representing the Police and burnt them; while others brought a 
poster of cukong—who in the recordings attempted to get the KPK to drop a bribery 
case—dressed in a police uniform, parodying the Commander-in-Chief of the Police 
(see figure 5.5).  
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The event indicated popular resistance representing the struggle over the power 
hegemony between the state and civil society with the use of agents for each; and 
“agents of each category,” Kurtz writes, “may be involved in political and cultural 
hegemonic practices. They may represent either an existing hegemonic structure or a 
counter-hegemonic structure. And they may be located in the institutions of the state … 
or civil society” (1996:109). Yet the idea of civil society is widely contested and it 
cannot be strictly separated from the state since the state exists within society, and the 
former cannot be assumed more dominant in terms of power possession than the latter, 
as Sharma & Gupta have illustrated: 
Once we see that the boundary between the state and civil society is itself an effect of 
power, then we can begin to conceptualize ‘the state’ within (and not automatically 
distinct from) other institutional forms through which social relations are lived … Such 
an analysis of state formation does not simply assume that the state stands at the apex of 
society and is the central locus of power. (Sharma & Gupta 2006:9)  
 
This notion seems to follow the Gramscian (1971) school of thought, asserting that state 
and society are mutually constitutive rather than separate entities; they are equally 
reinforcing elements of the socio-political structures. Here the state is conceived of as 
one aspect of civil society and at the same time civil society functions as part of the 
state; they are by no means in contradiction to each other and therefore cannot be seen 
as two distinct entities in opposition to each other. As Ernest Gellner put it: 
There is no talk of civil society as distinct from the state; there is only overlapping, 
identical political hierarchy and economic specialization, mutually reinforcing each 
other. Political rank and economic function are firmly welded, and one entails the 
other. (Gellner 1994:55) 
    
 Indeed, although the various elements of state and civil society appear 
independent, they are in fact interdependent, as Crehan points out: “The state and civil 
society do not represent two bounded universes, always and forever separate, but rather 
a knot of tangled power relations which can be disentangled into assemblages of 
threads” (2002:103). What is more, the apparent autonomy of civil society produces a 
sense of freedom and formal equality, but in reality it is endorsed by political forces 
associated with the state power. The concept of civil society is related to the creation of 
a so-called ‘level playing field’ where elements of both state and society are in contest; 
they then form an open arena or a public space in which hegemonic ideas concerning 
social and political life are contested (e.g. Kurtz 1996; Howell & Pearce 2001; Crehan 
2002). Within the kind of framework, social and political activism against corruption 
manifested in social movements organized by civil society groups represent a political 
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contestation to counterbalance the power hegemony of the state, or as Akhil Gupta has 
noted: “Any struggle against hegemonic configurations of power and domination 
involves a cultural struggle” through which “the state comes to be constructed” (2006 
[1995]:231). Here activists of civil society have created what is called a ‘constructing 
arena’ through a series of popular protests in support of a state agency, and the KPK and 
contestation of power hegemony reflect multiple understandings of what the relations 
between state and society ought to be, as Bebbington, Hickey & Mitlin explain: 
The resulting contestations and the hegemonies which emerge and the roles that [civil 
society] and NGOs play must in turn be understood in terms of the relationships and 
struggles for power among the constitutive actors of society. Importantly, this also means 
that agents from within the state may join forces with civil society actors in forging 
counter-hegemonic alternatives as well as dominant hegemonies. (Bebbington, Hickey & 
Mitlin 2008:7) 
 These arguments clearly show how power contestation involves multiple agents, 
as seen in the case of the Cicak-vs-Buaya conflict. In this fierce conflict, civil society 
activists strongly criticized the state and power establishment, while at the same time 
they also linked up with some state bodies, such as the KPK. Such political contestation 
illustrates how civic groups forge what Jenkins calls “creative alliances” with some state 
actors “to combat broader patterns of unaccountable governance in which corruption is 
a key component” (Jenkins 2007:65). Indeed the role of Indonesian civil society in 
support of anti-corruption movements has been made possible within a democracy 
system, as it provides the public with a good opportunity to watch out for corruption 
within state agencies and to encourage civil society groups to be involved in grassroots-
based anti-corruption initiatives. Since democracy guarantees civil rights and political 
liberties, thereby allowing citizens to play a part in the social and political processes, 
public attention to corruption has become much more intense; and with the help of the 
free press, corruption scandals among state officials are easy to disclose to the public. 
 Democracy is therefore the key to anti-corruption initiatives, as Anderson & 
Heywood have pointed out: “The increased attention paid to corruption is often seen as 
either a reflection of an increase in real levels of corruption or else an increase in the 
visibility of corruption—itself the result of a host of changes, including the rise of a new 
type of media, the spread of democracy, and the mobilization of civil society” 
(2009:34). This is particularly true in the case of Indonesia, as people have a very strong 
feeling that corruption becomes much more extensive and the perception of corruption 
have also increased. There is a widespread sense among Indonesians that the level of 
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corruption has grown as the media have regularly made abundant reports about it. With 
the help of the media, discourses around corruption have frequently appeared in social 
sphere taking its place alongside other ways of exercising and contesting power, 
especially in relation to the issues of patronage, clientism, and cronyism. Indeed, the 
increased perception of corruption is seen in the wide coverage by the media, showing 
that people are becoming aware of corruption. With the massive media coverage, 
corruption-talk as discourse has escalated and become more overt; and within 
democratic system, people enjoy political freedom to talk about corruption openly. In 
other words, public awareness of corruption has increased dramatically in parallel with 
the increased access to the right to information and the growing public participation in 
social and political processes.  
Nonetheless, Indonesian democracy also reveals ironic phenomena, as unintended 
consequences materialize along with democratic politics. Unlike the common belief that 
democracy will produce good governance, which means less corrupt government, 
Indonesian democracy is showing the contrary, since it is producing more corrupt 
politicians and state officials. Corruption seems to be the paradox of liberal democracy 
as it becomes much more pervasive within democratic systems. It is sad to witness how 
democracy in the country has become a breeding-ground for corruption, since the price 
of liberal democracy has been such a high one (e.g. Mietzner 2007; Aspinall & Mietzner 
2010). In spite of raising public enthusiasm in response to the new era of modern 
democracy, the current Indonesian democracy fits what Barbara Harriss-White & 
Gordon White have observed:  
Democratic systems also provide incentives and opportunities for corrupt behaviour, 
notably the enormous costs of mounting election campaigns, the capture of political 
parties by economic elites, the politicization of the state apparatus by elected officials 
and the desire of the latter to compensate for political uncertainty by building up a capital 
stake through corruption. (Harris-White & White 1996:3) 
 
 In this context, it can be argued that corruption seems to be a facade for 
‘patrimonial democracy’ (Webber 2005) in which political elites maintain popular 
support with the use of clientage relations by practising the so-called money politics, 
which is conceived as an object of corruption. In the world of politics, corruption has 
become a key channel for social mobility through the system of democracy, and corrupt 
politicians have a strong tendency to maximize their own benefit with the use of parties 
as vehicles for increasing their wealth, political influence, and social status within 
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society. In this respect, it seems relevant to quote Jonathan Parry who states that 
“[corruption] may be as much a product of a growing acceptance of universalistic 
bureaucratic norms as of its actual increase. Corruption has seemed to get worse and 
worse not (only) because it has, but also because it subverts a set of values to which 
people are increasingly committed” (2000:53).  
 Corruption thus represents social pathology since it is condemned by the public 
while at the same time it is part of daily practice within society. Not surprisingly, the 
people are deeply concerned with the issue of corruption because it is a serious threat to 
democracy. The fact that corruption is on the increase within democratic systems means 
it has become a major challenge for NGOs and civil society groups to maximize their 
efforts in combating it. They have been part of citizen participation and public 
monitoring to watch corruption and create a healthy democracy through the mechanism 
of checks and balances to halt the misuse of public power which results in corruption.  
However, the citizens alone will not be able to cope with corruption, if the state does 
not step in; instead, it will gnaw at the state body and then devastate the whole power 
structure, as Pardo has warned: “The experience of corruption may well be a corollary 
of the reach of the state. However, as it inevitably conflates the opposite of the rational 
legal authority and impersonal rules and of the realm of private interest, its corrosive 
power in the relationship between citizenship and the state may well become a key 
element in the demise of the state and its institutions” (2004:10). Yet with all due 
respect to the role of NGOs and civil society in exercising public control of the state 
government, further examination and deeper assessment are still needed regarding the 
efficacy of non-state actors in mobilizing grassroots initiatives of anti-corruption in the 
growing incidence of corruption in the era of liberal democracy. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
To conclude the discussion of this chapter, it can be argued that the power of NGOs and 
civil society institutions in propagating anti-corruption reforms is undoubtedly 
significant. They are widely recognized as representing civic participation in 
articulating public criticism against corruption. They have been relatively successful in 
becoming an effective watchdog for state bodies despite many political obstructions to 
carrying out their social activism. The relative success of social and political activism in 
mobilizing collective resistance to combat corruption can be seen in the fact that NGO 
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and civil society activists are always at the forefront of the disclosure of a number of 
huge corruption scandals within power structures. With the support of NGOs and civil 
society groups, the authorities feel that they are socially and politically encouraged by 
the public to take legal action against those committing corruption and to deal with any 
corruption incidents.  
Indeed NGOs and civil society agencies have become the major proponents of 
anti-corruption movements since they have been able to play a critical role as political 
safeguards in the battle against corruption. As the political significance of these non-
state actors is evident, the public acknowledge that the future of corruption eradication 
would be in great doubt without the participation of NGOs and civil society 
associations. With the spirit of volunteerism they work almost without any political 
interest in the sense that they are not seeking power. Instead, the main interest of these 
non-state actors is solely to promote accountable and transparent public governance and 
create clean government. As a result, the state government will operate merely for 
providing good services for the people, not for enriching those holding public power. 
This is actually the nature of social and political activism in campaigning for anti-
corruption reforms that affect the ideology of NGOs and civil society activists. More 
importantly, state actors—officials and politicians—are regarded as the central players 
who repeatedly commit corruption and thus become the main subjects of social 
watchdogs and public criticism. In this respect, the central argument as to why activists 
of NGO and civil society shape their own ideology rests largely on political idealism: 
overseeing and ensuring that those who occupy the state powers take full responsibility 
for achieving prosperity for the whole people by reducing corruption in public 
institutions.  
Although NGOs and civil society can sometimes go together and work hand in 
hand with state agencies (e.g. the collaboration between the KPK and NGOs and civil 
society during the Cicak-vs-Buaya conflict), they still keep some distance from the KPK 
and other state bodies and position themselves as the representatives of the general 
public. They appear to have become the key for public control and political force to 
criticize the misuse of the state powers. Moreover, NGOs and civil society agencies are 
also often critical of the KPK as this anti-graft body is conceived to have some sort of 
political barriers—they seem afraid of losing authority, of being the target of 
criminalization, of receiving various threats—when dealing with any illicit deals. Indeed 
the KPK frequently encounters serious political risks so that they seem very careful—if 
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not fearful—in investigating corruption scandals and in prosecuting state officials and 
politicians implicated in illegal practices. Activists of NGOs and civil society suspect 
that those who possess political powers commonly intervene in legal actions and 
undermine the authorities (e.g. the KPK), treating them as the subject of political co-
optation, when they prosecute those who are alleged of corruption. Such intervention 
often leads all parties involved to make compromises in the form of elite settlements for 
the sake of political stability, shielding the big boss, protection of the powerful, and the 
like. This kind of language is always used if huge corruption scandals with strong 
political dimensions end up without a clear solution, settled behind closed doors.    
It is acknowledged that what NGOs and civil society have done in terms of anti-
corruption activism is certainly far from perfect, but the public rely on them to carry on 
this task. Nonetheless, it should also be recognized that the relative success of NGOs 
and civil society agencies in the fight against corruption would not have been possible 
without the help of the media. In this regard, media people participate in bringing the 
idea of anti-corruption into wider audiences, raising collective consciousness among 
Indonesians. The next chapter discusses the role of the media in anti-corruption 
campaigns, along with other forms of public criticism against corruption pioneered by 
Indonesian artists. 
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Chapter 6 
 
THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC MEDIA AND POPULAR ART IN 
ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENTS 
 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to show that anti-corruption movements take the 
form of a collective effort involving a diversity of groups across Indonesian society. 
The central argument is that the media and popular art resonate considerably with the 
ideas and practices of anti-corruption. This chapter therefore explores the significance 
of the media and artists in support of public campaigns against corruption, using a 
variety of modes. It looks into public criticism of corruption expressed in ways such as 
TV programmes, songs, poetry, pantun (folk quatrains), cartoons, caricatures, and 
murals, regarding all of them as part of anti-corruption initiatives. The major theme 
discussed in this chapter is about how the media and artists use their collective efforts to 
echo the public voice and popular protest in combating corruption, thereby showing that 
they have become a critical factor in social movements that aim to eradicate illicit 
practices. The chapter will also demonstrate the efficacy of the media and artists in 
promoting public awareness of the problem of corruption. 
6.1 The Media: Public Criticism and the Culture of Resistance 
This section discusses the media used as a means of public criticism and of voicing 
people’s aspirations. But before going further, I should first clarify what I mean by ‘the 
public’. In the course of discussion in this and previous chapters, I apply the term ‘the 
public’ which refers to the general public—most of the Indonesian people—as their 
opinions and views often appear in both print and electronic media. However, for the 
sake of discursive analysis, I utilize the approach of representation through the educated 
groups and middle class elites, since they represent the so-called critical mass. With 
their intellectual capacity and critical thinking, they articulate people’s aspirations and 
voice opinions, thus becoming the focal point of public criticism against corruption. In 
the context of the print media, Indonesian newspapers and magazines are accessible to a 
limited audience, that is, the educated urban groups. However, in the context of the 
electronic media (TV), the media reach the much wider public of the lower classes and 
those who lack higher levels of education. They engage with these groups of people, 
and are indeed the indispensable means of dispersing the issue of corruption into a 
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wider audience so that it becomes the subject of public talks amongst Indonesian 
people, that is, the general public. In addition to this, here what is meant by the media 
refers to an instrument through which people express their opinions and views related to 
actual problems in daily life. In this respect, newspapers, magazines, and TV are 
classified as the media, through which people find a way of criticizing public policies 
and addressing social issues.  
It is acknowledged that democracy has brought Indonesian people to enjoy 
political liberty and civil rights so that they are now experiencing the exuberance of 
freedom in many aspects of public life. As the democratic system has become well 
established, there are no restrictions in politics, social life and cultural expression as was 
the case during Soeharto’s New Order (1966-1998). The new architecture of Indonesian 
politics under democracy allows people to articulate their aspirations freely, as 
repression from the state authorities has gone. Certainly political democracy was the 
paramount achievement of the 1998 reformasi movements, which made it possible for 
citizens to become involved in politics and guaranteed freedom of expression, of 
association, and of the press (e.g. Emmerson 1999; Budiman, Hatley & Kingsbury 
1999; O’Rourke 2002; Aspinall 2005).  
Generally speaking, the media appear to have become an influential factor in the 
dynamics of democratic politics, and media institutions are considered as one of the 
main pillars of democracy. Peter Gross (2002) applied the phrase ‘media-politics 
entanglement’ to illustrate how the media have played a vital role in promoting political 
democracy. In the context of Indonesian politics, Krishna Sen & David Hill, in their 
Politics and the Media in Twenty-First Indonesia (2011), have examined the role of the 
media in post-authoritarian Indonesia, explaining how  they have become very 
supportive of political transformation towards the establishment of democratic 
governance in the country. However, prior to the emergence of the reformasi era, the 
media experienced very strong restrictions under the New Order state as the authorities 
severely obstructed their capacity to operate freely; very often the media faced threats of 
being banned and of their printing permits being withdrawn by the regime. As appeared 
in a number of scholarly works (e.g. Dhakidae 1991; Romano 2003; Hill 2007 [1994]; 
Sen & Hill 2007 [2000]), the New Order government always dictated to the media that 
they should follow the principle of the so-called “free and responsible press” in the 
sense that they should be in line with state policy, thus forcing them to produce news 
and reports which were safe for the regime and which would maintain national stability. 
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Indeed, the New Order regime employed very tight control of the press through 
censorship and bans on its publications in the name of national security and political 
stability. The New Order state always used the language of social security and public 
order to limit the freedom of the press, since it did not want to place security and 
stability at risk or put the power establishment in jeopardy because of public criticism 
voiced by the media.  
During the period of the New Order regime, there were a series of press bans 
and withdrawals of publication permits mainly for political reasons; and the banning 
itself clearly indicated that “the press was becoming a significant site of political 
struggle” (Sen & Hill 2007 [2000]:52). Moreover, such bans reflected how the culture 
of resistance against the state power had been originated by the media even in the era of 
the authoritarian government. Although the press was tightly restricted by the autocratic 
power of the New Order, media people relentlessly struggled for their freedom to voice 
public criticism and express the aspirations of the people. To do this, they took all the 
risks including the withdrawal of publication permits if the regime felt infuriated by 
their reports.  What follow are some critical cases of the press being banned.  
Kompas and six other newspapers were banned by the state authority on 21 
January 1978 as they produced a series of reports on mass demonstrations to challenge 
the nomination of President Soeharto for the third tenure and on social protest against 
widespread corruption in the state agencies. The regime became angry as the power 
establishment was challenged by its political opponents, and the media made it possible 
through their publications. Meanwhile, in the 1980s, two dailies, Sinar Harapan and 
Prioritas, were banned on 9 October 1986 and 29 June 1987 respectively, over their 
severe criticism of the government’s economic policies. Furthermore, the most 
controversial suppression of the press was the bans of three major weekly publications 
on 21 June 1994: (1) the oldest and most prestigious Tempo magazine; (2) the most 
critical political tabloid DeTIK; and (3) the weekly Editor—all for different contents in 
their reports but for the same reason, that is, they threatened the regime's existence. 
Tempo vividly described a bitter conflict between two of Soeharto’s ministers—Finance 
Minister Mar’ie Muhammad and Minister for Science and Technology B.J. Habibie—
over the purchase and refurbishment of thirty nine ships from the German navy. DeTIK 
criticized the military, which dominated key civilian posts in the government offices, 
and opened political speculation about who would be the successor of President 
Soeharto. These were indeed the most sensitive issues that should not be questioned let 
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alone be criticized, since it was forbidden to debate them in the public sphere. The 
Editor announced in its headline that the President’s son, Tommy Soeharto, should be 
grilled on suspicion of being responsible for the collapse of the government bank, 
Bapindo. Those bans on the press clearly illustrate how media agencies experienced the 
fight against the very strict control by the state. In this respect, people now utilize the 
media as a way in which they can challenge the misuse of public power by state 
authorities or criticize government policies that do not meet public aspirations. With the 
emergence of democracy, the media have become much more important in terms of 
providing the public with a channel to express their criticism (e.g. Dhakidae 1991; Sen 
& Hill 2007 [2000]). The press is so vital for public control because it “not only serves 
as a watchdog, warning of faults and problems in the [state] system, but also acts as a 
channel for public opinion, providing communities with a voice in public affairs” 
(Romano 2003:43). Meanwhile, gaining wide access to the media has become a major 
demand of the middle class groups being part of common concerns of the public, as 
David Hill has mentioned: “As [an] ally of the open press, the emerging middle class 
demands access to information and knowledge from [the] mass media, both print and 
electronic, that is free to provide comprehensive coverage of a matter of public interest” 
(Hill 2007 [1994]:12-13). The educated groups and middle class elites are in need of 
access to the media as a mode of public transparency.  
Given the fact that the media have played a central function in public life, it is 
important to take into account how they are used as an effective tool to support public 
campaigns against corruption. It is almost impossible to get an appropriate view and 
understanding of the issue of corruption without connecting it with the media; 
corruption cannot be detached from the media since it is about popular narratives 
presented by the media to the public. Indeed, corruption practices per se obviously take 
place in clandestine locations beyond the direct observation of anyone, but the media 
then bring the cases to light for public discussion, involving and attracting a wide range 
of audiences, as Haller & Shore have rightly written: “the media discourse of 
newspapers [magazines and TV programmes] create ‘the public’ with rights and ‘the 
politicians’ [and state officials] with responsibilities” and they assert that “corruption 
narratives are of course mediated through media” (2005:15, 18).   
The major argument is grounded on the fact that the media provide people with 
an adequate space to invigorate critical discourse on corruption which spreads outward 
to the public. It is argued in this chapter that the media are the foremost agents of 
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dispersing ideas of social and political resistance against corruption and of increasing 
popular support for public criticism of corruption. The resonance of public campaigns 
against corruption has become very effective with the help of the media, and it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that the media have inspired the public to become much 
more aware of the perils of corruption in relation to the state government and citizens. 
Through the media, ideas of freeing the state agencies from corruption can easily thrive 
in society and are widely distributed therein. Likewise, through the work of journalists, 
anti-corruption initiatives can flourish unhindered among social and political activists 
and even reach out to much wider audiences across the country. As a result, the public 
have become much more attentive to the serious dangers of corruption which can 
threaten social life and put the fate of Indonesian people in jeopardy. Thus they respond 
to the critical issue of corruption by giving popular support to anti-corruption 
movements pioneered by social and political activists, as well as by media people and 
artists, as I will be presenting the roles of these last two respectively. 
6.2 Images of Corruption in the Indonesian Media  
This part discusses the issue of corruption as materialized in the media and how they are 
involved in circulating corruption narratives within society. It is very common for the 
magnitude of corruption to be due to its connection with politics, and this is why the 
issue of corruption receives huge public attention and wide coverage by the press. In 
this respect, media people feel that they should take part in publicising the hazard of 
corruption as one which must be taken very seriously. With this concern, I approached a 
senior journalist, Suleiman of TV-One, to talk about media and corruption, as he focused 
on fighting corruption through the public media. Suleiman graduated from the School of 
Government at Padjadjaran University, Bandung, West Java. Before entering the world 
of the media industry, he used to be an ardent social activist who had a strong idealism 
of dedicating himself to social and political advocacy for Indonesian society. Before 
joining TV-One, he had worked for several years first with a weekly magazine, Warta 
Ekonomi, and then with electronic media, SCTV (Surya Citra Televisi).  
When I met him at his office, Suleiman shared his thoughts about the vital role 
of the public media in empowering society and acting as a channel for the public voice. 
When he entered a professional career as a journalist, he still maintained his 
commitment to supporting public advocacy; and the media of course are a strategic 
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instrument to be used as a way of delivering what he called ‘a prophetic mission’; 
becoming a social control for both government and society. As a professional journalist, 
Suleiman had been frequently involved in investigative journalism, in which he 
investigated many cases including corruption and other political scandals in the state 
agencies. Concerned with media and corruption, he explained:  
As corruption has been far-reaching, it must be taken seriously and the media must take 
the lead to promote public campaigns to eliminate this ‘social virus’. The media can be a 
representative of the public voice and reflect the heart of the people concerning the 
problem of corruption, so they should take responsibility for fighting it by working 
together with other elements of civil society. Here the media are considered as the best 
way to narrate the dangers of corruption to the public and convey to people its negative 
impacts on society. (Quoted from interview, 2 November 2008) 
 
 Thinking of the negative effects of corruption on public life, Suleiman along 
with his TV crews then created a special news programme focusing on the issue of 
corruption, and called Kerah Putih: Liputan Mendalam Korupsi—White-Collar Crime: 
Deep Reports on Corruption, which was screened weekly on TV-One. The main 
purpose of broadcasting the Kerah Putih was to raise public awareness that corruption 
has become a very serious problem which greatly affects many aspects of social life 
within society. He wanted to show the public that corruption has put people at risk and 
jeopardized the country as a whole, since it weakens the structures of the government. 
As a journalist, Suleiman has been able to capture the voice of the people, and 
comments that they often grumble that corruption causes social grievances and 
injustice, because public funds that are intended for basic services such as education, 
health care and other social benefits are embezzled by corrupt officials. Suleiman 
explained that the media are believed to be an effective means to transform public 
consciousness of the dangers of corruption into collective actions for combating it and 
to transmute public criticism to all groups of society. Thus, it is hoped that news 
programmes on corruption, screened on television, would be able to curtail the intention 
of state officials to become implicated in it and would help the public watch out for the 
potential for corruption in those who hold public power. 
One of the much-watched editions of the Kerah Putih was an investigative 
report on a corruption scandal involving officials of Bank Indonesia—the Governor, 
along with four Deputy Governors and two managers—and fifty four legislators linked 
to both Islamic and secular-nationalist political parties, which shared a number of seats 
in the legislative body including the United Development Party, the Indonesian 
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Democratic Party of Struggle, and the Golkar Party. According to Suleiman, the 
broadcasting of the Kerah Putih attracted a large number of viewers because of the 
magnitude of the corruption scandal, as it amounted to Rp31.5 billion (US$3 million) 
and those implicated in it were high profile politicians. One of them was Paskah Suzetta 
of the Golkar Party who was appointed as a minister in Yudhoyono’s first cabinet. On 
the screen, narratives of the corruption scandal were presented in detail for viewers, 
along with some lively images of those who were accused of it. The scandal initially 
begun with the Bank Indonesia’s proposal of amendment of Law No. 23 of 1999 on 
Bank Indonesia, and the Constitution says that any amendment to a Law must be made 
with the approval of the Parliament. Disappointingly, some MPs who were responsible 
for this asked officials of Bank Indonesia for some ‘refreshments’ in return for the 
approval of the amendment of that Law. With the broadcasting of the Bank Indonesia—
MPs scandal on TV-One, the public then became convinced that corruption was indeed 
so complicated since it involved such important officials who occupied very senior  
positions. Given the fact that corruption has become deeply entrenched in public office, 
efforts to combat it need to be organized effectively by synergizing all elements of the 
nation. Obviously the media have become a crucial factor in the fight against 
corruption. Suleiman points out: 
The role of mass media in alleviating corruption is unequivocally important. Any social 
and political activism against corruption would be less echoed to the public without the 
help of the press. Likewise, public criticism of corruption would have no impact socially 
and politically unless the media kindly transformed it into the wider audience in order to 
become public discourse. This is the primary social responsibility of the mass media that 
must be carried out; and this is basically the main intent of broadcasting the Kerah Putih 
programme on TV-One. (Quoted from interview, 2 November 2008)        
 
 These views actually correspond to what scholars call ‘the power of the media 
institutions’ (e.g. Couldry 2000; Curran 2002; Gurevitch et al. 2005 [1982]). With 
reference to this notion, I argue that electronic media are among the major sources of 
corruption narratives which impact a great deal on how the public perceive this critical 
issue and how the state should deal with corruption and respond to public criticism of it. 
What the electronic media people did, as in the case of the TV-One’s Kerah Putih 
programme, was essentially to capture what the public are concerned about, that is, the 
issue of corruption, so they share in common the actual problems in everyday life. Here, 
the electronic media are able to reproduce social issues and broadcasts then bring them 
to the audiences, as Couldry has illustrated: “Through a long and uneven process 
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affecting programming, modes of presentation, speech styles of broadcasters, and so on, 
the audience … came to feel that the ‘world’ of broadcasting was in some sense their 
own world” (2000:11). In essence, the electronic media try to bring daily routines of 
events and social life within society for the public through live broadcasting by 
“[escaping] from the shadow of the state powers to become independent [institutions]” 
(Curran 2002:5). Crucial to these processes is the existence of what Habermas (2010 
[1989]) has described as ‘the public sphere’ through which the media are able to 
function as a public control by vocalizing public opinion, since this social function 
reflects democratic values. Meanwhile, the public sphere itself must be seen as a way of 
mediating the interests of both sides: the state and society. Here Habermas explains:       
The public sphere is one which mediates between society and the state, in which the 
public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion, in accordance with the principle of 
the public sphere—that principle of public information which once had to be fought for 
against the arcane policies of monarchies and which since that time has made possible 
the democratic control of state activities. (Habermas 2010 [1989]:73-74) 
 
 In addition to the images of corruption screened on television, print media also 
bring the corruption incidence to their readers by illustrating how it operates in public 
office, which involves state officials and politicians. In line with the electronic media, a 
weekly magazine called Tempo
20
 has frequently brought corruption scandals to 
audiences for public control and debate. On the edition of 7 July 2008, Tempo presented 
investigative reports on the same corruption scandal as TV-One did through the Kerah 
Putih programme. Tempo depicts on its front cover the official of Bank Indonesia who 
carries a bag full of money in his left hand and hugs shoulders with a politician while 
                                                 
20
 Tempo was established in April 1971 by a group of journalists and artists with the spirit of promoting 
investigative journalism. Among the founders of Tempo are Goenawan Mohamad, who was then 
appointed to become the first editor-in-chief, Jusril Djalinus, Bur Rasuanto, Fikri Jufri, Syu’bah Asa, 
Isma Sawitri, Putu Wijaya, and some more. Inspired by America’s Time, Tempo (meaning time) appears 
to be the first magazine in the absence of weekly media. The publication of Tempo was intended to be an 
alternative reading source for middle class groups working as professionals at both private institutions 
and public agencies. With the very popular tag line, Enak Dibaca dan Perlu (nice to read and needed), 
Tempo is widely acknowledged to be the most influential magazine as indicated by its weekly sales 
reaching about 120,000 copies with 535,000 readers distributed into big cities in Java and outside Java. 
Yet the vast majority of Tempo’s readers are concentrated in Jakarta (44.5%) and the surrounding areas of 
Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi (27.3%), while the rest of them are scattered across the country in other cities. 
With the feature of distribution, readership, and sales, Tempo is considered the leading magazine which 
greatly affects the building of public opinions and criticism. Tempo also claims to be an independent 
media agency which has no affiliation with any political party or individual so it enjoys freedom in 
expressing its views and assessments in relation to all contemporary issues in the nation. Regarding the 
success of the publication, Tempo has also appeared in an English edition since 2000, of which about 
24,000 copies are printed, with around 54,000 readers, indicating that it reaches English-speaking 
audiences both in Indonesia and beyond. (Most of data are taken from Pusat Data dan Informasi Tempo 
[PDIT, Center for Data and Information of Tempo]) 
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his right hand puts an envelope full of bribes into the pocket of the politician’s trousers. 
And the headline boldly reads Main Belakang BI-DPR—Illicit deals behind closed 
doors between Bank Indonesia and the House of Representatives.  Meanwhile, in the 
editorial the Tempo’s journalist wrote: 
It is indeed pathetic to see the Bank Indonesia’s scandal of briberies implicating MPs. In 
this country, corruption can be done in various ways; it can be covered by polite 
language with a cheerful joke, or can even be concealed in an official meeting with a 
keen sense of humour. If in fact corruption is perceived to be as evil as a murder, what 
has been done by corruptors is similar to films about the mafia, portraying a mafia figure 
who kills his enemies while feeding dogs; or a mafia boss who is praying in a holy place 
while giving an order to slaughter his opponents. (Tempo’s Editorial, 7 July 2008) 
 
The corruption narratives by Tempo seem very suggestive as the editor employed 
metaphorical descriptions to illustrate the degree of the dangers of corruption so that 
such narratives would sensitively affect public perception. As corruption is a secret 
activity, those committing it often make use of various ways to conceal such desire. 
Again, the Tempo’s editor illustrated the kind of camouflage as below:  
Corruption can be done with the use of symbolic language that seems graceful, polite and 
funny although it is actually loathsome. A small team formed by Bank Indonesia to deal 
with MPs on illicit transactions gave itself a very nice name: the Committee of Societal 
Development—just to cover up the transfer of money to legislators. A former official of 
Bank Indonesia once said that he very often received requests by MPs about uang pelicin 
(‘refreshment’ or pay-off) in a joke with various forms of allegories, such as ‘We [MPs] 
don’t have any budget’, or ‘There is a price that must be paid for this project’, or ‘We 
need zamzam
21
 water’. (Tempo’s Editorial, 7 July 2008) 
                                                 
21
 Zamzam is mineral water from Mecca, Saudi Arabia, as those who perform hajj (pilgrimage) always 
bring it home as a gift for their families and friends. 
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By presenting the actual cases of the corruption scandal, Tempo, like TV-One, tried to 
represent a ‘reality’. Here, representation refers to the construction of aspects of this 
reality such as people, political figures, religious sects, objects, cultural identities, etc. 
with the use of the media. Such representations can be through speeches, writings, live 
pictures, or visual objects as displayed on a TV screen or magazine cover. Yet 
representations are a sort of interpretation which may enforce particular ideologies to 
which one is orientated, as Kellner & Durham have illustrated: “Representations in turn 
were interpreted not just as replications of the real, reproductions of natural objects, but 
as constructions of complex technical, narrative, and ideological apparatuses” (2010 
[2001]:xxxiii). 
As a part of the cultural system and social practice, the media greatly influence 
almost all aspects of social life of human societies. Here, the media are “embedded in 
people’s quotidian lives,” while the public are “imbricated in discursive universes, 
political situations, economic circumstances, national settings, [and] historical 
moments” (Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod & Larkin 2002:2). Given the fact that the media 
have social significance in public life by playing an important part in shaping public 
opinion, one needs to take into consideration the vital role of the media in support of 
anti-corruption reform, since they have become “the most important mechanism in 
public culture for the circulation of discourses on corruption” (Gupta 2006 [1995]:222). 
The centrality of the media in proliferating public narratives of (anti)-corruption is 
unquestionable as conceived by Linda Wardoyo, a committee member of the Bung 
Hatta Anti-Corruption Award (BHACA).
22
 She expressed her views as follows: 
We give our thanks to the media as they have shown the public their crucial role in 
promoting the ideas of anti-corruption. In many cases, media people maintain great 
courage by disclosing a number of corruption scandals involved those holding political 
powers, even at the risk of losing their jobs. The media are able to disperse information 
within society, to mobilize social solidarity among citizens in the fight against 
corruption, and even to take the lead in revealing illegal practices within the state 
agencies. (Quoted from interview, 12 January 2009) 
         
                                                                                                                                               
    
22
 In honor of the former Vice President Mohammad Hatta, the Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption Award 
(BHACA) was established in 2003 by a collaboration of scholars, intellectuals, researchers, journalists, 
activists and businesspeople who are concerned about the prevalence of corruption in the country. The 
BHACA regularly grants an award to individuals from both the public and private sector—among them 
are officials, activists and scholars, as well as local leaders and regional administrators—who show strong 
leadership and a commitment to fighting against corruption. 
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 These views seem to represent the wider opinion, acknowledging that the media 
have played a critical part in developing a public discourse of (anti)-corruption. In this 
respect, the Indonesian media seem to have the responsibility to support public 
campaigns against corruption through the media industry. The power of the media is 
unquestionably indispensable since they are the most strategic medium for 
disseminating the ideas and practices of anti-corruption into society. They are also 
capable of mobilizing public opinion with regard to anti-corruption campaigns. 
   
6.3 The Poetics of (Anti)-Corruption: Popular Songs, Poems and Pantuns 
 
It is interesting to note that it is not only the media but also popular art forms that have 
played a critical role in public criticism against corruption. This section looks at art 
narratives of (anti)-corruption that take the form of popular songs, poetry and pantuns 
(folk quatrains). I would call them the poetics of (anti)-corruption, as people make use 
of these cultural media to articulate their criticism of corruption. There are many ways 
of narrating corruption, as have appeared in daily public talk; and among the interesting 
modes of conversing about it are popular songs, poems, and pantuns, as their lyrics are 
replete with critiques.  
I bring up here a group of musicians known as Slank, who are very active in 
support of anti-corruption movements. They have frequently participated in public 
campaigns against corruption through a series of music performances on many 
occasions such as social protests, public rallies, the commemoration of Anti-corruption 
Day, and others.  Just to take one event: on 9 December 2008, Slank, along with other 
groups of musicians, joined a cultural performance organized by the KPK to propagate 
anti-corruption programmes. On that day, amid the hectic morning hours in the capital, 
large crowds flooded the parking areas of the KPK office to attend the performance, 
dubbed a music concert for fighting corruption; and its slogan, shown on a black-and-
red banner (see figure 6.1), stirringly reads Satukan Tekad: Lawan! Lawan Korupsi 
Sekarang! (Let the spirit unite: fight! Let us fight corruption right away!).  The crowds 
stridently screamed and waved their hands as five musicians of the Slank came up on 
the stage; one of them, in a very loud voice, shouted to the crowds: “Corruption must be 
thoroughly eliminated! … Corruptors deserve to be condemned! … We shouldn’t let 
them damage the nation with their evil conduct!” From the ground, the crowds 
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deafeningly replied: Basmi koruptor! … Hancurkan koruptor! (Obliterate corruptors! 
Crush corruptors!). 
 
Figure 6.1: A group of musicians perform a music concert during the commemoration of Anti-
Corruption Day on 9 December 2008 in Jakarta  
 
A few moments later, they started singing several songs, and one of the hits they sang 
was Gosip Jalanan (Street Gossip)—the favourite one for Slank’s followers and a 
much-awaited one—which expresses the bad behaviour of officials and politicians who 
are often implicated in corruption, as these excerpts from the lyrics show: 
Street Gossip
iv
 
By Slank 
 
Have you ever heard about the mafia for gambling? 
One said that there are abundant bribes for the Police 
Officer whose job is to be a private guard for businesspeople 
Do you know about the mafia for the court? 
On the right hand is the code of law, on the left is crime 
Give them bribes and everything will be over 
Do you know that there is a mafia for the general election? 
Whether because of technology illiteracy or trying to rig votes 
In the end money can buy popular votes 
Do you know about the mafia for the Parliament? 
Those who draft laws and make regulations 
Drawing up acts with money as inducement 
 
 It is widely understood that music is an art of audition, and an artistic form of 
expressing personal feelings and human imagination as it is the universal language—the 
language of the emotions (e.g. Bowman 1998; Sharpe 2000; Ridley 2004). However, 
music and song alike have a social context in the sense that musician often makes a 
song with reference to social problems found in real life. Therefore, for Slank, music 
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can be utilized as a proper medium of public criticism with regard to social problems in 
everyday society. In this respect, Slank took the problem of corruption to be an object of 
criticism, thereby showing that they shared a common interest with the public about this 
grave problem, as Ahmad Budiman, manager of Slank, expounded: 
Corruption obviously hurts people and corruptors seem to have lost their moral standards as 
they don’t care that such evil conduct results in people’s anguish. How could they embezzle 
public funds while a lot of children suffer from malnutrition? How could they take the state’s 
money illegally while the poor lack food and the needy can't find healthcare? Slank have 
some degree of sensitivity about such bitter problems as corruption since this has clearly 
damaged the public interest and caused serious difficulties for people. This is why many of 
Slank’s songs contain criticisms expressing the group's very deep concerns about social 
problems in real life. (Quoted from interview, 12 February 2009)  
  
 In addition to Slank, other Indonesian artists have also creatively written songs 
for social criticism. Franky Sahilatua, for example, is a leading musician who is prolific 
in creating songs which specifically address social problems within society. The major 
themes of his songs touch the issues of—mentioning just a few—poverty, corruption, 
economic gap, social injustice, and unjust rulers, all of which certainly seize people’s 
interest. What makes Franky interested in bringing these actual issues into his music is 
because he is also a passionate social activist. The world of activism seems very 
influential on how he feels, reflects, and thinks of the real problems faced by people in 
everyday life, and he then transmutes them into the lyrics of a song. An example is a 
song that Franky wrote which addresses everyday problems, as expressed in the lyrics 
below: 
          You are … We are …v 
           By Franky Sahilatua 
 
Oil is expensive … the nation pays foreign debt 
Electricity is expensive … the nation pays foreign debt  
Education is expensive … the nation pays foreign debt 
Medicine and health services are expensive … the nation pays foreign debt 
The nation gets a loan … corruptors ‘eat’ the money 
But the people are to be the bearers of foreign debt 
         Poverty is full of tears 
         Malnourishment is endemic … the nation pays foreign debt 
         High unemployment is widespread … the nation pays foreign debt  
The poor become poorer … we are … we are … 
The rich become richer … you are … you are … 
 
 
All these songs apply language that is full of emotions, that represents reality and 
verbalizes resistance to the practice of corruption. In this respect, Lutz & Abu-Lughod’s 
Emotion and the Politics of Language (1990) helps one understand that emotions are 
not merely psychological phenomena but also socio-cultural facts that are tied to the 
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politics of everyday interaction which incites a so-called ‘emotion discourse.’ The 
phrase ‘emotion discourse’ refers to how emotion is construed in the context not only of 
psychological processes but also of social life in which one’s personal feelings are 
socially expressed in situated speech practices that become the subject of sociocultural 
analysis. Here, Lutz & Abu-Lughod point out in detail:  
The study of emotion as discourse allows us to explore how speech provides the means 
by which local views of emotion have their effects and take their significance. […] 
Rather than seeing them as expressive vehicles, we must understand emotional 
discourses as pragmatic acts and communicative performances. (Lutz & Abu-Lughod 
1990:11) 
  
As observed, these two songs reflect the actual problems within society, and musicians 
transform them into the lyrics of a song which emotionally touches people’s hearts. The 
language used in these songs represents the social problem of corruption, and in order to 
invigorate public awareness they “approach emotion through language and understand 
language as inescapably and fundamentally social” (Lutz & Abu-Lughod 1990:10). The 
two songs are obviously protest songs which are associated with social movements of 
anti-corruption and initiated by Indonesian musicians. Their lyrics contain messages of 
a very strong social protest against injustice resulting from corruption. The tone of these 
protest songs is similar, questioning the absence of justice and equality in public life, 
while depicting those who are in power as betraying the citizens by abusing their power 
and committing wrongdoing in public office. In the first song, Slank bitterly expressed 
his satirical criticism, as bribe-taking is widespread among those possessing power in 
every single line of the state apparatuses. In the second song, Franky cynically 
articulated how corruptors immorally ‘eat’ funds gained from foreign loans at the 
expense of the people, who will later have to pay it back; and unfortunately, at the same 
time the latter endure a long plight because all goods and social services are expensive 
so they could not afford them. These are actually the essential characters of the protest 
songs, as Deena Weinstein has pointed out: “... the protest in protest songs means an 
opposition to a policy, an action against the people in power that is grounded in a sense 
of injustice … [while] the preponderance of [popular] protest songs focus on what those 
songs identify as improper use of force” (2006:3).  Certainly, among Indonesian 
audiences who love popular songs, Slank and Franky are regarded as the makers of the 
protest songs canon, as they are the prominent musicians in this kind of music genre. An 
activist of ICW, Dini Ratnasari, expressed her feelings about the lyrics of the songs: 
192 
 
Such great musicians as Franky Sahilatua and Slank are not only artists, but also public 
figures who play a prophetic role as penyuluh rakyat (literally, the torch of the people). 
They have the ability to portray reality and to voice social criticism of the real problems 
in people's everyday lives through popular songs. The lyrics of their songs certainly 
reflect real life experience. They are truthful in articulating social protest without having 
a vested interest, in the sense that they are not part of or involved in political games in 
order to reach power. The people feel that the protest songs represent their aspirations. 
(Quoted from interview, 18 February 2009) 
       
To put this in a wider discursive context, some scholars (e.g. Eyerman & Jamison 1998; 
Clayton, Herbert & Middleton 2003) have asserted that music and song are central to 
the growth of modern critical culture, ranging from social movement to cultural change 
in a society. In The Resisting Muse: Popular Music and Social Protest, edited by Ian 
Peddie (2006), scholars have demonstrated that popular music has traditionally served 
as a rallying point for voices of opposition and it is commonly used as the notions of 
resistance and being anti-establishment. Here too, the use of popular songs for 
supporting social protest must be seen as a way in which people try to challenge the 
power establishment, as these approaches are commonplace in social movements and 
political activism everywhere (e.g. Eyerman & Jamison 1998; Bennett et al. 2005; 
Peddie 2006). It seems that popular songs employed in support of social protest are a 
very effective means for expressing civic disagreement with the ways in which those 
holding public office exercise their powers. Instead of using their powers for fulfilling 
the public interest, realizing justice and delivering social services for people, they 
misuse public powers for their own benefit. Borrowing the phrase of Bennett et al. 
(2005), the popular protest song is part of “the cultural politics of music” as it contains a 
strong social character which reflects resistance and empowerment. With sensitivity, 
that type of song inspires people to be able to “appeal to higher human sensibilities in a 
manner independent of the contradictions and paradoxes of everyday life” (Bennett et 
al. 2005:1). As seen in the texts, protest popular songs absorb actual problems within 
societal lives into lyrics in order to invigorate the moral audacity of the public in 
support of social and political movements to change the power establishment. As music 
is the universal language of the emotions resting in human experience (e.g. Finnegan 
2003), I argue that popular songs created by Indonesian musicians can be utilized as an 
effective mode of preserving public emotions in the fight against social injustice and 
unjust rulers, of maintaining the spirit of resistance against corruption, and of 
strengthening civil society groups in energizing and encouraging anti-corruption 
movements.  
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As popular songs are the effective ways through which Indonesian artists 
denounce corruption, so are poems and pantuns in which poets articulate their criticism 
on corruption with the uses of beautiful words. For this, one day in May 2009, the 
Ministry of National Education held an annual celebration of National Education Day 
by carrying out a series of cultural activities including a photos and paintings exhibition, 
poetry reading, a campaign of anti-corruption education among schoolchildren, and 
some others. One of the most well-known Indonesian poets, Taufiq Ismail, was invited 
to partake in that event to read his famous poem which addresses the issue of 
corruption, and the lyrics are as follows: 
  
I wonder if I’m also a Thiefvi 
              By Taufiq Ismail 
  
  Have a look at thieves who steal in groups, line by line 
  They form the lines very tightly, in an orderly way with strong discipline, silently 
  As they stand up very strongly, it is hard for you to reach them 
  As they do so in systematic procedure, it is impossible for you to sabotage 
  Since they are so silent, you would think that they were praying 
  Then we ask: is there anyone who persists in being a thief?  
Look at their numbers, tens of years long, widening from the front to the back  
Overwhelming from the top level to the ground one  
The groups are growing much bigger, the lines are becoming much longer 
  These groups are formed beyond borders: religion, ethnicity, and gender 
  How do you fight against thieves who rob in groups? 
  How do you arrest thieves who are protected by officials in hierarchies? 
  And, ones who protect them are those who have guns and rule the state government 
  How come? 
   
 Taufiq’s poem illustrates a great number of bad situations and bitter social life, 
as corruption has become pervasive, which leads him to question himself whether he 
might be as corrupt as others because people very easily find corruptors in every single 
line of state institutions. Through his poem, Taufiq expounds that corruption has taken a 
typical form in which it is done in a collective way, so it is called korupsi berjamaah 
(corruption in groups), as indicated by the verses of the poetry. Worse, corruption has 
become institutionalized as state officials within all hierarchies of the power 
structures—from the lowest to the top—are involved in it. As officials commit 
corruption for years, they even have followers and develop networks encompassing all 
groups of people regardless of their social-cultural backgrounds, which result in 
intricate relations in support of illicit deals. Within relationships of this kind, they then 
create the so-called partners in crime. That is why corruptors are very difficult to 
prosecute since the powerful person with weapons in his hands protects them in 
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exchange for the share of money embezzled from public office. This poetry indicates 
that Taufiq—and maybe also the vast majority of Indonesians with him—is in a great 
deal of desperation as corruption is becoming worse over time. Taufiq implies that 
fighting corruption is extremely difficult—if not impossible. 
Another famous poet, W.S. Rendra, participated in a poetry reading festival on the 
occasion of a cultural performance held in Taman Ismail Marzuki, Jakarta. Popularly 
dubbed Penyair Burung Merak (A Poet of Peacock), Rendra read the funniest pantun he 
had ever written, entitled Pantun Koruptor, which criticized corruption practice in state 
government and political institutions. The lyrics are as follows: 
Pantun Koruptor
23
 
    By W.S. Rendra 
 
Kalau ada sumur di ladang——If there is a well in the field 
Jangan diintip gadis yang mandi——It’s forbidden to peep at a girl who is taking a shower 
Koruptor akalnya panjang——Corruptors are very rich with deceitful ideas (or cheating tactics)  
Jaksa dan hakim diajak kompromi——Prosecutors and judges are offered bribes for a compromise 
Kura kura dalam perahu——A turtle is in a boat  
Buaya darat di dalam sedan——A playboy is riding a sedan  
Wakil rakyat jangan ditiru——One shouldn’t imitate legislators 
Korupsinya edan edanan——They commit corruption with huge amounts of money 
Berakit rakit ke hulu——To reach upstream one may take a boat 
Berenangnya kapan kapan——Others may go in swimming at any time 
Maling kecil sakit melulu——Little thieves very often get beaten, unfortunately 
Maling besar dimuliakan——Big thieves [corruptors] are always respected, fortunately 
 To understand what pantun is, I need to explain it briefly. Originally pantun is a 
traditional oral form of expression among the Nusantara people. It is a typical 
Indonesian poetic sentence, which, in its basic form, is comprised of a quatrain with the 
use of steady rhyme patterns. A pantun is traditionally recited according to a fixed 
rhythm; and in order to avoid diverging from the rhythm, every line of its verse should 
contain several syllables expressed in parallel contexts. Here Katharine Sim vividly 
writes: 
The pantun is a four-lined verse consisting of alternating, roughly rhyming lines. The 
first and second lines sometimes appear completely disconnected in meaning from the 
third and fourth, but there is almost invariably a link of some sort. Whether it be a mere 
association of ideas, or of feeling, expressed through assonance or through the faintest 
nuance of a thought, it is nearly always traceable. (Sim 1987:12) 
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 To give some idea of the meaning, I have given the original version of the pantuns in Indonesian, 
directly followed by the English translation. Indeed pantun is highly allusive and in order to understand it, 
readers generally need to know the traditional meaning of the symbolic verses and allegorical terms 
applied in it.      
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Rendra’s pantun actually depicts similar situations in far-reaching corruption and how 
corrupt state bureaucracies are. This pantun describes how corruption appears to have 
become a way of life among state officials—bureaucrats, police officers, judges, 
prosecutors and legislators—and they often abuse public powers for their own benefits. 
They exercise state powers not in the interests of the people but rather for the sake of 
the officials themselves; the misuse of public office has become very commonplace in 
everyday public life. The verses of the pantun clearly illustrate that being corrupt seems 
to be the main characteristic and common manner of those who occupy public positions 
as state officials, and politicians shamelessly put their positions on sale by taking bribes, 
payoffs, and the like. Through his pantun Rendra wittily tells about the misbehaviour of 
public officials and lawmakers who are very often implicated in bribe-giving and bribe-
taking, on one side; and how the state authorities treat unequally those who commit 
petty corruption and grand corruption, on the other side. Yet all these things of course 
break the principles of public morality and hurt the sense of justice for the people. 
Indeed Rendra’s pantun clearly describes that the culture of corruption has become 
deeply rooted in the power structures and part of social life within Indonesian society. 
As poetry and pantun are frequently quoted in public conversation, they turn out 
to be what Debra Spitulnik (1996) terms “society’s public words”, becoming the ways 
in which people talk about corruption and through which the issue of corruption is 
dispersed within Indonesian society to become public knowledge. Taking the issue of 
corruption as the essential elements of verses of poetry and pantun, they seem 
worthwhile for becoming modes of campaigning anti-corruption reforms, since both of 
them directly touch human emotions. The human emotions usually appear in the 
feelings of being deprived, divested and ill-treated as the state officials irresponsibly 
abuse public powers by committing corruption that clearly shows how the basic 
principles of justice are breached, whereas they are supposed to impose them. In this 
regard, the moral virtues of the poetry and the pantun’s verses rest in the call for those 
holding the state powers to have integrity and credibility so they morally deserve to 
assume public office. As poetry and pantun are rich with moral sentiment, poets have 
been able to find the language of poetry to criticize the misuse of public powers. It is 
argued that what Indonesian poets have done with public criticism via poetries and 
pantuns is best called the poetic resistance to corruption. They have a great deal of 
social resonance and political significance in anti-corruption activism. In this regard, it 
should be emphasized that popular songs, poems, and pantuns discussed here are part of 
196 
 
public discourse on (anti)-corruption. The Indonesian publics utilize these cultural 
measures to express their criticism against corruption and use them as a favourable 
means to stimulate people’s concerns about the grave problem of corruption. Thus, it 
can be argued that popular songs, poems, and pantuns are part of discursive expression 
of public campaigns against corruption. Here along with public criticism, symbolic 
resistance through iconographies also appears in the public space.  
 
6.4 Symbolic Resistance against Corruption: Murals, Caricatures, Cartoons 
 
 Campaigning through murals 
  
Apart from those poetic measures for fighting corruption, anti-corruption initiatives also 
appear in the form of murals, caricatures and cartoons. These iconic measures are part 
of public efforts to campaign against corruption. At the time of carrying out fieldwork 
for this thesis, I was commuting around Jakarta to meet my informants with whom I 
talked about corruption and anti-corruption activism. Along the long journey, my 
attention was drawn to a mural (see fugure 6.2) painted on a concrete pillar of 
overground in South Jakarta, depicting a pig with an inflated belly alongside three bags 
of money (Rp, rupiah) and scattered gold embezzled from the state’s treasury, as 
indicated by the written word korupsi (corruption). In addition, on top of the pillar was 
an instruction for the public: Lapor Dong! (Please kindly report to the authorities by 
dialing cell phone number 08121247247). The number given here is of course just 
imaginary, and the painter of this mural clearly wanted to criticize corruption in a 
satirical image that would seize the attention of the public. 
 Along with the mural of corruption, there are also other murals of paedophiles, 
drugs, and terrorism painted on the other sides of the same concrete pillar with various 
eerie facades of animals. In this mural, corruption is grouped into these three social 
problems that are commonly found within Indonesian society; and that is the main 
reason why corruption frequently appears in public talks and is dubbed a ‘social 
disease’, because all of them are categorized as ‘social viruses.’ As McLuhan says, “the 
medium is the message” (2002 [1994]), and these murals tell many things about what 
messages the artist wanted to convey to the public in relation to the events, stories and 
meanings behind those wall paintings. Here one could interpret that Indonesian people 
are severely burdened by these kinds of social diseases so that they have to face the very 
serious threats which could jeopardize their life.  
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Figure 6.2: An anti-corruption mural is painted on a concrete pillar of overground in South Jakarta 
Another mural below was found in another part of Jakarta illustrating how the KPK 
have to deal with serious difficulties and obstructions in carrying out their tasks in the 
fight against corruption, since many parties seemingly do not like what they have done 
so far. Thus, anti-corruption activists described such difficulties and obstructions faced 
by the KPK by drawing an eye-catching illustration (see figure 6.3). They drew a man 
(representing the state body) shackled with a very big weight so he could not catch a 
rat—a symbol for a corruptor.  
 
Fugure 6.3: An anti-corruption mural appears in public in the main road of Jakarta in support of the 
KPK. (Photo by Ari Saputra of detiknews.com) 
 
 In terms of its aesthetical aspect, the KPK mural may not be of interest to the 
public since it is a popular form of art. However, it should not be seen simply as an 
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artistic creation, but rather one should view this mural in a different way since it has a 
political dimension and reflects a strong public support of the KPK role in eradicating 
corruption. In the public rhetoric, the parliament, the police, the AGO, and even the 
president have declared their commitment to fighting corruption and working hand in 
hand with the KPK, as this anti-graft body is the bearer of a political mandate given by 
the law to take the lead in combating corruption in the country.  However, ironically the 
KPK faced very strong resistance from what social activists call politisi busuk (rotten 
politicians) who operate political systems, and from pejabat bobrok (decayed officials) 
who occupy public institutions. Instead of the KPK being supported (as the politicians 
and officials have reiterated many times), the anti-graft agency frequently had to deal 
with a series of organized political attacks, which were allegedly orchestrated by those 
shady officials, in the form of  the ‘criminalization’ of the KPK’s leaders. On this issue, 
Alexander Kenan, a prominent activist of ICW, shared his views: 
Politicians and state officials seemingly feel apprehensive about the KPK, since the public 
have seen this anti-graft agency showing its sharp teeth to jail corruptors, regardless of their 
social status and political position. Most people believe that, with the use of power they hold, 
corrupt officials arranged a plot to criminalize the KPK leaders with the aim of destabilizing 
the body. Fortunately, the public, including the mass media, fully supported them and 
sincerely stood by behind the agency. (Quoted from interview, 7 August 2009) 
  
 In fact Kenan’s comments to some degree represent those that very often 
appeared in public talks, and social activists claimed that evil powers set up a secret 
plan to paralyze the KPK in order to halt efforts to fight corruption so that the anti-graft 
institution would become powerless. Seemingly, after a great number of political attacks 
lasting several months in the year of 2009, the KPK became weak—some social 
activists even called it a macan ompong (toothless tiger)—so that their efforts to curb 
corruption declined and the spirit of fighting it decreased.  Reflecting on these 
circumstances, anti-corruption activists illustrated how those evil powers weakened the 
KPK through a symbolic painting in a public space so Indonesian people could easily 
grasp what the meaning and message of the mural for the public are. In the context of 
public narratives, this mural maintains a very strong political dimension, and its 
political message seems more important than its iconic art form and its aesthetical 
aspect, as Coote & Shelton point out: “…the ‘artness’ of the objects sometimes seems to 
be of secondary importance after their political or symbolic roles” (1994:3). In this 
sense, the mural is thus political and reflects a contest of political discourse taking place 
in social space. 
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 Campaigning through caricatures 
Alongside murals, caricatures have also become an important medium for expressing 
public criticism of corruption. The caricatures that will be presented are taken from 
Kompas, the most prominent national newspaper circulating across the country.
24
 The 
following caricatures are created by GM Sudharta and Thomdean of Kompas. They are 
considered one of the most prolific artists who have produced enormous caricatures 
with high quality in terms not only of the aesthetical aspects of their works, but also of 
the efficacy and accuracy in illustrating social events represented by caricatures they 
created. Much of corruption incidence often comes first in rumours. As rumours abound 
in public space, accusations of corruption among officials occupying public offices are 
widespread. And since accusations are sparked off in social space, officials usually lay 
the blame on each other, reflecting that they distrust one another. Observing a great deal 
of suspicion among state officials, Sudharta described such situations in his soft 
criticism in a caricature (see figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.4:  A caricature illustrates distrust among state officials (by Sudharta of Kompas) 
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 Kompas was established in June 1965 by P.K. Ojong and Jakob Oetama—the latter then became the 
first editor-in-chief. Since its inception, Kompas has become the leading newspaper that presents 
reporting, pieces and features with such high quality, becoming the most prestigious print media in the 
country. With the very popular tag line, Tanpa Kompas Terasa Belum Pas (without Kompas, things don’t 
seem right), Kompas claims that one would feel something was missing from the start of one's day 
without reading it first, as this newspaper brings updated information and current news for reference. 
Moreover, with the friendly motto, Amanat Hati Nurani Rakyat (the channel for the people’s conscience), 
Kompas declares that it aims to place people’s aspirations at the very central point and to voice them in a 
way that would enunciate public opinions and articulate public interests. As of 2010, according to a 
journalist, Ahmad Arif, week day sales of Kompas exceeded 530,000 copies, with more than 620,000 
copies for the Sunday edition, while its actual readership is currently estimated at more than three million 
people nationwide. Its readers vary in terms of social and economic classes, education, professional and 
cultural backgrounds; and they take Kompas as their primary reference for current national and 
international issues. Having gained a great deal of social and political impact, Kompas has become a 
powerful trend setter of print media in terms of voicing public criticism. Taking into account all those 
features, it is widely recognized as the most influential newspaper in Indonesia. 
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The caricature illustrates the KPK investigating corruption committed by officials, 
while the Police (POLRI), supported by the Attorney General’s Office (JAKSA) and the 
Parliament (DPR), counteract to investigate corruption within the KPK. It describes the 
bitter hostility between the KPK and those three state bodies, who then investigate each 
other to find out who is the most corrupt among themselves. The three public agencies 
all together point their fingers at the KPK, accusing it being a home for corruptors as 
some of its officials are also accused of taking bribes. It depicts a boy holding a flyer 
with the words: ‘Korupsi? No!!’, and asking Oom Pasikom (an imaginary character), 
with curiosity: ‘Lha…yang korupsi man…na?!’ (So, who is the corruptor then?!); and 
he, while staring at the boy, responds cryptically: ‘Ah! kura-kura dalam perahu ..!’ 
(This is a local saying meaning that someone already knows what the answer is, but he 
keeps questioning about something as if he doesn’t know). Through this caricature 
Sudharta tries to illustrate that public perception of the three state agencies—the Police, 
the AGO and the Parliament—is very bad; in the public’s view, they are considered as 
the most corrupt institutions. Here Sudharta rightly portrays what materializes in daily 
public narratives transforming them into artistic works so they become what Benedict 
Anderson calls ‘symbolic speech’ in the sense that those drawings speak for real events. 
They also represent ‘a mode of political communication’ (1990:155) which is a useful 
bridge between the public interest and political establishment. Indeed, artistic works 
themselves can be an effective instrument to describe the complexity of social and 
political relations. Placing the KPK as a common enemy for those three state bodies in a 
dynamic of power relations, Sudharta tries to translate into iconographic creations what 
emerges in public discourse and what the public senses, feels and thinks of live events. 
This approach of mass communication seems much more evocative, as “the live, 
ephemeral communication is transmuted into an illustration” (Anderson 1990:154), so 
that the public becomes interested in receiving the message and capturing what hides 
behind an image. 
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Figure 6.5: A caricature illustrates the Parliament as the House of Bribery (by Sudharta  
of Kompas) 
 
Another caricature (see figure 6.5) tells another story. As a political institution, 
the Parliament has, by law, a number of political rights including the prerogative of 
approving the budget as well as that of agreeing who will be appointed as state officials, 
such as the Chief of the Police, the Commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the 
Governor of Bank Indonesia, and others. Worse, with all these political entitlements 
rumours proliferate saying that many legislators often request what is called uang 
pelicin (literally ‘greasy money’, an idiom for bribes, kickbacks, and others) in return 
for such approval. With regard to such gossip, people often illustrate attitudes of these 
kinds in the satirical words of Razak Ismail, a businessman, who said: “MPs are not 
really representatives of the people; they are actually political brokers (calo politik) and 
budget/business scalpers (calo anggaran/proyek).”  Reflecting on these circumstances, 
GM Sudharta illustrated in a mocking caricature the use of Indonesian currency. It 
shows a drawing of the offices of the Parliament and the words Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat (the House of Representatives) changed into Dewan Persuapan Wakil Rakyat 
(the House of Bribery for MPs). This caricature depicts the Parliament not as the House 
where people are represented by MPs, but rather as a public office where illegal 
transactions (e.g. payoffs, buyoffs, kickbacks, etc.) between legislators and their 
counterparts take place officially.  
It is important to note that the discourse of corruption is usually connected with 
poverty. As discourses of corruption appear in public conversation along with that of 
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poverty, narratives of these subjects also materialize in caricature (see figure 6.6) as 
seen in Thomdean’s work published by Kompas. It depicts a very poor person who 
becomes a beggar, with a small basket labelled BLT (Bantuan Langsung Tunai—direct 
cash transfers), begging for some coins, while he holds a poster with the words: Harga-
Harga Naik! Yang Korup Jangan Ikut Naik! (Prices increase, but not the numbers of 
corrupt officials, please!). This caricature is a severe public criticism since it shows the 
contradiction between a deprived person living in very bad condition, in extreme 
poverty, on the one hand, and widespread corruption in public offices across the 
country, on the other hand. Sadly, the poor do not have any access to public resources 
so they inexorably beg for coins. Thomdean brought the issue of poverty into creative 
manipulation to attract people’s attention and touch public emotions; he rightly captured 
people's heart and affected public opinion. This is because a caricature—being an iconic 
form—is “never [a] purely passive condition; but it involves some degree of ideational 
and emotional engagement with the relations suggested by the subject” (Firth 1994:16). 
  
 
Figure 6.6: A caricature depicts a very poor person who becomes a beggar while corruption is 
pervasive (by Thomdean of Kompas) 
 
 The caricature on corruption vis-à-vis poverty is a symbolic discourse which 
seems ideological since it depicts the contradictory circumstances where those 
occupying public powers are not responsible for the people who are suffering from 
poverty. The moral message of the caricature rests on the tendency for the state agencies 
and those holding public powers to avoid the responsibility of bringing prosperity to 
people, as these are satirically portrayed in impoverished conditions.  Certainly, 
symbolic discourse entails multiple meanings and ideologies, as Burton has written: 
“Discourses are linked to ideologies and representations, and evolve ways of using 
203 
 
language—verbal, visual, or whatever code—about a subject, so as to produce particular 
meanings about that subject” (2005:53). In this respect, such representations by the 
Indonesian public media often report that state officials and politicians enrich 
themselves with abundant wealth, living in luxurious lifestyles, while they leave the 
poor with social and economic difficulties, living with hardship in daily life. Therefore, 
the public feelingly question about social justice, contrasting the fact that many state 
officials and politicians commit corruption.  
The main argument regarding these iconographic works refers to the idea of 
symbolic anthropology as advocated by, among others, Clifford Geertz (1973, 1974). 
As Morphy & Perkins have explained, “Symbolic anthropology was concerned equally 
with the semantic [or, in Geertz’s term: semiotic] aspects of symbolism and with the 
effectiveness of those symbols” (2006:10) in social contexts, and I argue that those 
murals and caricatures are forms of symbolic resistance against corruption created by 
Indonesian media which enliven popular narratives of (anti)-corruption. What 
materializes in public discourse in the form of the murals and caricatures presented 
above is part of social creativity in articulating public anger over corruption. With this 
regard, public criticism over corruption is delivered with the use of symbols as seen in 
those iconic images so that they can also be called symbolic expression (Geertz 1973, 
1974), since people try to express their opinions and views in the public sphere through 
those aesthetical creativities by “applying the principles of symbolic anthropology to 
media texts, treating these texts as symbolic expressions of the cultures that produced 
them” (Peterson 2003:53). Being used as a channel of political communication, these 
murals and caricatures appear as symbolic public criticism over social problems, since 
these creative drawings represent social events and contain messages and meanings 
which are transformed into public discourse. In fact, murals and caricatures are basically 
cultural products which must be seen as symbolic representation through which people 
express certain concepts and meanings connected with social life. All symbolic forms 
appearing in those murals and caricatures represent social facts and impose multiple 
meanings which need to be interpreted with reference to actual events. In this respect, 
symbols can be created in public life through a series of social interactions that reflect 
the reality with which people connect. The symbolic images of murals and caricatures 
are drawn from the social experiences that appear in the lives of human society in 
Indonesian contexts. They reflect what has happened in Indonesian society, that is, the 
struggle for promoting a better country with reduced corruption in the state institutions. 
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 Campaigning through cartoons 
As murals and caricatures play a part in public campaigns against corruption, so do 
cartoons, which are quite similar in the way they deliver social criticism on corruption. 
They are used to support social activism against corruption by manipulating images and 
words to express a very strong disapproval of and a deep dissatisfaction with far-
reaching illegal practices in the form of misuse of public powers which result in 
corruption. The following are cartoons published by Kompas that communicate how 
people talk about corruption by illustrating it in words and images combined. I will 
explain first what each cartoon actually refers to and then follow it with a discussion. 
Cartoon (figure 6.7) below illustrates a group of people joining an organization called 
P.K.K.K.I or Perhimpunan Koruptor Kelas Kakap Indonesia—Association of High Class 
Corruptors of Indonesia. They are cheering in celebration as they listen to the authorities 
saying that there is not enough evidence found in a legal enquiry to indicate a crime of 
corruption committed by the suspects; and therefore, further investigation is suspended 
and the case is closed. These corruptors celebrate their ‘victory’ in a vivacious party, 
yelling: hip hip huraa!!! … Horeee!!! ...Yess!! 
 
Figure 6.7: A cartoon illustrates a meeting among big corruptors (by an artist of Kompas) 
 
 
Cartoon (figure 6.8) below illustrates a social event of Tobat Nasional (National 
Repentance), left-right: (row 1) Oh my Lord, please forgive us for all of our sins and faults. 
Please don’t be in wrath at our beloved nation … Amen!; (row 2) please forgive us for 
having much moral decadence in our country, especially pervasive corruption … Amen!; 
(row 3) Oh my Lord, please open up the hearts of corruptors so they will willingly return 
the wealth and money they have embezzled from the state’s treasury ... Amen.    
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Figure 6.8: A cartoon illustrates an event of National Repentance (by an artist of Kompas) 
 
 The Indonesian media utilize these cartoons as a strategy and approach to 
articulate soft criticism over the pervasive corruption in the country. This strategy seems 
very effective in raising people's criticism of corruption. It is also effective in 
propagating the ideas of anti-corruption among the public, as the media are able to reach 
much broader audiences. Cartoons combine words and images so that they are useful 
for conveying a very strong message—but with soft method—for readers and viewers, 
since both present “a division of the human experience of representation, presentation, 
and symbols” (W.J.T Mitchell quoted in Varnum & Gibbons 2001:x). What makes 
cartoons different from other modes of representing social events is the active 
engagement between the readers and the objects. With the use of storytelling techniques 
and images, cartoons are a powerful cultural medium to convey political messages to 
the public. In this sense, cartoons, borrowing Gupta’s words, are a sort of “cultural texts 
that give [one] important clues to the political culture” (2006 [1995]:223) of society. It 
is clear that cartoons maintain a political dimension, since they reflect actual events 
within society. The media use them as a mode of political communication so that 
readers find it much easier to construe historical events and what is happening in public 
life. As Anderson puts it:  
Of all the forms of visual political communications, cartoons are perhaps the most readily 
decipherable. Since they frequently make use of written words, they seem closest to 
printed documents. As they are usually responses to historical events, they can, on one 
level at least, be mined for their “factual” contents. (Anderson 1990:156) 
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 Certainly thoughts, commentaries, annotations and ‘dialogues’ in cartoons 
should not be detached from historical events, since the former came into public 
discourse through mass media from the latter.  Nor should one conceive of cartoons just 
as a personal imaginary of those who created them, because the ideas presented in 
cartoons are the reflections of reality mirroring social events within Indonesian society. 
The things that have happened in social life are illustrated in cartoons and presented by 
the media as a storytelling shared by people and one which has proliferated into broader 
audiences in order to arouse public awareness and evoke collective consciences. Such 
an approach seems to be helpful particularly for those who have not had any access to 
sources of political affairs, as Anderson writes: “Cartoons [are] a way of creating 
collective consciences by people without access to bureaucratic or other 
institutionalized forms of political muscle” (1990:163). This is because cartoons can be 
utilized as “a mode of visual political communications” (Anderson 1990:156) and an 
instrument of political campaigns that may affect readers’ views and shape their 
opinion, resulting in how they respond to the issues being discussed in those cartoons.  
Likewise, corruption discourse cannot be separated from storytelling, which 
appears in various forms including cartoons. It is believed that there is no corruption 
narrative without storytelling, as Gupta (2005) rightly mentions that there would not be 
a good analysis of corruption without its stories revealed by the media with the use of 
cultural idioms, allusions, allegories and others; and cartoons become a medium for 
public narratives to represent corruption. Here, cartoons of corruption narratives may 
help one understand the nature of illegal practices taking place in the state government 
by comprehending the patterns of power relations among state actors involved in it. 
Illustrating how popular narratives of corruption appear in the Indonesian media 
through cartoon allegories, Heinzpeter Zonj writes: “In cartoon[s] … bureaucrats are 
often depicted publicly denouncing corruption while receiving a bribe behind their 
backs.  These satirical textual and pictorial genres unveil the hypocrisy of the ‘serious’ 
critique of corruption which nevertheless all newspapers engage in” (Znoj 2007:63). As 
a mode of public discourse, cartoons help one reconstruct complex power relations and 
the media can be seen as a source of power, becoming the tool of dominant forces in 
society. Certainly, a discourse cannot be detached from social contexts; it is always 
connected to society and history along with actual and specific events. It also indicates 
that there are always power relations and power contestations appearing in discourse, 
since “discourse encodes relations of difference, distinction, and power that are relevant 
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in a particular historical moment” (Peterson 2003:96). In this respect, stories and 
narratives of corruption in cartoons are obviously historical as they are derived from 
public awareness of social realities and political affairs in which people share some 
interest in common. Nonetheless, in the course of anti-corruption campaigns, it should 
be underscored here that murals, caricatures, and cartoons have political significance for 
stimulating public awareness of the perils of corruption. They are part of the discursive 
repertoire of campaigners in support of promoting public criticism against corruption. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
To conclude this chapter I would argue that Indonesian people are very enthusiastic in 
endorsing public efforts to curb corruption in the country. They are keen to take part in 
public campaigns to combat it and are eagerly involved in anti-corruption movements. 
Various modes of fighting corruption illustrate that the public are discontent with the 
illegal practices through the misuse of public power which result in corruption, 
briberies, and other forms of illicit deals, and these cannot be tolerated for any reason. 
Social activists benefit from the democracy system, as it allows the public media to play 
a dominant role both in the fight against corruption and in proliferating the ideas of anti-
corruption in Indonesian society. The centrality of the public media in voicing public 
criticism on corruption is evident; and the mass media, along with popular songs, 
poetries, pantuns, murals, cartoons, and caricatures function as what Joseph Errington 
(1998:282) calls an “interactional medium and ideological construct”, thus becoming 
the way of expressing people’s aspirations and public views, since the contents and 
messages brought by these measures impose ideological beliefs and meanings. In this 
context, media people are considered as the critically important groups who advocate 
the interest of the people and provide a wide space for public criticism. They are 
certainly central actors who play a crucial role in articulating public aspirations and 
building bridges between the public and the state establishment. What has been 
explained above clearly indicates that public criticism of corruption has been very 
significant, showing that the role of public culture in various forms is pivotal in the 
proliferation of corruption discourse in the public sphere. As a result, people have 
become much more aware of corruption as a grave problem in the country, which 
unquestionably creates serious difficulties for people’s lives. Interestingly, people 
utilize any sort of public media such as TV, newspapers and magazines, along with 
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other cultural media such as popular songs, poems, pantuns, murals, caricatures, and 
cartoons. As a part of public culture, all these cultural products play a significant role in 
criticizing corruption and are utilized as an effective means for enlivening public 
discourses on corruption. 
Like the study on religious activism against corruption, the research on the role 
of the media and popular art in combating corruption is the major contribution to 
scholarly work on the subject. Most studies of anti-corruption usually look into the role 
of social and political institutions, but this research examines public culture and popular 
art which, in the context of social activism against corruption, have not yet been 
considered by other scholars. This study shows how musicians, poets and popular artists 
are fervently interested in engaging with anti-corruption movements, as they receive 
wide attention from the Indonesian public. This research demonstrates that they are, 
along with other social groups, very supportive of fighting corruption. The general 
public indeed benefit from them greatly, so that corruption eradication achieves greater 
social and political effects on public life.   
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Concluding Remarks 
  
1. Modernity, Urban Politics, and the Occult 
As discussed throughout the chapters of the thesis, Indonesian politics shows how 
modernity brings together traditional values, modern political cultures, and secular 
rationality. Indonesian society experiences that politics can take place in different 
cultural and historical contexts as seen in the way in which political modernity appears 
in a mixture of mystical beliefs, the involvement of witchcraft and the occult, 
supernatural magic, and modern-secular democracy—something beyond the 
comprehension of ‘rationalist’ adherents. Indonesian politics has been transformed into 
a modern-secular democracy by juxtaposing traditionalism and modernism, as they are 
intermingled becoming the main features of Indonesian modernity. The process of 
political transformation in Indonesia can thus be described as, borrowing Arce & 
Long’s phrase (2000), the ‘mutational processes of change’ in which the society is still 
confined by ancient traditions and primordial values, while at the same time it orientates 
to the culture of modernity and is eager to adopt modern values and attitudes. These 
different cultural features are embedded within the social and political life of Indonesian 
society, reflecting that Indonesians are adaptive to the process of modernization while 
they still embrace traditional beliefs. Sundoro, an intellectual-cum-activist associated 
with the NU, assessed the current development of Indonesian politics saying: 
Although Indonesia has adopted modern democracy and applied democratic political 
system similar to Western democracies, cultural values, social basis, and state of mind of 
many Indonesian people (and especially the Javanese) are still ‘traditional’. And these 
traditional values and beliefs cannot be abruptly uprooted from their cosmological faith, 
since they have immensely become the cultural identity of the society. (Quoted from 
interview, 6 May 2009) 
 
Ethnographic materials brought into discussion in the thesis reveal how Indonesian 
modernity embodies paradoxical values and beliefs between myth, mystic, and magic—
all depicted as a form of enchantment and rationality, secular reasoning, and scientific 
objectivity—all described as a form of disenchantment. Interestingly they are mixed 
together and transformed into urban politics. Here, the notion of urban politics does not 
link politics merely to political organisations, bureaucratic institutions, administration of 
a state, democratic political management, and political governance, as one may find 
analyses of it in Judge, Stoker & Wolman’s Theories of Urban Politics (1995). But 
rather, it also relates politics to cultural ceremonies, sacred rituals, and spirit-possession 
210 
 
rituals—all becoming an integral part of the political processes that occur in urban areas 
and involve urban elites who maintain an imaginative obsession of state power. 
Moreover, urban politics is enlivened with various traditional beliefs and cultural values 
taking the shape of witchcraft narratives and occult rituals and is connected with the 
diverse structures of political power in which urban elites desire public positions. For 
this, all politico-socio-economic resources—political organisations, social institutions, 
principal actors, economic assets, the power of urban elites—are therefore exploited in 
support of the establishment of power structures and the domination of bureaucratic 
politics. In this sense, political modernity experienced by Indonesian society does not 
necessarily follow the experience of the Western nations in applying modern 
democracy. This is because different societies have their own historical experiences and 
there is some space for local interpretation with reference to local values and beliefs. 
Indonesian political modernity is thus culturally located based on its own customs and 
traditions; it is indeed “re-embedded in locally-situated practices” (Arce & Long 
2000:1). In other words, Indonesia creates its own trajectories of modernity by 
presenting a localised cultural representation through discourses and practices. This 
argument fits with what Jonathan Spencer has argued in Anthropology, Politics and the 
State (2007) explaining: 
[T]he paradoxes raised by the cultural interpretation of new, ‘modern,’ institutions and 
practices [suggest] that these institutions and practices never carry their own stories 
imminent within them, but in fact are understood in whatever idiom comes to hand. 
Political modernity is a diverse modernity, because different people bring different 
histories, values, and expectations to their encounters with its apparently invariant forms. 
But the political itself is not a static object mutely awaiting its local interpretation. 
(Spencer 2007:48) 
    
The system of modern democracy has been in place within Indonesian politics for 
thirteen years since the authoritarian New Order state ended in 1998. At the onset, 
public expectations were high and people were hoping that with the establishment of 
democracy good governance would materialize. At first, it was part of political reform 
to promote accountability and transparency of public governance in which there would 
be no room for corruption. Moreover, it would also hopefully lead the nation to 
modernity indicated by the supremacy of rationality in polity, but witchcraft and the 
occult still prevail in society enlivening the newly-established modern democracy. 
Indeed witchcraft and corruption have become critical issues as both play a part in the 
political processes and in the struggle over state power.  
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Narratives of witchcraft and corruption always emerge in the public sphere 
showing that the country’s politics is replete with stories of magic and illicit practice. In 
fact, magic and witchcraft have become part of local culture and entrenched in people’s 
beliefs referring to the cosmology of Indonesian society. They are often associated with 
a political contest to attain and maintain power. Such phenomena can be seen in the case 
of politicians who employed sorcery against their rivals during the 2009 general 
elections; the revelations of President Yudhoyono who claimed to have received sorcery 
attacks at the time of the presidential race; and the very bad experience of prosecutors 
and NGO activists who were assaulted by witchcraft by those who were alleged to be 
corrupt. Narratives of witchcraft often appear to be a way of understanding state power, 
how people come to power, and how they keep power on their hands, as Moore & 
Sanders have asserted: “State power is itself associated with witchcraft and occult 
power; […] and the link between state power and occult forces has been reinforced in 
the popular imagination” (2001:18). In short, magic and witchcraft are usually 
understood in the context of constructing state power in the sense that those who are 
deeply fascinated with power are often involved in magic and sorcery as both can be 
employed to reach their ambitions. Within this context, as part of the study of political 
anthropology, the main contribution of this research is to show that politics is not only 
related to political institutions, pressure groups (e.g. opposition parties, NGOs), interest 
groups (e.g. political parties, lobby groups), and members of social organizations and 
political agencies in power. This study tries to show that politics is also intimately 
connected to social imageries of and an obsessive fascination with power amongst 
politicians who use all possible means to justify their ends. It also shows how local 
cultures and cosmological beliefs are closely linked to the machinery of politics, and 
how these influence the behaviour of politicians. This research also shows how 
Indonesian politics is enlivened with magic and witchcraft narratives, possession rituals 
and mystical beliefs and practices, which invigorate the country’s political dynamics 
and heighten the intensity of power struggles.  
 
2. Corruption, Witchcraft, and Competing Moral Idioms      
In the course of anthropological studies (e.g. Geertz 1980; Cheater 1999; Kurtz 2001; 
Spencer 2007), power maintains symbolic meaning since it provides social prestige for 
those possessing it; and facilitates the accumulation of material wealth. As widely 
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discussed in chapter 1, the concept of power held by the Javanese seems to follow a 
culturalist approach.  This group conceives of power as being mystical, derived from the 
tradition of old Java. In this regard, the Javanese people perceive power as bequeathed 
from God or the gods, and as gained through a series of sacred rituals. They also 
perceive that it should be exercised for the benefit of all people, not for the interest of 
individuals occupying it. With power in his hands, the ruler should serve the people 
instead of exercising it for self-aggrandizement. In other words, those who hold public 
powers should not be implicated in corruption as it breaches moral principles. The 
power-holders should maintain the moral dimension of power by taking the 
responsibility to serve the people, instead of amassing material wealth through 
corruption for their own benefit.  
In this context, the anthropologist Jordan Smith’s views seem relevant when he 
raised concerns about the issues of witchcraft and corruption. He made an alternative 
interpretation illustrating that witchcraft with subsequent witchcraft accusations are 
used as a way that the public can criticize the prevalence of corruption, while social 
inequality is very extensive; and the state government that bears the responsibility to 
tackle this problem seems unable to deliver its job properly. Smith stated: “Stories of … 
magic practices form part of a dynamic cultural complex for which ‘witchcraft’ serves 
as a crude but widely organized label. It is important to understanding why stories of the 
occult—of witchcraft—are so prominent in the interpretations of corruption and 
inequality in contemporary society” (2007:143). Within this line of reasoning, what 
appears in public talk often takes the shape of corruption-causes-poverty narrative in 
which the public view the kind of contradictory phenomena as a problem of morality. 
They raise this issue into social space in order to instigate collective consciousness 
about the peril of corruption for public lives. This is because corruption undoubtedly 
breaches the principles of justice and equality. The Muslim cleric, Ahmad Bestari, 
mentioned during a Friday sermon: 
Many officials and politicians are really starving for money. They are greedy and deeply 
obsessed with becoming affluent persons. Entrapped by such obsession, they become a 
slave of money and material wealth; they are zealous worshipers of lavishness and 
luxurious life. And to meet such desires, they even commit corruption and implicate in 
illicit deal; without having a sense of sin, they embezzle state’s wealth. Such behaviour 
indeed breaches religious ethics. They don’t even have sympathy toward people who live 
with difficulty and suffering. (Quoted from a Friday sermon) 
The views of Bestari clearly represent the voice of morality in response to the problem 
of corruption. The similar views commonly materialize in public discourses expressing 
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how people are deeply frustrated with the fact that corruption has become far-reaching. 
Yet the moral ambiguity of corruption is clearly seen in political practice under the 
framework of patron client relationships, since state officials and politicians who hold 
public powers bear moral obligations to provide their subordinates, clients, cronies, 
friends, and families with access to economic opportunities, public resources, jobs, and 
the like. This behaviour, in the view of critics, is of course categorized as a sort of 
corruption, collusion, and nepotism. As a result, debates about the boundaries of 
acceptable corruption frequently manifest in social sphere which lead to public 
controversy, illustrating how behaviour that is considered as corrupt to some may not be 
corrupt to others. This clearly represents the ambivalence of corruption, as contradictory 
views emerge and contest one another. In spite of very strong public condemnation on 
this issue, some groups of Indonesian society benefit from corruption bound by 
networks of patronage. Here, it is interesting to note the revelation of Radius Prawiro, a 
Western-educated technocrat serving as an economic minister of the New Order state, 
as quoted by Robertson-Snape saying: “In a patriarchal society such as Indonesia, the 
government had become the ultimate patron. There was almost no element of the 
economy that was not directly touched by the government ... every point of economic 
interaction within the government was a new opportunity for patronage or corruption” 
(in Snape 1999:592). All these views clearly demonstrate how the issue of corruption 
raises competing moral idioms as people and elites conceive it differently and with 
ambiguity. 
 Similarly the moral ambiguity of witchcraft is seen in how people respond to 
this cultural phenomenon. They view sorcery as harmful, like corruption, so that both 
are the subject of condemnation. In this respect, sorcery and corruption are considered 
to have created some kind of negative effects on the lives of the people. Like corruption, 
witchcraft is a potential danger for human societies and a serious threat to the safety of 
the people’s lives as seen in the subjective experience of prosecutors and social activists 
who put their lives at risk because of sorcery employed against them when they were 
dealing with corruption investigations. In essence, both witchcraft and corruption could 
hurt and destroy human societies, while at the same time they are often used in the 
pursuit of power as well as to construe the world of politics and the ideas of power 
associated with them. At this point, it is important to contextualize witchcraft and 
corruption with the emergence of democracy. As illustrated, liberal democracy has led 
to fierce political competition and those who are strongly obsessed with political power 
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usually apply any necessary measure. In order to reach such ambitions, power-seekers 
are willing to take any means possible including the involvement of witchcraft and 
corruption. Both should not be seen in opposition to one another, but rather they are in 
support of the power struggle and political contest. These notions correspond to what 
Bubandt has observed in Indonesia’s North Molluca, saying: “As political competition 
has become localized, sorcery and corruption have become to be seen as similar rather 
than opposed political tools. The ambiguity arises because they are tools that are 
publicly condemned as illicit means of ensuring the failure of others, but which, in the 
North Malukan political imagination, are nevertheless seen as necessary for achieving 
political success” (Bubandt 2006:419). Indeed it has been very clear how sorcery and 
corruption have created conflicting moralities between good and bad or benign and 
malevolence among those who are involved. Whatever morality one wants to embrace 
entirely depends on the individual’s economic and political interests. That is why the 
ambivalence of witchcraft and sorcery is evident. 
  
3. Power, Witchcraft, and (Anti)-Corruption  
Popular narratives have shown that witchcraft and corruption are very often imbued 
with accusations. Accusations usually abound if someone suddenly becomes wealthy 
and powerful. Those who suddenly attain economic success and achieve political power 
are then accused of having been involved in corruption and witchcraft. It is 
understandable if there is a tendency that those who are implicated in corruption are 
often in search of material wealth, and those who are involved in corruption for 
accumulating wealth usually do so for the sake of more power. Yet power might also be 
obtained with the use of magic and witchcraft as those who are obsessed with it make 
use of any means necessary including the manipulation of the supernatural. In this 
regard, supernatural magic can be used as a political instrument for obtaining and 
possessing power as it materialized in the course of political contestation at the time of 
the 2009 general elections. Such political contest was enlivened with narratives of 
sorcery as supernatural magic and witchcraft maintain a political dimension; they are 
connected with social imaginaries of power amongst those who are deeply fascinated 
with it. In this sense, the similarity of sorcery and corruption is seen in both can be 
utilized as a political measure to destroy the credibility of politicians in the context of a 
power struggle. In fact, the issues of witchcraft and corruption vehemently instigate 
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much social controversy and they are very often used to undermine someone’s political 
opponents so that the others can take advantage of winning the political contest. As both 
witchcraft and corruption are highly secret and take place in clandestine settings, they 
are construed “to explain the success of some politicians and the misfortune of others, 
relying on a perception of political power as depending heavily on hidden practices and 
on concealing true intentions” (Turner 2007:125-6).           
 Often, narratives of witchcraft also appear to be connected with the idea and 
practice of anti-corruption in that it threatens people who engage with activism against 
corruption placing them in jeopardy since they might be the target of malevolent magic. 
The case of state prosecutors and NGO activists who received sorcery assaults clearly 
asserts that the dangers of magic and witchcraft for human beings are evident. As they 
were investigating corruption scandals, they were perturbed by magic and occult forces 
which seriously hurt them. On the dangers of witchcraft in relation to corruption 
eradication, Dian Megawangi, a senior state prosecutor, intoned:        
Combating corruption is highly perilous since we have to deal with the powerful that 
hides behind the scene. They are not reluctant to fight back with the use of both physical 
force and the occult power to hurt anyone who tries to investigate corruption and 
prosecute the alleged corrupt. For this, malevolent magic is not the exception to be 
employed and those who engage in anti-corruption practices very often deal with it. 
(Quoted from interview, 3 February 2009) 
 
Megawangi’s illustrations on the perils of sorcery in regard with the fight against 
corruption seem to suggest that there are double immoralities within witchcraft and 
corruption. Officials and politicians are first implicated in corruption and they then 
employ sorcery to attack those who investigate it. The iniquity of witchcraft and 
corruption is seen in the context of how they threaten human security and damage social 
order as both are harmful for private and public life. This is the centre of double 
immoralities of witchcraft and corruption as they are very destructive for both human 
societies and state powers. As witchcraft destroys the body of a person through magical 
means, so does corruption paralyzing state agencies so bureaucratic systems cannot 
function properly. Nonetheless, efforts to eradicate corruption are unlikely to decrease 
as anti-corruption activism is still strong despite plenty of threats and obstructions.  
Yet corruption remains a very serious problem in Indonesia and it has been so 
endemic for years within the power structures of the state government. As corruption 
has become so extensive, anti-corruption initiatives are relentlessly promoted by both 
state agencies (e.g. the KPK) and non-state bodies in which collective efforts have been 
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made to tackle the grave problem. With the use of a wide variety of approaches, various 
societal groups such as social and political activists, NGOs, religious organizations, 
civil society associations, and the media have taken part in public campaigns against 
corruption, whether in the form of social protest, public advocacy, or others. They are 
indeed essential in supporting anti-corruption movements that make people become 
more critical of corruption. In this context, democratic politics in the country has thrived 
vibrant environments for civil society and other social groups to be involved in 
promoting anti-corruption reforms.  
It is a great fortune that political configuration has altered considerably. As part 
of the democratization process, the public now enjoy freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press, so that Indonesians now freely criticize any kind of power abuse 
resulting in corruption and other forms of illicit deals. Unlike the authoritarian New 
Order that always concealed corruption incidents within state bodies, and public media 
especially the press were tightly restricted when reporting any sort of illegal practices to 
the public. Within the democratic system, everyone can speak out when criticizing 
corruption as it has become a very popular issue within society. People utilize public 
media such as TV channels, newspapers, and magazines to support public campaigns 
against corruption. As a result, anti-corruption initiatives have widely appeared in 
headlines of both print and electronic media invigorating the spirit of fighting 
corruption. As part of public cultures, those public media have played a significant role 
in criticizing corruption and are used as a very effective means of dispersing the public 
narrative of corruption. Yet despite the massive coverage of the media about corruption 
and regular editorials in support of anti-corruption programmes, the culture of 
corruption seems unchanged as it has become deeply ingrained within the state 
agencies.   
Furthermore, social and political activists, intellectuals, and academics very 
often work in collaboration with artists, poets, journalists, and others to set up cultural 
movements by mobilizing supporters from grassroots to battle corruption. Religious 
leaders and Muslim clerics associated with the Nahdhatul Ulama and the 
Muhammadiyah, as well as Islamic ideology-driven activists of the HTI also take part in 
anti-corruption movements either through Friday sermons or public rallies and 
campaigns in social space. The involvement of Muslim leaders and religious 
organizations in anti-corruption campaigns, especially the HTI seems to be part of 
‘counter-publics’ since they refer to Islamic values and teachings when criticising illicit 
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deals and illegal practices within public institutions. Having considered as counter-
public movement, social activism of these religious organizations is indeed ideological 
in the sense that Islamic values must be applied as the moral basis for social behaviours 
and public affairs; and therefore those occupying public powers should strictly follow 
religious ethics. Their activism in the battle against corruption can be viewed as an 
aspect of what Hirschkind (2006) calls ‘ethicopolitical project’. Such activism tries to 
connect “Islamic traditions of ethical discipline to practices of deliberation about the 
common good, the duties of Muslims in their status as national citizens, and the future 
of the greater Islamic community (the umma)” (p.8).  
In this respect, this thesis has shown that activism against corruption in 
Indonesia takes a variety of forms with different sources of origin both secular and 
religious, but they are collectively orchestrated in support of a wider movement against 
corruption. All these measures are new modes of criticizing corruption in the era of 
democracy which are completely different from those of the New Order state. In the 
period of the Soeharto government, censuring corruption in the public sphere was 
absolutely forbidden and it could be considered as a form not only of personal assault 
towards a state official, who must be saved from humiliation overtly, but also of 
political attack towards the legitimate government which might disrupt social stability. 
Let alone criticizing corruption cases openly through the public media, even the bravest 
critics did not have enough courage to talk about corruption although it took place in an 
off-the-record forum with a very limited audience such as seminars or informal 
discussions within academia. Considering that the political situations were not 
conducive for talking about corruption in public spaces, people preferred to do it in 
clandestine places and all the talks were concealed by using what James Scott (1990) 
calls the ‘hidden transcript.’ This is to illustrate that people were afraid of speaking up 
about social issues concerning their interests because of hegemony on public discourses 
by the power holders. The New Order ruler very often exercised power to produce ideas 
and beliefs in order to control information sources including the media, so there was no 
alternative way for public discourses because the popular voice was under domination 
by the regime. Instead of talking in the public arena, people then used the back-stage 
talk strategy indicating that there was another story usually in the form of folktales, 
fairy-stories, rumours, etc. behind the official story produced by those possessing 
power. Explaining the conceptual meaning of the term ‘hidden transcript’ Scott said that 
it is “to characterize discourse that takes place “off-stage,” beyond direct observation of 
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power holders. The hidden transcript is thus derivative in the sense that it consists of 
those off-stage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what 
appears in the public transcript” (1990:4-5).  
Public criticism, as a part of anti-corruption activism, is based on the spirit of 
civic morality and grasps passionate support from the grassroots, but unfortunately it 
faces very strong rejection from shady politicians as they form a cartel of politics in 
parliament and political parties. As political democracy paves the way for a multi-party 
system, politicians then create oligarchic politics which is considered as the main cause 
of institutionalized corruption. Both elite cartels and the political oligarchy are the 
major obstacles of anti-corruption movements so that NGO activists and civil society 
have to cope with many challenges and difficulties. Yet elite politicians and state 
officials always reiterate political rhetoric in support of anti-corruption reforms. 
Thinking of their anti-corruption rhetoric, people are aware that it would have little 
effect since they themselves benefit from and are involved in corruption for the sake of 
the power establishment. This is the reason why people become frustrated with the fact 
that corruption remains uncontrolled despite persistent efforts arranged by various 
groups of Indonesian society to combat it. However, they realize that eradicating 
corruption will take many years; anti-corruption activism is indeed an everlasting effort 
and Indonesians should prepare for an endless battle against the social disease. 
Nevertheless, Indonesian civil society and NGOs are determined to continue their 
struggles to fight corruption for the betterment of the nation despite a great deal of 
opposition which is mostly political. They believe that the new system of modern 
political democracy will be much more beneficial for all Indonesian people if corruption 
can be eradicated from state agencies and political institutions. [*] 
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Appendixes 
                                                 
i
 The meaning of the symbolism of Hastabrata teachings: 
 
 
Character one:  Earth 
Earth is generous, giving an equal opportunity to anyone to benefit from it and allows everyone 
to walk on it impartially. Earth is benevolent, becoming a good place for living existence, where 
everything is available for anyone. Like Earth, a leader should be munificent and willing to put 
aside his own interests and always dedicate himself to his people, serve them, and work for his 
country full of sincerity. 
 
Character two:  Sun 
Sun is the centre of energy for life which relentlessly produces sunbeams needed for people’s 
lives and living creatures, and radiates down on them equally without any exception. Like Sun, 
a leader should be able to enlighten the people, giving them good guidance to achieve common 
goals. As Sun moves within the world system in an orderly way, so a leader should follow the 
basic principles to guarantee social order for all the people. 
 
Character three: Moon 
Moon appears at night with light for the universe, offering tranquility, serenity, and harmony. 
Like Moon, a leader should bring light to the darkness and enlighten dark circumstances. He 
should be able to educate people by setting a good example in societal life, and befriend 
enemies and look after his friends. 
 
Character four: Star 
Stars enliven the sky at night, becoming a means for sailors to navigate the ocean. Like Star, a 
leader should perform as a role model for people in terms of manners, attitudes, and morality. 
He should have high ideals and make strong efforts to achieve the advancement of the nation, 
and be persistent, responsible, and trustworthy. 
 
Character five: Ocean 
Ocean is so wide, accommodating many things and never rejecting whatever things go over it. 
Like Ocean, a leader should have a ‘wide heart’, full of sincerity and patience. If he is criticised, 
he should not be emotional and effusive; yet neither should he become forgetful of his duty if he 
receives flattery and adulation. He should accommodate the aspirations of people in spite of 
their social and cultural differences. 
 
Character six: Wind 
Wind is unseen but it can be sensed; Wind can go anywhere into every single corner and space. 
Like Wind, a leader should be beneficial for people going anywhere across the country to 
understand public interest and absorb people’s aspiration. He should sincerely dedicate his 
energies and efforts for the sake of the people by promoting prosperity for them.    
 
Character seven: Sky 
Sky is huge and wide and can accommodate all things—mountains, valleys, forests, land, sea, 
and the whole world. Like Sky, a leader should have a great soul and wide heart to embrace 
everyone and treat them equally regardless of their social status and cultural background.  
 
Character eight: Fire 
Fire is very hot and can burn everything, but is needed for life. Like Fire, a leader should be 
decisive about anything, follow nothing but the truth, and be able to impose the law justly for 
everyone and dispense justice for all people. He should not be partial in keeping justice in the 
land and should lead the country solely for the betterment of the people’s lives. 
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ii
 The 113th sūrah al-Falaq (Arabic: سورة الفلق, the Daybreak), a brief 5-verse invocation, is 
usually recited by Muslims asking Allah Almighty for protection from the evil of satan. 
قل ف لا ةروس  
Sūrat al-Falaq [Verse 113] 
The Daybreak 
مي حر لا نمحر لا الله مس ب 
 
  و            ق ل ف لا   ر ب-١ 
   ق ل     م  ر   ن  م-٢ 
     و ا      ق  س    ر   ن  م  و-٣ 
      لا           ف  لا  ر   ن  م  و-٤ 
    س  ح ا       س  ح  ر   ن  م  و-٥ 
In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful  
 
 Say: “I seek refugee with Allah, the Lord of the daybreak; 
 “From the evil of what He has created; 
 “And from the evil of the darkening (night) as it comes with its darkness; (or the moon 
as it sets or goes away); 
 “And from the evil of those who practise witchcrafts when they blow in the knots; 
 “And from the evil of the envier when he envies.” 
  
iii
 The verse of the Qur’an mentions about shirk: “Verily, Allah Almighty forgives not that partners 
should be set up with Him (in the worship), but He forgives except that (anything else) to whom He 
pleases and whoever sets up rivals with Allah in worship, he has indeed invented a tremendous sin.” 
(Chapter 4, verse 48). 
 
 
 
iv
 Original version in Indonesian: 
 
Gosip Jalanan 
 – Slank 
 
Pernah kah lo denger mafia judi? 
Katanya banyak uang suap polisi 
Tentara jadi pengawal pribadi 
[…] 
Ada yang tau mafia peradilan? 
Tangan kanan hukum di kiri pidana 
Dikasih uang habis perkara 
Apa bener ada mafia pemilu? 
Entah gaptek apa manipulasi data 
Ujung-ujungnya beli suara rakyat 
Mau tau gak mafia di senayan? 
Kerjanya tukang buat peraturan 
Bikin UUD ujung-ujungnya duit 
[...] 
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v
 Original version in Indonesian: 
 
Kamu-kamu ... Kita-kata 
Franky Sahilatua 
 
Minyak mahal, bangsa bayar utang.  
Listrik mahal, bangsa bayar utang. 
Sekolah mahal, bangsa bayar utang.  
Berobat mahal, bangsa bayar utang. 
Bangsa yang utang, koruptor yang makan.  
Yang miskin tambah miskin, kita-kita-kita.  
Yang kaya tambah kaya, kamu-kamu-kamu. 
Kota banjir bangsa bayar utang.  
Desa terendam, bangsa bayar utang. 
Pengangguran tinggi, bangsa bayar utang.  
Busung lapar, bangsa bayar utang… 
 
 
 
 
vi
 Original version in Indonesian 
 
 
Jangan-jangan Saya Sendiri Juga Maling 
 – Taufiq Ismail 
 
[...] 
Lihatlah para maling itu kini mencuri secara berjamaah. 
Mereka bersaf-saf berdiri rapat, teratur berdisiplin dan betapa khusyuk. 
Begitu rapatnya mereka berdiri susah engkau menembusnya. 
Begitu sistematik prosedurnya tak mungkin engkau menyabotnya. 
Begitu khusyuknya, engkau kira mereka beribadah. 
Kemudian kita bertanya, mungkinkah ada malling yang istiqamah? 
Lihatlah jumlah mereka, berpuluh tahun lamanya, 
membentang dari depan sampai ke belakang, 
melimpah dari atas sampai ke bawah, 
tambah merambah panjang deretan saf jamaah. 
Jamaah ini lintas agama, lintas suku dan lintas jenis kelamin. 
Bagaimana melawan malling yang mencuri secara berjamaah? 
Bagaimana menangkap malling yang prosedur pencuriannya 
malah dilindungi dari atas sampai ke bawah? 
Dan yang melindungi mereka, ternyata, 
bagian juga dari yang pegang senjata dan yang memerintah. 
Bagaimana ini? 
[…] 
 
 
  
 
